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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
[American] lawyers are obliged, however, to yield to the 
current of public opinion, which is too strong for them to 
** 
resist . . . . 
This Article seeks to  answer two questions. First, to  what 
degree has public opinion influenced American constitutional 
interpretation, both on and off the Supreme Court, over the 
past two centuries? Second, how much weight, if any, should 
constitutional decision-makers give to  public opinion, however 
that protean concept is defined? The Article initially places 
these queries in a contemporary context by considering the 
extended discussion of public opinion in the Planned 
Parenthood v. Caseyl opinions of Justice Souter: Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia. Justice Souter partially relied on 
public opinion to not overrule the constitutional right to  an 
abortion created in Roe v. Wade: while Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia claimed in their Casey dissents 
, that public opinion was constitutionally irrelevant? 
** 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 279 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1835); see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: 
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 17 (1988) (illustrating the influence of 
public opinion on the Supreme Court); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
H o m w  HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that 
Courts cannot make "significant" changes without support from the electoral 
branches); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as 
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing that Justices follow 
election returns). But see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME 
COW AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992) (asserting 
that judicial doctrine has a major effed on outcomes and that the Justices are 
relatively insulated from policy and political considerations). Law and public 
opinion have a symbiotic relationship: "The history of the Anglo-Saxon race shows 
that, for ages past, the members of the legal profession have been powerful for 
good or evil to the government. They are, by the nature of their duties, the 
moulders of public sentiment on questions of government . . . ." Ex parte Garland, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 385-86 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (holding that Congress 
cannot condition pardon to keep attorney out of federal courts by requiring loyalty 
oath). 
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
2. The New York Times reported that Justice Souter was primarily 
responsible for the joint opinion. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling 
Court Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at Al. 
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
4. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-15. Contra id. at 2862-63, 2884. 
1040 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
The second part of the Article demonstrates that all three 
Justices' arguments in Casey have a viable intellectual 
tradition. This section presents a history of public opinion from 
before the American Revolution to the present. It considers the 
views of David Hume, James Madison, Chief Justice Marshall, 
Abraham Lincoln, Chief Justice Taney, and Justice Brandeis, 
along with a host of others. 
Part I11 argues that public opinion ought to influence many 
constitutional decisions. In other words, public opinion is a 
legitimate interpretive factor, comparable to text, history, 
structure, precedent, and policy. Indeed, some constitutional 
disputes, such as impeachment standards and proceedings, can 
only be effectively regulated by public opinion. 
Public opinion can either expand or contract important 
constitutional rights. The different fates of Supreme Court 
nominees Robert Bork and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are public 
reafl'iirmations of the Supreme Court's previous decisions 
outlawing gender discrimination; Bork characterized such 
non-originalist outcomes in the area of sexual equality as 
"illegitimate," or "unsatisfactory"5 while Ginsburg was a 
leading advocate of gender neutrality. On the other hand, the 
Court's unwillingness to combat segregated suburban schools in 
Milliken v. ~ r a d l e y ~  becomes somewhat defensible because of 
probable adverse public opinion, confirmed by the country's 
continued unwillingness to rectify the underlying problems. 
Other important cases appear different when viewed from this 
perspective. Justice Powell's condemnation in Regents of the 
University of California v. ~ a k k e '  of "quotas" while approving 
of "diversity" in affirmative action plans may not be very 
coherent or elegant, yet his opinion was arguably the "best" 
decision, simply because both political sides have adopted his 
rhetoric in the subsequent debate over this inherently 
contentious issue. 
Some constitutional rights, however, are so important that 
the Court should resist public opinion. For example, the "core" 
5.  ROBE^ H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 131, 330 (1990); see also Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, 
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 
1272 11.397 (1987) (regretfully concluding that gender discrimination decisions are 
illegitimate). 
6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
7. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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right in Brown v. Board of Education8 of all schoolchildren to  
be able to attend public schools that do not overtly, maliciously 
segregate on the basis of race, should be immune from current 
public influence. Such observations and arguments lead t o  a 
questioning, or at least to  a qualification, of the sigmficance of 
"principles," neutral or otherwise, in constitutional 
adjudication. 
For those who are theoretically inclined, the most 
important constitutional debate is not about any particular 
decision but involves the permissible modes of constitutional 
interpretat i~n.~ The Supreme Court, leading political 
thinkers,'' and major American politicians have frequently 
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
9. The history of constitutional adjudication extends beyond the rise and fall 
of certain cases and doctrines to the ebb and flow of particular forms of argument. 
See PHILIP B O B B ~ ,  C O N ~ I O N A L  FATE (1982). Precluding particular forms of 
rhetoric can constrain judicial discretion, determining the appropriate role for the 
unelected judiciary within the American constitutional system. Justices can claim to 
be more "neutral" and more consistent if they apply the same forms of reasoning 
in different contexts. 
Most importantly, the "legitimacy" of outcomes depends upon the choice of 
"legitimate" arguments. Raoul Berger's unyielding originalism calls into question 
the seminal school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, because the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers stated that public schools could remain 
segregated. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION F 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 118-19 (1977). Bork's originalism undermines 
Brown's cousin, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling applied the "equal 
protxtion component" of the Due Process Clause of the FiRh Amendment to 
outlaw school segregation in the District of Columbia, even though the Framers 
never intended such an interpretation. BORK, supra note 5, at 83, 305-06. John 
Hart Ely construed "representation reinforcement" to uphold the school 
desegregation cases but to question the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
10. The battle over the role of public opinion recurs in many doctrinal 
debates. For instance, Professor Blasi partially defended the prior restraint doctrine 
because "the dissemination of speech may create public opinion pressures that can 
exert a healthy influence on the formulation and application of first amendment 
standards." Vincent Blasi, Towards a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central 
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 50-51 (1981). 
As part of his critique of Blasi's multifaceted defense of the prior restraint 
doctrine, Professor Redish made three interrelated arguments: 
Initially, the public would not likely react to particular expression with 
sufficient fervor and unanimity that the reaction would be widely 
noticed . . . . [Elven if the public did express a coherent and favorable 
opinion, it is doubtful that that view would influence a court's substantive 
constitutional analysis. Moreover, it is arguable that it should not do so 
in any event because most would agree that generally a strong negative 
public reaction to  challenged expression should have no influence on 
judicial constitutional analysis. 
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First 
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and legitimately used several conceptions of "public opinion" in 
constitutional interpretation to create a complex constitutional 
tradition. The Supreme Court, in particular, has ranged from 
giving determinative weight to public opinion, conceptualized in 
a variety of ways, to excluding public opinion completely fiom 
constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, the Court has 
tended to refer expressly to public opinion when the issues 
were particularly contentious. 
Some historical context is needed before turning to the 
Casey decision. United States v. Hudson" is a classic, early 
example of the Court expressly applying public opinion to 
resolve a controversial issue, e.g., whether federal courts could 
recognize common law crimes. The issue had embroiled the 
country for some years before the Supreme Court resolved it. In 
1793, a lower federal court instructed the jury to find the 
defendant, Gideon Henfield, guilty for violating a presidential 
proclamation: "As a citizen of the United States, he was bound 
to act no part which could injure the nation . . . . This is the 
law of nations; not an ex post facto law, but a law that was in 
existence long before Gideon Henfield e~isted."'~ In 1798, 
Justice Chase, presiding over a lower court trial of a man 
charged with bribing a federal official, disagreed: "[Tlhe United 
States, as a federal government, have no common law; and, 
consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their courts, 
for offences merely at the common law."13 When the Supreme 
Court finally addressed the issue fourteen years later in United 
States v. Hudson, Justice Johnson adopted Justice Chase's 
conclusion that federal courts could not create common law 
crimes. The most startling aspect of Johnson's opinion was his 
reasoning: 
Although this question is brought up now for the first 
time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having 
been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for 
many years has this jurisdiction been asserted; and the 
general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of 
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 60 (1984). 
11. 11 US. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that government cannot bring 
common law seditious libel action against newspaper). 
12. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). 
13. United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 
16,766). For a brief discussion of Justice Chase's jurisprudence, see STEPHEN B. 
PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING 98-99 (1991). 
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opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition." 
Justice Johnson's argument has enormous contemporary 
implications. For example, what if Justice Blackmun had based 
the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade completely on the views of 
the American Medical A~sociation?'~ Further, imagine the 
Supreme Court stating in Bowers v. Hardwick that 
homosexuals have a fmdamental right to engage in their form 
of consensual sexuality solely because public opinion resolved 
the issue.16 
11. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY: A MODERN EXAMPLE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT'S RELATIONSHIP TO PUBLIC OPINION 
Although it is chilling to imagine the existing Court basing 
its decisions only on public opinion, Supreme Court Justices 
have considered public opinion's relevance to constitutional 
adjudication. The most dramatic recent example is Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey." In Casey, five Justices refused to 
reverse the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, "the right of the 
woman to  choose to have an abortion before viability and to  
obtain it without undue interference from the State."18 
Premising the joint opinionlg on such relatively 
immutable concepts as the rule of law, stare decisis and a 
judicial commitment t o  p r i n ~ i p l e ~ ~  Justice Souter claimed 
that the people would only support judicial opinions that 
transcend immediate public opinion: 
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims 
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises 
with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing 
on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. 
Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally 
principled decisions under circumstances in which their 
principled character is  sufficiently plausible to be accepted by 
14. 11 US. (7 Cranch) at 32. 
15. 410 US.  113, 141-44 (1973). 
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexuality is not protected by 
substantive due process). 
17. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
18. Id. at 2804. 
19. Justices 07Connor, Souter, and Kennedy signed the joint opinion. 
20. 112 S. Ct. at 2804. 
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the Nati~n.~'  
According to Justice Souter, the Court must resist partisan 
opposition to its most important, "watershed" opinions: "So to 
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling 
reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the 
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question."22 In other 
words, Roe v. Wade gained additional authority by being so 
fiercely criticized, so divisive. 
Justice Souter had a t  least two conceptions of the public 
who create public opinion: First, the partisans who evaluate an 
opinion for its compatibility with their beliefs, and second, the 
broader spectrum of society that believes in the "rule of law." 
The Supreme Court needs the latter group's sympathy, support, 
and respect to preserve the overall legitimacy of the legal 
system: "Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making 
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their 
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by 
the Nation."23 One reason Justice Souter affirmed Roe was to 
create the judicial constancy that would sustain overall public 
respect for the Supreme Court, even if many members of the 
public disliked the Court's protecting women's right to an  
abortion under the Constitution. 
In his concurrenceldissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed 
with what he viewed to be the plurality's position: "[Tlhis 
Court's duty [is] to ignore the public criticism and protest that 
may arise as a result of a decision. Few would quarrel with this 
~ t a t e m e n t . " ~  Chief Justice Rehnquist then criticized the 
plurality for actually incorporating public opinion into its 
analysis by being less willing to overrule "intensely divisive" 
cases.25 According to Chief Just ice  Rehnquist ,  t h e  
"divisiveness" standard leads to the paradox of retaining 
unpopular decisions until opposition fades away. Furthermore, 
the standard forces the Court to make judgments beyond the 
Court's capacity: "[Blecause the Court's duty is to ignore public 
opinion and criticism on issues that come before it, its 
members are in perhaps the worst position to judge whether a 
decision divides the Nation deeply enough to justify such 
21. Id. at 2814. 
22. Id. at 2815. 
23. Id. at 2814 (emphasis added). 
24. Id. at 2862 (Rehnquist, CJ.,  concurring & dissenting). 
25. Id. at 2862-63. 
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uncommon prote~tion."~~ Although he claimed to agree with 
Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist created a far more 
severe form of isolationism. The Court is obligated to ignore not 
only public opinion but also "criticism." If one takes Chief 
Justice Rehnquist literally, there is one less reason for 
commentators to critique constitutional law.27 
Justice Souter's opinion did not preclude public opinion 
from consideration even as much as Chief Justice Rehnquist 
had claimed. In addition to justifying his commitment to 
principle and stare decisis because such steadfastness 
preserves public respect for the Court, Justice Souter consulted 
public opinion to determine which "watershed" constitutional 
cases should have been overruled. For example, he concluded 
that the Lochner substantive due process cases2$ were 
properly reversed because it "seemed unmistakable to most 
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom 
protected . . . rested on fundamentally false factual 
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated 
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."zg He also 
quoted Professor Charles Black's explanation of why Brown 
legitimately overruled Plessy v. Ferguson: "[Tlhat question has 
meaning and can find an answer only on the ground of history 
and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the times 
and places aforesaid."30 Justice Souter believed that the Court 
could only keep favorable public opinion by ignoring divisive 
26. Id. at 2863 (emphasis added). 
27. "Most lobbying by the executive and legislative branches is open and 
direct; lobbying by the judiciary is filtered through legal briefs, professional 
meetings, and law review articles." FISHER, supra note **, at 19; see also Fowler 
V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 
1172 (1953); Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court and Legal Writing: Leaned 
Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-Antitrust Lobby?, 48 GEO. L.J. 105 (1959). 
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 
U.S. 525 (1923); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (signalling 
demise of Lochner era). 
29. 112 S. Ct. at 2812 (emphasis added). 
30. 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE LJ .  421, 427 (1960) (emphasis added)). Turning to 
Roe, Justice Souter used the ambiguous collective pronoun "our," apparently 
extending his perspective beyond the Court (which frequently refers to itself as 
'We"): "Neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our 
understanding of it has changed." 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (emphasis added). Justice 
Souter used the same ambiguous pronoun later in the same opinion to reject cases 
refusing to extend equal protection to women: "These views, of course, are no 
longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the 
Constitution." Id. at 2831 (emphasis added). 
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public reactions, at least until the public is no longer divisive 
and has developed a broad consensus that the Court has erred. 
Justice Souter's opinion is simultaneously a plea for continuity 
and a justification of perpetual constitutional reinterpretation. 
The Supreme Court can transform "watershed" constitutional 
caselaw whenever it discerns a widespread belief that a 
particular form of constitutional jurisprudence is ineffective or 
otherwise inappr~priate.~' In the absence of such a finding, 
the Court should accept the status quo, applying the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Justice Souter is assuming that the Court can 
make some very fine-tuned determinations. Not only must the 
Court determine when an issue is so contentious that the Court 
should remain committed to the status quo, but the Court must 
also ascertain when public opinion has so shifted that the 
Court should overrule its prior decisions. This task will be 
difficult because some disagreement will linger over virtually 
every important constitutional issue. In other words, when do 
judicial critics constitute a merely divisive dissent instead of an 
overwhelming majority that should pressure the Court to  
change watershed decisions? 
Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence/dissent that the 
furious controversy over abortion placed the Court in a 
hopeless position in terms of public opinion. Many would see 
the Court as capitulating to  public pressure no matter what it 
did: 
m e  have been subjected to what the Court calls "political 
pressure" by both sides of this issue . . . . Maybe today's 
decision not to overrule Roe will be seen as buckling to 
pressure from that direction. Instead of engaging in the 
hopeless task of predicting public perception-a job not for 
lawyers but for political campaign managers-the Justices 
should do what is legally right . . . ." 
Justice Scalia also bemoaned the public's impression that their 
reactions mattered: "How upsetting it is, that so many of our 
citizens . . . think that we Justices should properly take into 
account their views, as though we were engaged not in 
31. Justice Souter's argument suggests that the Court periodically transforms 
its doctrine, modes of argument, and outcomes. Similar notions have arisen in legal 
academia. Professor Ackerman has delineated three major constitutional "moments": 
the Founding, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the New Deal. See BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
32. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting & concurring). 
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ascertaining an  objective law but in determining some kind of 
social consensus."33 
This Article's review of Supreme Court cases that consider 
public opinion, usually in express terms, concludes that Justice 
Souter's candid, flexible incorporation of public opinion into 
constitutional interpretation better reflects constitutional 
history. His approach is more consistent with the weight of 
Supreme Court precedent, as seen in Hudson, than with the 
more monastic views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia. But Justice Souter is only employing the historically 
dominant view; the Rehnquist-Scalia position retains its own 
constitutional pedigree. Putting the issue more generally, the 
Court traditionally has vacillated between the two competing 
sub-traditions expressed in  Casey. 
This Article does not argue solely from tradition. If 
consequentialism is to play any role in constitutional 
adjudication:* the Court should consider public reactions, 
including enforcement difficulties, whenever it formulates 
doctrine. As Justice Frankfurter explained, constitutional 
adjudication is "applied po l i t i~ s . "~~  Frankfurter gave a 
compelling example to support his precept: "The simple truth of 
the matter is that decisions of the Court denying or sanctioning 
the exercise of federal power, as in the first child labor case, 
largely involve a judgment about practical matters, and not at 
all any esoteric knowledge of the Const i t~t ion."~~ Judicial 
politics must include a strain of realpolitik, an awareness of 
the limitations of both power and principle. The Court must not 
only evaluate previous public responses and the existing state 
of public opinion, but it must also anticipate how the public 
will react to its decisions.37 
33. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia expressed similar sentiments in his 
concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 535 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (1989) (permitting extensive state regulation of abortion). 
34. See BENJAMIN . CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-03 
(192 1). 
35. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and t h  Judiciary, SURVEY (1913), 
reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 
1913-1918, at  3, 6 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1962). 
36. Felix Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Od. 1, 1924 (unsigned editorial), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 35, at  
10, 12. The Court's political role made judges "less than ever technical expounders 
of technical provisions of the Constitution. They are arbiters of the economic and 
social life of vast regions and at times of the whole country." FELIX FRANKFURTER 
& JAMES M.LANDIS, BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 173 (1928); see also 
Louis Fisher, Social Influences on Constitutional Law, 15 J. POL. SCI. 7 (1986). 
37. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL CTION 
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Self-consciously including public opinion in constitutional 
adjudication also raises basic jurisprudential questions. For 
instance, how can Justice Souter's sensitivity to public opinion 
coexist with his commitment to "prin~iple"?~~ Does public 
opinion have any place in Justice Scalia's search for "objective 
lawYsg Does the concept of public opinion destroy the 
distinction between law and politics, thereby undermining "the 
rule of law," the autonomy, and even the legitimacy of the 
HOW can the constitutionalization of public opinion 
be reconciled with the anti-majoritarian impulse that questions 
yet justifies judicial review?" Are there methodological and 
ideological differences in  trying to ascertain public opinion 
instead of "tradition" and "history"'? On a more disturbing level, 
is law nothing more than an elaborate fiction, a fluid collection 
of metaphors which creates a secular "religion" that we lawyers 
hope the public will find a ~ c e p t a b l e ? ~ ~  This Article cannot 
pretend to resolve such difficult questions; it seeks to make 
those queries more immediate. At the very least, conscious 
incorporation of public opinion into constitutional doctrine 
makes constitutional law even more indeterminate. 
111. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION FR M THE GLORIOUS 
~ V O L U T I O N  THROUGH THE LOCHNER ERA 
This section presents a brief intellectual history describing 
the evolution of the concept of public opinion from an 
eighteenth-century, aristocratic sense of honor among 
gentlemen to the triumph of the masses by the early 
(1990) (discussing how politicians anticipate public opinion as well as respond to 
it .) 
38. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at  2814. 
39. Id. at  2884 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
40. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONST~UTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); see also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989) (describing relationship of Supreme Court 
opinions to public opinion polls). 
41. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The 
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAW. L. REV. 43 (1989). Justice Chase held that the 
federal courts were "the only proper and competent authority to decide whether 
any statute made by congress . . . is contrary to . . . the federal constitution." 
United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709). 
42. I wish to thank Professors Lazarus and Gellman for helping me develop 
this question. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONS~P~PTIONAL F JTH (1988); Sanford 
Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123. 
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nineteenth century. Different conceptions of public opinion 
influenced leading pre-Revolutionary cases, political theorists, 
the Constitutional ratification debates, the political conflict 
between the Republicans and the Federalists, decisions by the 
early judiciary, and the controversy over slavery. Most of these 
conceptions of public opinion have continued to influence 
constitutional thought." 
A. The Influence of Public Opinion on Law and 
Constitutional Thought Prior to the Constitution 
America's cult of celebrity is merely a perversion of the 
Enlightenment. When the Enlightenment thinkers rejected the 
centrality of a Christian God, including the accoutrements of 
Heaven and Hell,"' they had to find substitutes to bind and 
regulate society. Part of the Enlightenment's as 
expressed by Adam Smith, was the Principle of Approbation: 
"For approbation, heightened by wonder and surprise, consti- 
tutes the sentiment which is properly called admiration, and of 
which applause is the natural e~pression?~ Human beings, 
governed by passion;' naturally seek the approval of other 
humans. They will perform great feats, benefitting all, to  gain 
that recognition. Smith asked: "For to  what purpose is all the 
toil and bustle of this world? What is the end of avarice and 
ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and 
pre-eminence?" His answer was a cheerful echo of 
Ecclesiasticism: 
43. Because public opinion is such a protean concept, it has played numerous 
roles. Dicey wrote that the concept of public opinion was an "abstraction." A.V. 
DICEY, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND 414 (2d ed. 1914). 
44. According to Professor Horwitz, the Lmhner formalists hoped "neutral," 
"autonomous" law would serve as a secular replacement to keep society cohesive. 
MORTON J. H o R ~ ,  THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 193 
(Oxford University Press 1992) (1977) [hereinafter H o ~ w n ,  TRANSFORMATION 1870- 
19601. 
45. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers offered other social bind- 
ing agents. Adam Smith recommended the market. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO 
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 
Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). Most Enlightenment theorists preferred some form of 
"republicanism," premised upon virtue instead of force. GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104-05 (1992) (discussing evolution of 
beliefs about necessary societal adhesives). 
46. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 64 (1759). 
47. Id. at 75; see &o ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSON- 
AUTY (1984). 
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To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with 
sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advan- 
tages. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which 
interests us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of 
our being the object of attention and approbation." 
David Hume had another, more global definition of public 
opinion: "It may farther be said, that, though men be much 
governed by interest; yet even interest itself, and all human 
affairs, are entirely governed by opinion.'*g On the Continent, 
Rousseau also concluded that opinion was the foundation of 
government: 
What means has the government for shaping behavior? I 
respond: public opinion. If our conduct arises from our own 
feelings in solitude, it arises from the opinion of others in 
society . . . . Not reason, not virtue, not the laws can oversway 
public opinion unless one finds a means of changing the lat- 
ter.50 
For Rousseau, public opinion was a country's actual constitu- 
tion51 
Public opinion was not just a device of abstract political 
theory. At several critical moments, public opinion dramatically 
influenced the Anglo-American legal system. The protracted 
48. SMITH, supra note 46, at 113. 
49. DAVID HUME, Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute 
Monarchy or to a Republic, in 1 ESSAYS MORAL, POLPTICAL, AND LITERARY 51 (Eu- 
gene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (1777) [hereinafter HUME, British Govern- 
ment]; see DAVID HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in 1 ESSAYS MORAL, 
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, supra, at 32-36 [hereinafter HUME, First Principles]. 
There is a narrower version of Hume's argument; the Court always considers pub- 
lic opinion in constitutional cases because elected officials' actions invariably reflect 
public opinion, at least to some degree. See DICEY, supra note 43, at 3. Professor 
Dicey was not the first to make such an argument. In 1795, a lawyer told the 
United States Supreme Court that "[tlhe Conftitution of Pennfylvania explicitly 
provides, that no law fhall be paffed prohibiting emigration from the ftate. This 
is, perhaps, the only direct expreffion of the public fentiment on the fubjed." 
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 142 (1795) (argument of counsel). Indeed, 
the entire constitutional text expresses a form of public opinion. The public that 
ratified the constitutional text approved of certain words with generally understood 
meanings. Part of the Court's job is to determine what the public meant when it 
ratified a particular text. 
50. GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTEN- 
MENT 99-100 (1984) (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUS EAU, L ~ R E  A M. D'ALEMBERT 
176, 178 (Paris, Gamier-Flammarion 1967)). 
51. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 272 (Charles M. 
Sherover trans., 1984) (1762). 
10371 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1051 
struggle between Lord Coke and King James over the relation- 
ships between the Common Law and the Royal Prerogative 
took place during "heightened popular feeling" caused by the 
High Commission's imprisoning the lawyer Nicholas Fuller for 
contempt. Fuller had been battling that Royal Court's efforts to 
force individuals to  make an oath particular religious 
beliefs." In the absence of such angry public sentiments, Coke 
might have been unable to defy the King. 
The trial of the Seven Bishops in 1688 was a turning point 
in the almost century-long conflict between the Stuart Kings 
and the coalition of Parliament and Common Law lawyers. 
King James, a Catholic, demanded that seven Anglican Church 
Bishops read in their churches a declaration endorsing James' 
annulment of existing religious laws. When the Bishops re- 
fused, James charged them with seditious libel. Three judges 
rejected the Bishops' defense of truth. But Judge Powell in- 
structed the jury that James had acted illegally by annulling 
existing laws and that truth was a defense.53 Lord MacAulay 
graphically described the public reaction to  the jury's acquittal, 
showing how emotional public opinion can be: 'Yet were the 
acclamations less strange than the weeping. For the feelings of 
men had been wound up to  such a point that at length the 
stern English nature, so little used to  outward signs of emotion, 
gave way, and thousands sobbed aloud for very joy."54 
The Seven Bishops case affected the American trial of 
Peter Zenger for seditious libel in 1735. Zenger printed some 
pieces, written by James Alexander, which criticized the Royal 
Governor's administration. Like the Bishops, Zenger pled truth 
as a defense. The prosecution claimed truth was either irrele- 
vant or an aggravating factor, undermining and insulting the 
government. The prosecutor argued that three of the four judg- 
es in the Seven Bishops case had rejected the defense of truth. 
Zenger's attorney replied: 
If it be objected that the opinions of the other three judges 
were against [Powell], I answer that the censures the judg- 
ments of these men have undergone, and the approbation 
Justice Powell's opinion, his judgment and conduct upon that 
trial has met with, and the honor he gained to himself for 
52. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE  ONE 298-306 (1957). 
53. 2 LORD THOMAS B. MACAULAY, MACAULAY'S HIS~ORY OF ENGLAND 165-67 
(1954). 
54. Id. at 168. 
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daring to speak truth at such a time, upon such an occasion, 
and in the reign of such a King, is more than sufficient in my 
humble opinion, to warrant our insisting on his judgment as a 
fill authority to our purpose." 
Zenger's lawyer was arguing that the public reaction, both 
immediate and historical, legitimated Powell's sole opinion in 
the Seven Bishops case, giving it fill authority, not just rele- 
vance. Zenger's judges, however, agreed with the prosecution. 
They defined and applied "opinion" to achieve the opposite 
result; the government should not be libelled even by true 
statements because the people need to have "a good opinion of 
it."56 The jury ignored the judges and acquitted Zenger, trig- 
gering another enthusiastic public outb~rst.~' Public opinion 
55. JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN 
PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 72 (Stanley N. Katz 
ed., 2d ed., Belnap Press 1972) (1736). 
56. Id. at 100 (quoting The Queen v. Tutchin, 14 Howell's State Trials 1096, 
l l28 (1704)). 
57. Id. at 101. It should not be surprising that the Zenger and Seven Bishops 
case juries, which had the power to decide questions of law and fact, reflected 
existing public opinion. Juries are an essential part of the Anglo-American legal 
tradition because they manifest community mores. Just as juries sometimes ignore 
existing law, they also protect the "rule of law" from corrupt rulers. Jbhn Adams 
explained that the jury placed inside the "executive branch of the constitution . . . 
a mixture of popular power." Because of this popular power, "the subject is guard- 
ed in the execution of the laws." BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74 (1967) (quoting Letter from John Adams). Members 
of the Court have acknowledged the link between juries and general -public opinion: 
"[T]welve people are more likely than one person to reflect public sentiment." 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 487 n.33 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring & dis- 
senting) (holding that judge can implement death penalty despite jury recommenda- 
tion of mercy) (quoting Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
63 (1980)). 
The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debate over the appropriate role of the 
jury, a struggle the jury system largely lost as the judges gradually excluded juries 
from deciding "questions of law," revolved around the appropriate role of public 
opinion in all types of adjudication. In the early 1800s, former Speaker of the 
House Theodore Sedgwick recommended major changes in the judge-jury relation- 
ship: "In all instances where trial by jury has been practiced, and a separation of 
the law from the fact has taken place, there have been expedition, certainty, sys- 
tem and their consequences, general approbation." RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFER- 
SONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 190 (1971). Justice 
Gray also defended the expanded judicial role: "Wlhen the law is settled by a 
court, there is more certainty than when done by a jury, it will be better known 
and more respected in public opinion." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 164 
(1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (holding uncontradicted confession by one defendant of 
joint commission of murder admissible against both defendants). Nevertheless, con- 
tinuing jury powers, particularly nullification, demonstrate that public opinion plays 
a major role within the legal system at the critical point of determining criminal 
10371 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1053 
had made truth a defense. 
According to the historian Gordon Wood, it was no coinci- 
dence that the Zenger case was a libel case involving rulers' 
reputations. Unique social and economic forces made the Amer- 
ican elite protective of their reputations. Bereft of formal ranks 
of nobility, the elite needed their reputation to gain respect and 
financial credit.58 As a result, libel litigation flourished in the 
eighteenth century. For instance, a boat manufacturer sued 
someone for saying his boats were "only fit to drown people."5g 
The American aristocracy7s quest for fame extended beyond 
personal benefit. Douglas Adair asserted in his famous essay, 
Fame and the Founding Fathers, that the leaders of the Revo- 
lutionary generation, many of whom also framed the Constitu- 
tion, were obsessed with public opinion and with their place in 
history.60 Furthermore, the pursuit of glory was virtuous. 
Gordon Wood has described that impulse in almost existential 
terms: "Everyone had appetites and interests, but only the 
restless-minded, the great-souled, the extraordinary few, had 
ambition-that overflowing desire to excel, to  have precedence, 
and to  achieve fame.'s1 
There were obvious political ramifications in courting pub- 
lic opinion. The Revolutionary leaders knew their revolution 
succeeded because public opinion supported it; the Revolution- 
aries had put into practice Hume's truism about the primacy of . 
opinion.62 John Adams reminisced about this point in a letter 
to  Jefferson: 
What do we mean by the Revolution? The war? That was no 
part of the Revolution; it was only an effect and consequence 
of it. The Revolution was in the minds of the people, and this 
was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years 
before a drop of blood was shed at Le~ ington .~  
Jefferson would hardly disagree. His plea in the Declaration of 
guilt or innocence. At the very least, the Anglo-American legal system has never 
been completely premised on objectivity and principle. 
58. WOOD, supra note 45, at 38-39. 
59. Id. at 60. 
60. DOUGLAS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1974). 
61. WOOD, supra note 45, at 39. Wood believed that the gentlemen of the 
period were far more concerned about their reputation among their peers than 
with general public opinion. Id. at 40-41. 
62. See HUME, British Government, supra note 49. 
63. BAILYN, supra note 57, at 1 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas 
Jefferson, 1815). 
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Independence was addressed to  the court of world opinion and 
thus to history: 'When in the Course of human Events, it be- 
comes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands 
which have connected them with another. . . a decent Respect 
to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare 
the causes which impel them to the Separat i~n. '~~ 
The pre-Revolutionary American public did not express its 
views solely through juries or eloquent revolutionary docu- 
ments and pamphlets. The lower classes, generally excluded 
from power, periodically took to  the streets as semi-organized 
mobs. They undermined the Royal  government:^ capacity to 
enforce general writs of assistance by gathering near buildings 
that were to be searched, thereby intimidating the officia.ld5 
Thomas Hutchinson, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, felt 
the sting of public opinion most directly: a mob burned his 
house down in 1765. Hutchinson's Humean analysis should 
come as little surprise: "Authority is in the populace . . . no law 
can be carried into execution against their mind.'*6 
Not all eighteenth-century thinkers found even cold com- 
fort in the dominance of opinion. David Hume agreed with 
Rousseau that public opinion determined governmental rule 
but did not find that linkage reassuring: 
As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors 
have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on 
opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim 
extends to the most despotic and most military governments, 
as well as to the most free and most popular." 
Opinion was simply a fearsome, inevitable force: "Government 
is instituted in order to restrain the fury and injustice of the 
people, and being always founded on opinion, not on force, it is 
dangerous to weaken, by speculation, the reverence that the 
multitude owe to authority.*8 Hurne would not have been sur- 
64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis add- 
ed). The original feminist manifesto made a similar plea to "the opinions of man- 
kind." THE SENECA FALLS DECLARATION F SENTIMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS para. 1 
(1848). 
65. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 446 (1978). 
66. BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON 73-74 (1974) 
(quoting Letter from Thomas Hutchison to Samuel Jackson). 
67. HUME, First Principles, supra note 49, at 32-33, quoted in DICEY, supra 
note 43, at  2. Hume noted that governments gained strength over time from opin- 
ion. Hum,  First Principles, supra note 49, at 33. 
68. 5 DAVID Hum, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 59 (1863). Nor would Hume have 
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prised by the blunt reductionism of the despot Napoleon: "Opin- 
ion rules e~erything."~ 
Many other pre-revolutionary leaders in America expressed 
views similar to  Hume's, revealing the self-conscious hierarchi- 
cal gap between the untitled American aristocracy and their 
fellow Americans." Early in his career, John Adams referred 
to the masses as the "common Herd of Mankind."71 In 1774, 
John Randolph applied a class analysis to public opinion, 
bluntly stating: "When I mention the public, . . . I mean to  
include only the rational part of it. The ignorant vulgar are as 
unfit to judge of the modes, as they are unable to  manage the 
reins of g~vernment."'~ Randolph elevated the "reasoned" 
views of the elite above the ignorant reactions of the passionate 
masses. 
Soon after the American Revolution, the Federalists, who 
agreed with Hume's concerns about the masses, battled 
Jefferson's Republicans over the significance of public opinion, 
both in and out of court. Hume's conservatism infuriated men 
like Jeffers~n,?~ who saw public opinion as presumptively lib- 
erating. Perhaps Hume provoked Jefferson by striking a nerve. 
Jefferson wrote in 1788, twelve years after the Declaration of 
Independence, that "'tavern keepers, Valets de place, and 
postilions'-were 'the hackneyed rascals of every country' who 
quarrelled with Samuel Johnson's basing aesthetic evaluations upon public opinion: 
"A man . . . who writes a book, thinks himself wiser or wittier than the rest of 
mankind; he supposes that he can instruct or amuse them, and the publick to 
whom he appeals, must, after all, be the judges of his pretensions." JAMES 
BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 142 (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1980) 
(1791). Boswell prefaced that quote by noting: "[Johnson] had, indeed, upon all 
occasions, a great deference for the general opinion." Id. 
69. DICEY, supra note 43, at 1 n.1. 
70. The debate over whose public opinion should count more, the views of the 
elite or the masses, continues to this day. For a powerful defense of democracy 
against elitist "guardianships," see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 
52-79 (1989). See also Stephen L. Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of 
Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U. L. REV. 71 (1986); Symposium, Constitutional Ad- 
judication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); Eugene V. 
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAW. L. REV. 193 (1952); 
J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society--Judicial 
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL . REV. 1 (1968). 
71. WOOD, supra note 45, at 27. 
72. Gordon S. Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolu- 
tion, in MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 102, 106-07 (Robert 
H. Horwitz ed., 2d ed. 1979) (quoting JOHN RANDOLPH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE 
PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA (1774)). 
73. GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 32 (1981). 
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'must never be considered when we calculate the national char- 
acter.' "74 Jefferson preferred the small agrarian farmer, made 
independent by his land, to  the urban masses. Nor was Jef- 
ferson sanguine about human nature. He warned the Virginia 
assembly about governmental corruption because "human na- 
ture is the same on every side of the Atlantic."" Thomas 
Paine had a purer Republican perspective, linking public opin- 
ion, free speech, and democracy together through a plain writ- 
ing style designed to reach a broad a~dience.?~ In his libel de- 
fense of Thomas Paine for writing Rights of Man, Erskine ex- 
plained the basic linkage between free speech, public opinion, 
and a just government: "[Tlhe liberty of opinion keeps govern- 
ments themselves in due subjection to their duties."?? 
In conclusion, the concept of "opinion" already had several 
meanings before the drafting and ratification of the Constitu- 
tion. Political theorists like Hume and Rousseau used "opinion" 
as an all-embracing concept that described the temper of the 
times, the Zeitgeist.?' During the colonial period, most of the 
American elite saw mass public opinion as an irrational threat 
to individual liberties, while revolutionaries like Erskine and 
Thomas Paine believed only public opinion could prevent tyran- 
ny.7g Finally, early leaders sometimes conceived of public 
opinion as the verdict of their gentlemen peers and at other 
times as the will of the entire people. Public opinion analysis 
therefore has at least two factors: (1) a determination of whose 
opinions are to  be consulted, and (2) an assessment of what 
weight, if any, should be given to those views. 
74. WOOD, supra note 45, at 28 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Hints to Ameri- 
cans Traveling in Europe (June 19, 1788), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 268 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1954-55)). 
75. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William 
Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1955) (1787). 
76. Wood, supra note 72, at 110-11. 
77. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 186 n.4 (1979) ( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) 
(holding that plaintiff who is public figure can depose news media about state of 
mind to  determine malice); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-48 
(1936) (enjoining state tax on newspapers) (quoting 1 LORD ERSKINE, SPEECHES OF 
LORD ERSKINE 525 (James L. High ed., 1876); see also LLOYD P. STRYKER, FOR THE 
DEFENSE 210-16 (1947). 
78. To the degree that Hume is right, this article involves everything and 
therefore has difficulty proving anything. Supreme Court Justices are no more 
capable of escaping the Zeitgeist than the rest of us. 
79. See ERSKINE, supra note 77, at 525. 
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B. Public Opinion and the Framing of the Constitution 
The Framers of the Constitution viewed public opinion as a 
constitutional lodestone. In The Federalist, Madison accepted 
Hume's truism as a premise: "If it be true that all governments 
rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in 
each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, 
depend much on the number which he supposes to have enter- 
tained the same opinion."'' However, Madison did not fear 
public opinion as much as Hume, creating two definitions of 
public opinion: public passion and public reason:' Madison 
wrote: "[Ilt is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to  
control and regulate the government. The passions ought to  be 
controlled and regulated by the government."82 Because he 
had to obtain votes from average citizens as well as from his 
fellow gentlemen, Madison broke down the prevailing distinc- 
tion, as expressed by Randolph, between the elite and the rest 
of the citizenry. One can assume Madison believed that consti- 
tutional supporters, of whatever class, exercised "public rea- 
son." "Reason" and "passion" were no longer class differences 
but rather political distinctions. 
Because the Constitution had to be ratified by the voters, 
the Framers were intensely aware of and deferential to public 
opinion. They believed the voters could legitimate the new 
Constitution by consent. Madison wrote in The Federalists3 
that the constitutional delegates "must have borne in mind 
that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to  be submit- 
ted to the people themselves, . . . its approbation [would] blot 
out antecedent errors and irreg~larities."~~ Some of the irregu- 
80. THE FEDERALTST No. 49, a t  314-15 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of 
The Federalist Papers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 65 (discussing how the Supreme Court 
has utilized The Federalist in opinions). 
81. Madison's distinction between reason and passion permitted the people, 
who tend toward passion, to create a legitimate, viable government if they followed 
reason: "Elsswhere [Madison] has said that only the people have the right to es- 
tablish a constitutional system; but now he adds a qualifier-the people can do i t  
only when they are calm." WILLS, supra note 73, at 28. 
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 80, a t  317. 
83. The Federalist Papers were carehlly written to influence an uncertain 
electorate. George Washington feared he would undermine the drive for national- 
ization by making any public endorsements; many would believe he was seeking 
despotic power. WILLS, supra note 50, a t  102-03. 
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 80, a t  253 (James Madison). Madison 
later made the same argument about the Bill of Rights. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 
772 (1796) (Statement of James Madison), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
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larities were rather significant. The Constitution's ratification 
process ignored the existing Article of Confederation's require- 
ment that all states consent to any amendments.85 The Con- 
stitutional convention drafted a document that vastly exceeded 
what many people understood the primary purpose of the con- 
vention to be: facilitating commercial relations? Thus the 
electorate had to decide the most important constitutional 
question of all: Should the new Constitution be ratzed in ex- 
press violation of the terms of the existing constitution? In 
other words, the crucial jurisprudential concept of consent is a 
form of public opinion. 
During the ratification campaign, the Framers had cause 
to fear existing public opinion. Many Framers were strong 
nationalists, even monarchists, but they lived in a land still 
fearful of any concentration of power. Their rebuttals to the 
Anti-Federalists' claims that the new Constitution would con- 
centrate governmental power were less than candid: "The Fed- 
eralists met this attack by an attempt to  deny the accusation in 
public, but it seems from their private statements that they 
intended t o  create a national government, although prevailing 
opinion obliged them to compromise."' The Federalists may 
have designed the Constitution to  rein in democratic senti- 
ments, but the ratification campaign required them to glorify 
those sentiments: 'We, sir, idolize dernocra~y."~~ 
Neither Madison nor Hamilton thought any written Consti- 
tution could ever transcend public opinion. For Hamilton, pub- 
lic opinion limited all written constitutions. Concerning free- 
dom of the press he said, "mhatever fine declarations may be 
inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether de- 
pend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people 
and of the go~ernrnent."~~ Madison concurred: "The restric- 
MADISON 263 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). For a discussion of the multiple levels of 
constitutional thought and power, see John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Essay: 
Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992). 
85. Forrest McDonald, however, argued that the Constitution actually com- 
plied with the Articles' requirements. FORRESI' MCDONALD, NOWS ORDO SECLORUM 
279 (1985). 
86. Id. at 98. 
87. JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 121 (1961). 
88. Wood, supra note 72, at 116 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 222 (reprint 
ed. Ayer Co. 1987) (1888) (statement of John Marshall)). 
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 80, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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tions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded 
when opposed to the decided sense of the public."90 Madison 
demonstrated how public opinion could transform the constitu- 
tional debate over federalism: 
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people 
should in future become more partial to the federal than to 
the State governments, the change can only result from such 
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as  
will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that 
case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving 
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be 
most due.g1 
The Framers of the Constitution designed the new govern- 
ment both to incorporate and regulate public opinion. Most 
tellingly, the people only directly elected the members of the 
House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the will of the people 
permeated the entire Constitution: "Even the judges, with all 
other officers of the Union will, as in the several States, be the 
choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselve~."~~ 
90. WILLS, supra note 50, at 101. Gordon Wood concluded that Madison still 
considered "public opinion" to  be the views of the elite as late as 1791. Wood, 
supra note 72, at 125-26. Yet in The Federalist, Madison distinguished public rea- 
son from public passion on the merits, not on class grounds. THE FEDEWIST No. 
49, supra note 80, at 317 (James Madison). 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supm note 80, at 296 (James Madison). 
Madison's comment could help resolve notably volatile Tenth Amendment doctrine. 
In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation of state minimum wages in 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 US. 183 (1968). Wirtz was overruled by National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (prohibiting congressional regulation of state 
workers' wages and hours), which in turn was overruled nine years later in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991), and New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 
(1992), the Court undermined Garciu by distinguishing it; Garcia had been largely 
decided on the ground that the Court could not develop any meaningful Tenth 
Amendment distinctions, 469 U.S. at 537-39. 
The Tenth Amendment activists have their own tradition. The Slaughter-Home 
Cases admitted the Court would have problems determining the appropriate doc- 
trine: "[Tlhis line has never been very well defined in public opinion," 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US. (16 Wall.) 36, 81-82 (1872) (upholding monopoly 
over slaughter-house locations). That lack of clarity did not preclude judicial re- 
view. Id. at 82; see also Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 560 (1879) (con- 
cluding that a state can move a county seat). 
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 80, at 242 (James Madison). Even 
relatively arcane issues were analyzed in terms of public opinion. Pinckney ex- 
plained in 1800 why congressional immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
was so important: 
[Olur Constitution supposes no man . . . to be infallible, but considers 
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Yet some of the choices were designed to be quite remote. Ham- 
ilton argued that independent Courts would protect the Consti- 
tution from temporary majorities reflecting prevailing public 
opinion: "This independence of the judges is equally requisite to 
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from . . . 
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious 
oppressions of the minor party in the comrn~ni ty .~~  Lifetim-e 
judicial tenure was essential: "[Otherwise] there would be too 
great a disposition to  consult popularity to  just* a reliance 
, 
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the 
 law^.'"^ Madison saw another advantage in giving the judi- 
ciary the primary interpretive role: "The danger of disturbing 
the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public 
passions is a still more serious objection against a frequent 
reference of constitutional questions to  the decision of the 
whole society.'*5 
C. The Battle Between the Republicans and the Federalists 
1. The Republicans'glorification of public opinion 
The electoral process, which now determined leadership, 
them all as mere men, and subject to all the passions, and frailties, and 
crimes, that men generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of 
such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legislature for 
their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to public opin- 
ion. 
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 71 (1800). 
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 80, at  469 (Alexander Hamilton). 
94. Id. at 471. 
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 80, at  315 (James Madison). During 
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the First Congress considered requiring legisla- 
tors to comply with the instructions of their electorate. Hartley successfully made 
the Burkean argument that representatives should implement their own views 
instead of being pure proxies for the majority will: T h e  right of instructing is lia- 
ble to great abuses; it will generally be exercised in times of popular commo- 
tion . . . . I have known, Sir, so many evils arise from adopting the popular opin- 
ion of the moment, that I hope this government will be guarded against such an 
influence." CREATING THE BIU OF RIGHTS 154 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). 
Jefferson defended the First Amendment because it served public opinion so 
well: "[Tlhe only security of all, is in a free press. The force of public opinion can- 
not be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces 
must be submitted to. It is necessary, to keep the waters pure." Letter from Thom- 
as Jefferson to Marquis de la Fayette (Nov. 4, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
- JEFFERSON 325 (HA. Washington ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871) 
[hereinafter Jefferson to Fayette], quoted in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 143 n.3 (1943) (alteration in original) (holding that municipality cannot forbid 
person to knock on doors to distribute religious handbills). 
10371 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1061 
undermined the pre-Revolutionary cohesion among the Ameri- 
can elite. All political leaders needed votes in a country which 
was turning increasingly democratic after the Rev~lution.'~ 
Whatever other virtues democracy may have, it forces elites to 
compete among themselves to gain the populace's favor. 
Madison's distinction between reason and passion as good 
and bad public opinion faded during the ensuing political con- 
flict between the Federalists and the Republicans." The de- 
bate between the Federalists and the Republicans became ever 
more polarized, more Manichean. The partisan split between 
the Republicans and Federalists revived class-based definitions 
of public opinion. Jefferson summed up the Republican perspec- 
tive when he explained why he preferred the nature of the 
people to the elite: "[Tlhe sickly, weakly, timid man, fears the 
people, and is a Tory by nature. The healthy, strong and bold, 
cherishes them, is formed a Whig by nature.'*8 Jefferson 
trusted an educated populace more than any elite: '%very gov- 
ernment degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people 
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe deposi- 
tories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be 
improved to a certain degree.'*' This general perspective ex- 
plains Jefferson's wariness of judicial review: 
You seem . . . to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters 
of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine 
indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of 
an oligarchy. . . . [Tlheir power the more dangerous as they 
are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other h c -  
tionaries are, to the elective 
During the debate over the Alien and Sedition Act, Madi- 
son, who had become a Republican, opposed the Federalist Act, 
96. See WOOD, supm note 45; Wood, supra note 72. 
97. See WOOD, supm note 45, at 363-64. For a thorough review of these polit- 
ical conflicts, see STANLEY E m s  & ERIC MCK~~RICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: 
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 (1993). 
98. See WOOD, supra note 44, at 97 (quoting Jefferson to Fayette, supra note 
95). 
99. JEFFERSON, supra note 75, reprinted in 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
254 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1894). 
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 15 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276, 277-78 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. 
Bergh eds., 1903). Lincoln read this letter during the Lincoln-Douglas debates. See 
Wallace Mendelson, Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 
U. CHI. L. REV. 327 (1962). 
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which heavily regulated political speech. Madison defended the 
Virginia Resolutions' opposition to the Act as 
expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect 
than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflec- 
tion. The expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are 
carried into immediate effect by force. The former may lead to 
a change in the legislative expression of the general 
will-possibly, to a change in the opinion of the judiciary; the 
latter enforces the general will, whilst that will and that 
opinion continue unchanged.lO' 
According to Madison, "judicial will," and the force that  accom- 
panies it, should never be completely insulated and isolated 
from public opinion. Madison explicitly appealed to the public 
for constitutional change: "The truth declared in the resolution 
being established, the expediency of making the declaration at 
the present day may safely be left to the temperate consider- 
ation and candid judgment of the American To Re- 
publicans, opinion was everything. Thomas Cooper defiantly 
accepted the costs of punishment for violating the Seditious 
Libel Act: "I depend principally on my practice: that practice, 
imprisonment will annihilate. Be it so. I have been accustomed 
to make sacrifices to opinion, and I can make this."'" 
Many early politicians believed that the public could rein- 
terpret the Constitution. Jefferson relied on a "just" public 
opinion to validate the Louisiana purchase, an exercise of pres- 
idential power exceeding Jefferson's prior strict construction- 
ism: 
An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one 
who should do it in cases for which they were not intended, 
and which involved the most important consequences. The 
line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the 
good officer is bound to draw it a t  his own peril, and throw 
himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his 
motives.'04 
101. JAMES  ADIS IS ON, REPORT ON THE RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 341, 402 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
102. Id. at 352. 
103. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 643 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 
14,865). 
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 99, at 279, 281-82. 
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Whether the politicians and leaders wanted it or  not, the 
Constitution quickly evolved into something far different than 
the Framers intended. Henry Jones Ford contended that the 
rapid evolution of the Electoral College was "conclusive evi- 
dence of the ability of public opinion to m o w  the actual con- 
stitution to any extent required."105 Nor were such changes 
limited to  such basic structural questions as who should elect 
the President. For example, the demand for paper money over- 
whelmed the Framers' constitutional protections of specie.lo6 
John Pope used public opinion to legitimate the National 
Bank.lo7 When President Andrew Jackson vetoed a subse- 
quent National Bank bill, he also acknowledged public opinion: 
"Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should 
not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power 
except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can 
be considered as well settled."lo8 Note that President Jackson 
invoked a corporate form of opinion: the views of the people 
and the States. 
The country's rapid changes precipitated a change in con- 
sciousness among the elite. They worried less about personal 
reputation and more about the overall will of the country. By 
1817, "public opinion" had reached a novel status in American 
consciousness; it was "that invisible guardian of honour-that 
eagle-eyed spy on human actions-that inexorable judge of men 
and manners-that arbiter, whom tears cannot appease, nor 
105. HENRY J. FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS 161 
(1914). 
106. WOOD, supra note 45, at 316. 
107. Pope defended the Bank by distinguishing between "individual liberty" 
and "measures of general policy": 
My reflections and practical observations on the Government incline me to 
the opinion that, with regard to measures of general policy not assailing 
individual liberty or right or the independence of any State, there is not 
that danger to be apprehended from a liberal construction of the Consti- 
tution which gentlemen seem to imagine. So long as the Government is 
in the hands of the people, measures affecting the whole nation, if op- 
pressive or inconvenient, will be resisted and corrected by the public 
feeling and opinion. 
22 ANNALS OF CONG. 233-34 (1811) (Statement of Sen. John Pope). Eight years 
later, Chief Justice Marshall would uphold the Bank partially because the Bank 
did not affect "the great principles of Liberty," but only "the respective powers" of 
the federal government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 
(1819). 
108. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 1139, 1144-45 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
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ingenuity soften-and from whose terrible decisions there is no 
appeal."'Og Public opinion was the "vital principle" that per- 
meated America; it undermined all fixed principles, whether 
they be rules of law or social mores.l1° Tocqueville described 
how public opinion and the rule of law uniquely reinforced each 
other in American culture: "Those who wish to attack the laws 
must consequently either change the opinion of the nation or 
trample upon its decision.""' 
2. The Federalist perspective 
The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, 
summed up the Federalists' pessimistic view of the average 
citizen, a premise that justified putting an enlightened elite at  
the helm of power: "The mass of men . . . are neither wise nor 
good, and virtue, like the other resources of a country, can only 
be drawn to a point and exerted by strong circumstances ably 
managed, or a strong government ably administered."" Led 
by Hamilton, the Federalists did not rely on republican virtue 
or approbation; they preferred the monarchial device of corrup- 
tion, of providing financial benefits to those who supported the 
g~vernment."~ They also benefited from a post-Revolutionary. 
disillusionment: "[Tlhe people do not exhibit the virtue that is 
necessary t o  support a republican government."'" According 
to one Federalist critic, North Carolina laws were "[tlhe vilest 
collection of trash ever framed by a legislative body."l15 
The Federalists quickly turned to the judiciary for protec- 
tion of property,ll6 contract,"' and the new written 
109. Wood, supra note 72, at 125 (quoting WILLIAM CRAFTS, JR., AN ORATION 
ON THE INFLUENCE OF MORAL CAUSES ON NATIONAL CHARACTER, DELIVERED BE- 
FORE THE PHI BETA KAPPA SoC!D3IY, ON THEIR ANNIVERSARY 5-6 (Aug. 28, 1817)). 
110. Id. 
111. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 247. 
112. WOOD, supra note 45, at 261 (quoting John Jay, quoted in DAVID H .  
FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERALIST PARTY IN 
THE ERA OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 7 (1965)). 
113. WOOD, supra note 45, at 263 (quoting HELEN R. PINRNEY, CHRIS~OPHER 
GORE: FEDERALIST OF M A S S A C H U S ~ ,  1758-1827, at 37 (1969)). Hamilton's 'cor- 
ruption" may have included more illegal techniques. His chief aide went to jail. 
GORE VIDAL, Political Melodmnurs, in UNITED STATES; ESSAYS 1952-1992, at 854 
(1993). 
114. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN 
AMERICAN HISI'ORY 132 (2d. ed. 1989). 
115. Id. 
116. Common law property rights also yielded to changes in technology and 
ideology: "The onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent, have its way. 
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constitutions. Chancellor James Kent lectured on the need for 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative actions: "If 
public opinion was in every case to  be presumed correct and 
competent to be trusted, it is evident, there would have been no 
need of original and fundamental limitations. But sad experi- 
ence has sufficiently taught mankind, that opinion is not an 
infallible standard of ~afety.""~ Chancellor Kent, however, 
did not give the judiciary the last word: 
[Ilf the ljudiciaryl should a t  any time be prevailed upon to 
substitute arbitrary will, to the exercise of a rational Judg- 
ment, as  i t  is possible it may do even in the ordinary course 
of judicial proceeding, it is not left like [the legislature], to the 
mere controul of public opinion. The Judges may be brought 
before the tribunal of the Legislature, and tried, condemned, 
and removed from office.'lg 
It should not be surprising that lawyers and courts led the 
Federalists' efforts to constrain the democratic will. Tocqueville 
described the inherently consenrative, aristocratic instincts of 
most lawyers: 
Men who have made a special study of the laws derive 
from this occupation certain habits of order, a taste for for- 
malities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular con- 
nection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to 
the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the 
multitude. 120 
The law is made for the times, and will be made or modified by them." Lexington 
& O.R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289, 309 (1839) (holding railroad not a 
nuisance). 
117. In his famous argument in Dartmouth College opposing a state law which 
modified an existing contract with Dartmouth College, Daniel Webster said: 
It will be a dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold these insti- 
tutions subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations 
of political opinions. If the franchise may be at any time taken away, or 
impaired, the property also may be taken away, or its use perverted. 
TIIKOTHY FARRAR, REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 
AGAINS~ WILLIAM H. WOODWARD 282-83 (Boston, 1819). 
118. JAMES KENT, INTRODUCTORY LECTURE TO A COURSE OF LAW LECTURES 
(1794), reprinted in 2 AMEFUCAN POLITICAL W ~ G  DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 
1760-1805, at 936, 942 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). Kent 
equated public opinion with faction: The Courts of Justice which are organized 
with peculiar advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence of Faction." 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
119. Id. at 943-44. 
120. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 273. A.V. Dicey observed that judges are 
older than most of their contemporaries. Their views will usually lag two gener- 
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The Federalists heeded Hamilton's vision in The Federalist 
Papers, interpreting constitutions and protecting vested proper- 
ty rights under "fixed principles" of law that only could be di- 
vined and applied by judges.lzl 
The Federalists did not completely exclude public opinion 
from their constitutional analysis. During the debate over the 
Alien and Sedition Act, the Federalist Massachusetts legisla- 
ture endorsed the Act, using the rhetoric of public opinion: 
"[The freedom of the press] is a security for the rational use 
and not the abuse of the press-of which courts of law, the 
juries, and people will judge; this right is not infringed but con- 
firmed and established by the late act of Congress."lP The 
Resolution's conclusion was equally forceful, linking constitu- 
tional interpretation to  public opinion manifested through elec- 
tion returns: "The legislature M b e r  declare, that in the fore- 
going sentiments they have expressed the general opinion of 
their constituents, who have not only acquiesced without com- 
plaint in those particular measures of the Federal Government, 
but have given their explicit approbation by reelecting those 
men who voted for the adoption of them? 
How could Republicans and Federalists applaud and ap- 
peal to  public opinion during conflicts like the Alien and Sedi- 
tion Act? To a large degree, they had two different audiences in 
mind: The Republicans referred to the "whole people" while the 
Federalists tended to value the views of "those philosophical 
and patriotic citizens who cultivate their reason."124 The Re- 
publicans had the last word. They won the next election and re- 
pealed the Act. 
The debate between the Republicans and the Federalists 
over the primacy of public opinion was not limited to political 
power. Gordon Wood has explained how the Alien and Sedition 
Act, which had made "truth" a defense, triggered an 
ations behind the times, because people tend to reflect the most powerful thinking 
of their immediate forefathers. DICEY, supra note 43, at  369. 
121. WOOD, supra note 45, at 325. 
122. M ~ s s ~ c ~ u s m s  RESOLUTIONS IN REPLY TO VIRGINIA (1799), reprinted in 
JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 136 (1991) (emphasis added). 
123. Id. at 138. 
124. WOOD, supra note 45, at 363 (quoting Letter from James Madison (Mar. 
7, 1790)). Gordon Wood also described a social component to the dispute: "[Mlost 
Revolutionary writers, at the outset at least, presumed the existence of these uni- 
versal principles, of right behavior and expected a uniformity of response, suppos- 
ing that their audience either was, or would like to be, part of that restricted 
circle of men of good taste and judgment." Wood, supra note 72, at 109. 
10371 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1067 
epistemological disagreement over the meaning of "truth": 
While the Federalists clung to the traditional assumption that 
truth was constant and universal and capable of being discov- 
ered by enlightened and reasonable men, their Republican 
opponents argued that opinions about government and rulers 
were many and diverse and the truth of such opinions could 
not be determined simply by judges and members of juries, no 
matter how educated and reasonable such men might be.125 
The dispute between the Republicans and the Federalists 
over public opinion can be exaggerated. No American politician 
seeking elected office could contemptuously dismiss the public 
and remain in power. Although his views were unique at  the 
time, Federalist James Wilson combined the Hamiltonian com- 
mitment to a strong central government with the Jeffersonian 
belief in majority rule, anticipating the ultimate outcome of the 
Federalist-Republican debate.126 Only a few bitter Federalists 
withdrew from the public arena during the early nineteenth 
century. 12' 
Such divergent views reveal the inherent difficulty of de- 
termining the appropriate role of the public in constitutional 
theory. This rich discourse also demonstrates that the early 
political leaders, including conservative Federalist judges, did 
not have a one-dimensional idea of how to organize their novel 
republic. They groped toward their new form of government. 
Most leaders believed the public had to  participate in the evo- 
lution of the Constitution. Nobody knew how or how much. But 
many changes took place in the early years; the public ignored 
the Framers' views on the electoral college, the prohibition 
against paper money, but legitimated rival political parties.12' 
Admittedly, the rate of constitutional change diminished. But 
myriad constitutions could have emerged out of that single 
text; the courts and the public joined together to create the 
basic system that we continue to use today. 
125. WOOD, supra note 45, at 362. 
126. Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1, 
4-5 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson believed that all three branches of the 
federal government had to be premised upon popular consent, not command. Id. at 
24-25, 47. 
127. James Wilson, Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation, in THE 
WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. (1804), reprinted in 1 THE 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 126, at 97, 119. 
128. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSI'EM (1969). 
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D. Public Opinion and the Early Courts 
Both State and Federal Courts sought and needed public 
support to prevail against the more powerful elected branches. 
In 1788, the Virginia State Legislature passed a statute in- 
creasing the responsibilities of many judges. "The judges there- 
for sent a 'Respectful Remonstrance' . . . asking that 'the pres- 
ent infraction of the constitution may be remedied by the legis- 
lature them~elves.'"'~~ The judges said if the legislature re- 
fused to act, "they see no other alternative for a decision be- 
tween the legislature and judiciary than an appeal to  the peo- 
ple."130 After the legislature refused to change the law, the 
judges made that appeal by resigning. The legislature capitu- 
lated, amending the statute and reappointing the judges.13' 
Like Justice Souter in Casey, early judges used public 
opinion to justify judicial review. Several early courts developed 
Hamilton's argument that the judiciary was the intermediary 
between the people and their elected representatives: 
This constitution is sanctioned by the consent and acquies- 
cence of the people for seventeen years; and it is admitted by 
the almost universal opinion of the people, by the repeated 
adjudications of the courts of this commonwealth, and by very 
many declarations of the legislature itself, to be of superior 
authority to any opposing act of the legislature.'" 
The judges envisioned a dialogue between the judiciary and the 
public. They wrote their opinions to persuade both the litigat- 
ing parties and the public of the correctness of their decisions. 
In other words, the courts initially interpret constitutions, but 
the public could oppose particular adjudications and statutes, 
as they did with the Alien and Sedition Act. This process ulti- 
mately extended beyond discourse. Many judges accepted the 
Republican argument that the people, not the judiciary, are the 
129. POWELL, supra note 122, at 73. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 72-73. This early episode c o n f m  Justice Souter's argument that 
the judiciary depends on widespread public support. 
132. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 37 (1793). Judicial opinions 
and legislative acts can increase in authority due to the passage of time and the 
validation by public opinion: "[Tlhe constitution, and the subsequent acts of the 
convention . . . [bloth depend upon the acquiescence of the people, as the conven- 
tion was not deputed to make the constitution; or to pass laws under it; and, 
therefore, if the people acquiesced under the constitution, they acquiesced in the 
interpretation also." Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 185 (1804). 
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ultimate guardians of liberty.lss 
The federal courts initially did not fulfill Hamilton's ex- 
pectations that the unelected courts would effectively constrain 
' the elected branches.la In 1801, Chief Justice John Jay re- 
fused President Adams' reappointment because "under a sys- 
tem so defective" the Court would never "obtain the energy, 
weight and dignity which were essential to its affording due 
support to the National Government, nor [would it] acquire the 
public confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the 
justice of the nation, it should possess."135 
The Court gradually asserted itself against the two more 
powerful branches. Attorney General Caesar Rodney published 
a letter he wrote to President Jefferson complaining about a 
judicial decision, Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston,lS6 that  
undermined Jefferson's embargo. Justice Johnson, the author of 
Gilchrist, turned to  the newspapers to sway public opinion: 
That the president should have consulted that officer upon a 
legal subject [in private], is perfectly consistent with the rela- 
tion subsisting between [the executive and judicial depart- 
ments] . . . . But when that opinion is published to the 
world . . . an act so unprecedented in the history of executive 
conduct could be intended for no other purpose than to secure 
the public opinion on the side of the executive and in opposi- 
133. But, should usurpation rear its head; should the unnatural case ever 
occur, when the representatives of the people should betray their 
constituents, we are referred, for consolation and remedy, to the pow- 
er and vigilance of the state governments; to publick opinion; to the 
active agency of the people in their elections; to that perpetual depen- 
dence on the people, which is the primary controul on the govern- 
ment . . . . 
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 619 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). 
Justice Chase asserted that the courts were the primary guardians of liberty: 
"If your constitution was destroyed, so long as the judiciary department remained 
free and uncontrolled, the liberties of the people would not be endangered. Suffer 
your courts of judicature to be destroyed: there is an end to your liberties." United 
States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 640-41 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865). 
134. Hamilton complained in 1802: "I am still labouring to prop the frail and 
worthless fabric [of the Constitution] . . . . What can I do better than withdraw 
from the scene? Every day proves to me more and more that this American world 
was not made for me." FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 
356 (1979). Gordon Wood has described how many other early leaders, including 
Jefferson, became discouraged about the fate of America by the end of their lives. 
WOOD, supra note 45, at 367-68. 
135. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE C O N S T ~ I O N  23-24 (1919) 
(quoting John Jay). 
136. 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420). 
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tion to the j~diciary.'~' 
The Court needed the public to support its power to ignore 
the public. In 1810, the Supreme Court stated in Fletcher v. 
Peck' that judicial interpretations of the relevant text must 
prevail over public opinion: 'Would the act be null, whatever 
might be the wish of the nation, or would its obligation or nul- 
lity depend upon the public sentiment?"'" In Osborn v. Bank 
of the United States, Justice Johnson dissented because the 
Court may have satisfied "the public mind" but failed to comply 
with the Constitution when it upheld a congressional law giv- 
ing the Bank of United States jurisdiction to sue in  federal 
circuit courts. 13' 
From the very beginning, Justices have had two different 
conceptions of their role. Some believe that the Court interacts 
with the country, while others believe the Court must insulate 
itself from outside pressures. Some Justices, like Justice John- 
son, who wrote Hudson'40 and dissented in 0sborn,14' ap- 
pear to hold both viewpoints at different times. Justice Johnson 
thus personified the two competing sub-traditions (incorporat- 
ing public opinion and being hostile to public opinion) that con- 
stitute the Supreme Court's approach. 
Chief Justice Marshall increased the Supreme Court's 
power by synthesizing Republican and Federalist thinking.'" 
He sought to separate law from politics but remained attuned 
to the country's political mood when applying that distinction: 
[Marshall] has a strong attachment to popularity but indis- 
posed to sacrifice to it his integrity; hence it is that he is 
disposed on all popular subjects to feel the public pulse and 
hence results indecision and an obsession of doubt. . . . 
Doubts suggested by him create in feeble minds those which 
are irremovable. He is disposed . . . to express the great re- 
spect for the sovereign people and to quote their opinions as a 
137. WIW JOHNSON, REPLY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL CEASAR RODNEY'S AT- 
TACK ON HIS DECISION IN THE G m m ~  CASE(1808), reprinted in 1 THE GROWTH 
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 563-64 (William M. Goldsmith ed., 1974). 
138. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (prohibiting State from rescinding legis- 
lative land grants made by prior, fraudulent legislature). 
139. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (holding that 
Bank of United States' charter gives jurisdiction to United States circuit courts). 
140. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
141. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at  871. 
142. Many Federalists did not think Chief Justice Marshall was sufficiently 
committed to their ideology. POWELL, supra note 122, at 173. 
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, matter of 
Chief Justice Marshall systematically sought the public appro- 
bation and support that Chief Justice Jay believed the Court 
could never achieve.lM Chief Justice Marshall's careful, 
pathbreaking opinion in Marbury v. Madison obtained signifi- 
cant judicial power over both the President and Congress with- 
out forcing either elected branch to  counter-atta~k."~ 
Chief Justice Marshall did not limit himself to his opinions 
to convince the public; he wrote letters to newspapers t o  per- 
suade the populace of the validity of McCulloch v. Mary- 
land,146 which upheld the Second National ~ank.'*' He 
began McCulloch by observing that the elected branches had 
created such banks in the past. His constitutional jurispru- 
dence was formed not only by theory but also by practice. Chief 
Justice Marshall's successes led to  Tocqueville's observation 
that the American public had ratified another fundamental 
question of constitutional law: "Americans have acknowledged 
-- 
143. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King (May 12, 1800), in 3 THE 
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 236-39 (Charles R. King ed., 1896). 
144. Chief Justice Marshall eventually achieved his goal. In a dissent to 
Marshall's opinion permitting Georgia to expel the Cherokee Indians, Justice 
Baldwin observed: T h e  opinion of this court is of high authority in itself; and the 
judge who delivers it [Marshall] has a support as strong in moral influence over 
public opinion, as any human tribunal can impart." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 32 (1831) (Baldwin, J., dissenting). 
145. Marshall held that the Executive acted unconstitutionally by depriving 
Marbury of his "vested legal right" to his commission but that Marbury could not 
prevail because Congress had unconstitutionally expanded the Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803); see 
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE LJ .  
1; James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992). 
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
147. See generally JOHN WHAU'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). Given its abstract, protean nature, the concept of pub- 
lic opinion is putty in the hands of a skillful judge, particularly a relatively non- 
partisan judge like Chief Justice Marshall. Depending upon the issue, Chief Justice 
Marshall emphasized different relationships between the people, the elected branch- 
es, and the Court. When validating an act, he emphasized that the Legislature is 
the agent of people and a co-interpreter of the Constitution. For example, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall 
began his defense of the National Bank by referring to prior legislative acts, not to 
constitutional text. When Chief Justice Marshall decided that an Act ran counter 
to the Constitution, he ignored existing public opinion as reflected through legisla- 
tion and the Legislature as the people's agent. Instead, the Court became the in- 
termediary on behalf of the people. For example, neither the people nor their rep- 
resentatives could disturb the "vested legal right" of Marbury to his commission, 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803), or of innocent holders in 
due course, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 132-33 (1810). 
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the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution 
rather than on the laws. In other words, they have permitted 
them not to  apply such laws as may appear to themto be un- 
con~titutional."~~~ 
Although Justice Story was far more of a Federalist than 
Chief Justice Marshall, he sometimes incorporated public opin- 
ion into constitutional interpretati~n.'~~ In Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, Story extrapolated, at least in part, his constitutional 
interpretation of the meaning of Article I11 from an existing 
congressional statute: "[This distinction has] been brought into 
view in deference to the legislative opinion, which has so long 
acted upon, and enforced, this distin~tion."'~~ Observe that in 
McCulloch, Hudson and Hunter's Lessee, the Supreme Court 
believed that ten to  twenty years was a s6cient length of 
time for judicial andlor public interpretations of the Constitu- 
tion to  become ~rystallized.'~' 
The Framers designed the Constitution to protect private 
property from pro-debtor, majoritarian  legislature^.'^^ The 
Supreme Court eventually fulfilled Hamilton's hopes of being 
the primary guarantor by significantly immunizing private 
property and contract rights from public opinion through the 
doctrine of "vested legal rights."lS3 For example, in Fletcher v. 
148. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note **, at 100 (emphasis added). 
149. Justice Story described the abortive constitution that the philosopher John 
Locke drafted for Caroline in 1669 in a way that summarizes this article's thesis: 
Perhaps in the a ~ a l s  of the world there is not to be found a more 
wholesome lesson of the utter folly of all efforts to establish forms of 
governments upon mere theory; and of the dangers of legislation without 
consulting the habits, manners, feelings, and opinion of the people, upon 
which they are to operate. 
JOSEPH ~ I Q R Y ,  COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58 
(reprint ed. 1987) (1833). 
150. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336 (1816) (holding 
that state supreme court must follow decision of United States Supreme Court). 
Professor Amar partially premised his "two-tieredw theory of Article 11. jurisdiction 
upon Story's arguments in Martin. Alchil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 
111: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 210 
(1985). 
151. In Casey, Justice Souter partially gave Roe v. Wade more authority be- 
cause it had endured for almost twenty years and many women had relied on it. 
P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992). 
152. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC NTERPRETATION OF THE C O N S T ~ I O N  F 
THE UNITED STATES (1913). For a discussion of the historiography that followed 
from Beard's thesis, see WILLS, supra note 73, at xiv-xvi. 
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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Peck,'% Chief Justice Marshall protected allegedly innocent, 
third-party purchasers of legislative land grants from a state 
legislature which sought to  revoke the grants due to  prior leg- 
islative fraud.ls5 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the parlia- 
mentary sovereignty argument that public o@on was the only 
constraint on governmental alterations of existing eleemosy- 
nary corporate charters in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.'" In his concurrence in that case, Justice Story 
made an argument Justice Scalia would appreciate: "I have en- 
deavored to  keep my steps . . . under the guidance of authority 
and principle. It is not for judges to  listen to the voice of per- 
suasive eloquence or popular appeal."15' 
The constitutionalization of the common law did not com- 
pletely isolate private "vested legal rights" from public opinion. 
The common law had been formed by a combination of Yearned 
men," judges, and public opinion:'" "[Wle must suppose, that 
the framers of our constitution were intimately acquainted with 
the writings of those wise and learned men, whose treatises on 
the laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion on 
the subjects of obligation and contract."'" If the common law 
is formed by an interaction between 'learned men" and public 
opinion,lBO and if the Constitution protects the common law, 
cannot public opinion change the common law and thus the 
Con~titution?'~' 
154. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
155. Id. at 132-33. 
156. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 643 (1819). "According to the theory of the Brit- 
ish constitution, their parliament is omnipotent. To a ~ u l  corporate rights might 
give a shock to public opinion, which that government has chosen to avoid; but its 
power is not questioned." Id. Chief Justice Marshall also wrote that the public 
opinion was the only effective monitor of abuses by corporate officers: "Should this 
reasoning ever prove erroneous in a particular case, public opinion, as has been 
stated at the bar, would correct the institution." Id. at 650. 
157. Id. at 713 (Story, J., concurring). Justice Story defended "principles" as a 
necessary aspect of the virtue of judicial certainty. STORY, supra note 149, at 175. 
158. See JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION F OUR COMMON LAW 
5-6 (1884) (equating the common law with the "popular willn). 
159. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353-54 (1827) (holding that 
congressional bankruptcy power does not exclude states from also regulating 
bankruptcies). 
160. CARTER, supra note 158, at 6. 
161. More particularly, public opinion has been able to change the dehition of 
nuisance over the centuries, incorporating new forms of injury, including environ- 
mental damage. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992) (holding that coastal regulation reducing property to no economic worth was 
a "taking," unless it constitutes a nuisance under background principles of state 
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, the rule of law 
appeared triumphant.lB2 While still a lawyer, Abraham Lin- 
coln told a crowd in 1838: 
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher 
to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to 
violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and 
never to tolerate their violation by others. 
. . . .  
. . . [Allthough bad laws, if they exist, should be re- 
pealed as soon as possible, still while they continue in force, 
for the sake of example, they should be religiously ob- 
served. 
In the early years of the Republic, Americans temporarily man- 
aged to combine the cult of public opinion with their belief in 
the rule of law. All common, statutory, and constitutional laws 
ultimately expressed the people's will. As Tocqueville made 
clear throughout his famous study of American society, public 
opinion, defined in the modern sense as the overall mood of the 
country, completely prevailed. 
nuisance laws). 
162. The debate over the relationship between law and public opinion extended 
beyond constitutional law. State courts transformed common law by preserving 
some desirable Blackstonian principles but changing others. See, e.g.,  mom^ J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (Oxford University 
Press 1992) (1977) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION 1780- 18601. Such legal 
flexibility undercut the codification movement, which reflected the belief that the 
public could better express their will through statutes than by accepting judicial in- 
terpretations of common law: 
Statutes, enacted by the legislature, speak the public voice. Legislators, 
with us, are not only chosen because they possess the public confidence, 
but after their election, they are strongly influenced by public feeling. 
They must sympathize with the public, and express its will: should they 
fail to do so, the next year witnesses their removal from office, and oth- 
ers are selected to be the organs of the popular sentiment. 
ROBERT RANTOUL, JR., Oration at Scituate, in MEMOIRS, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 
OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. 251, 280 (Luther Hamilton ed., Boston, John P. Jewett & 
Co. 1854). 
Even common law adjudication included assessment of public views. In his in- 
famous concurrence precluding women from practicing law because of the Yaw of 
the Creator," Justice Bradley referred to the common law: "So h d y  fnced was this 
sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that 
system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her 
husband." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
163. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address 
Before the Springfiid Young Men's Lgceum, (1838), reprinted in THE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 16-17 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967). 
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Where do the three Casey opinions that considered public 
opinion fit in this ideological continuum? Justice Souter sound- 
ed like a Federalist when he wrote that the Court gained its 
prestige by deciding cases using "fixed principles." But his 
conscious courting of public opinion places him with moderates 
like Madison. The country's early history also confirms his 
observation that the Supreme Court needs popular support. By 
dismissing public opinion as an annoyance, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist resembled those embittered Federalists who with- 
drew from the public arena because they were disgusted by the 
triumph of the public.'" Justice Scalia made the Federalist 
philosophical argument by praising "objective" law. Both dis- 
senters can find comfort in the dissent in Osborn, just as Jus- 
tice Souter can find support in Hudson. In fact, the real tradi- 
tion is the fluctuation of the Court between the two approach- 
es. After all, Justice Johnson wrote the dissent in Osborn and 
the majority opinion in Hudson. 
E. Public Opinion and Slavery 
No issue divided the United States as much as slavery.lB5 
In the course of sending slaves back to their captors, Chief 
Justice Marshall observed in The Antelope: "That the course of 
opinion on the slave trade should be unsettled, ought to excite 
no surprise. The Christian and civilized nations of the world, 
with whom we have most intercourse, have all been engaged in it.ml66 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Marshall believed that the 
public's views were changing: "Public sentiment has, in both 
countries, kept pace with the measures of government; and the 
opinion is extensively, if not universally entertained, that this 
unnatural tr&c ought to be suppressed."167 Justice Baldwin, 
who struggled with the slavery question, pitted judicial "princi- 
ple" against current public opinion: 
To consider [slaves] as persons merely, and not property, is, 
in my settled opinion, the first step towards a state of things 
to be avoided only by a firm adherence to the fundamental 
principles of the state and federal governments, in relation to 
this species of property. If the first step taken is a mistaken 
164. Wood, supra note 72, at 119. 
165. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68 (1872). 
166. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114-15 (1825) (requiring slaves 
from forfeited ship to be returned to their masters). 
167. Id. at 116. 
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one, the successive ones will be fatal to the whole system. I 
have taken my stand on the only position which, in my judg- 
ment, is impregnable; and feel confident in its strength, how- 
ever i t  may be assailed in public opinion, here or 
elsewhere. '6.13 
Part of the problem was that each side could assert a basic 
legal principle: liberty competed against property.'" 
The courts frequently had to decide the legal status of 
alleged fugitive slaves. Leonard Levy described how a 
small but very aggressive minority in Massachusetts effectively 
challenged the administration of fugitive slave laws.17' In 
such a context, "public opinion" became the views and actions 
of a few zealous advocates who may or may not have reflected 
the majority of the populace. To a certain degree, the American 
form of government needs the consent of minorities as well as 
the majority. A profoundly alienated or angry minority can 
influence policy as much as the more passive majority. Justice 
Story tried to  solve the problem in Prigg v. Pennsylvania by 
releasing the states from any obligation to return fugitive 
slaves: "[Ilt would be left to the mere comity of the states to act 
as they should please; and would depend for its security upon 
the changing course of public opinion, the mutations of public 
policy, and the general adaptations of remedies for purposes 
strictly according to the lex fori."'" Story upheld Congress's 
fugitive slave act by combining current public acceptance with 
168. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 517 (1841) (Baldwin, J., dis- 
senting) (avoiding decision on state constitutional provision banning slave importa- 
tion because state did not pass activating legislation). Baldwin concluded that 
states could ban slavery but could not exclude slaves from out of state if slavery 
were continued within the state. 
169. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 421 (1815) (holding that neutral 
may hire an armed belligerent vessel to ship goods). 
170. According to one Supreme Court advocate, hostile public opinion negated 
state enforcement of state fugitive slave laws: 
It is true that the legislature of the state of New York, several years 
ago, enacted a law authorizing the governor of the state, in his discretion, 
to surrender fugitives from foreign countries. But public opinion has lately 
manifested itself strongly against the validity of the law; and the gover- 
nor, during the last year, refused to act under it. 
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 554 (1840) (argument of counsel) (equal- 
ly divided Court dismissing habeas corpus petition). 
171. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF 
J u m c ~  SHAW 72-108 (1957). 
172. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 US. (16 Pet.) 539, 614 (1842) (freeing fugitive 
slave catcher for violating state law). 
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the views of Framers and ratifiers: 
This very acquiescence . . . of the highest state functionaries, 
is a most decisive proof of the universality of the opinion that 
the act is founded in a just construction of the Constitution; 
independent of the vast influence which it ought to have as a 
contemporaneous exposition of the provisions, by those who 
were its immediate framers, or intimately connected with its 
adoption. '" 
Story's argument coexists somewhat uncomfortably with his 
consultation of the "legislative mind" in Hunter's Lessee and his 
refusal to  consider public opinion in Dartmouth College. For 
Story, the significance of public opinion varied with the issue. 
Until Casey, no Justice discussed the role of public opinion 
more f d y  than Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.17* Taney 
contrasted the "public opinion" at the time of the Framers with 
public opinion at the time of the case. Current public opinion 
was constitutionally irrelevant: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public 
opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the 
civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce 
the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more lib- 
eral construction in their favor than they were intended to 
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an 
argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal 
called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed 
unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by 
which it may be amended? 
Turning to  historical public opinion, Taney claimed that 
the entire country considered blacks to be inferior during the 
Revolution. Nobody intended the Declaration of Independence's 
phrase "all Men are created equal"'" to apply to blacks: "It is 
difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in 
relation to that unfortunate race."'77 Racial discrimination 
persisted in all parts of the country during the ratification of 
173. Id. at 620-21. 
174. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding slave is not 
American citizen and Congress cannot ban slavery from Territories). 
175. Id. at 426. 
176. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 W.S. 1776). 
177. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. 
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the Constitution."8 Even the disappearance of the slave trade 
in the North was not attributable to public opinion: "[Tlhis 
change had not been produced by any change of [public] opin- 
ion in relation to this race; but because it was discovered, from 
experience, that slave labor was unsuited to the climate and 
productions of these  state^.""^ According to Taney, these 
facts determined the meaning of the Constitution: 'We refer to  
these historical facts for the purpose of showing the fixed opin- 
ions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that 
day spoke and acted."lS0 
As has been discussed elsewhere, Taney's grasp of history , 
was quite faulty.ls' Many Revolutionary pamphleteers had 
extended their egalitarian analysis to  castigate American slav- 
ery.'82 Eighteenth-century Pennsylvania Quakers led the 
fight against the slave trade.'" Thomas Jefferson, author of 
the Declaration of Independence, expressed racist sentiments, 
but he also believed blacks had equal liberties? Better his- 
tory probably would not have changed the outcome. Taney 
could have accurately distinguished such progressive views as 
178. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible 
marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or 
spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or 
the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection. 
This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the 
Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions 
and language. 
Id. at 410. 
179. Id. at 412. 
180. Id. at 409; see also Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 351, 376 
(1874) (Miller, J., dissenting) (holding that state can release lien on railroad). 
181. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgot- 
ten Past, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 37 (1993); Herbert J. Storing, Slavery and the 
Moral Foundations of the American Republic, in MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AM- 
ERICAN REPUBLIC 214-33 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 1979). 
Taney's history was controversial at the time. One of the lawyers in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania had stated more than a decade earlier: "Before the close of the Revo- 
lution, however, public opinion in the northern section of the country, had materi- 
ally changed with regard to the policy and humanity of [slavery]." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
539, 563 (1842). Chief Justice Taney had a Merent view: "The number [of blacks] 
that had been emancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those 
held in slavery; and they were identified in the public mind with the race to 
which they belonged." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 411. In addition to criticiz- 
ing Taney's history, Justice Curtis relied on learned men to limit slavery to posi- 
tive law because it was "contrary to natural right," a concept "agreed [to] by all 
writers on the subject." Id. at 624 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
182. BAILYN, supra note 57, at 232-46. 
183. DAVID H. FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED 601-03 (1989). 
184. JEFFERSON, supra note 75, at 163. 
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minority sentiments, even in the North, at the times of the 
Revolution and Constitutional ratification. 
Taney's one-sided history demonstrates the perils judges 
face in assessing public opinion of any form, at any time. It is 
hard for Justices to determine the views of the Framers, the 
mood of the country at the time the relevant text was ratified, 
or the country's opinion at  the time of a decision. Given their 
tendency to make everything in their opinions converge toward 
one seemingly inevitable outcome, Justices tend to get nonjudi- 
cia1 facts wrong. Even if Justices do get such facts right, they 
will (or at least should) rely on existing historiography, which 
is far from immutable. 
Nevertheless, Taney's analysis demonstrates that the 
Court must determine at least one form of public opinion in 
every constitutional law case. The Court should determine why 
the general populace, not just some articulate, vocal Framers, 
agreed to the constitutional text in question. If the Justices iso- 
late themselves from large segments of history by refusing to  
determine public consciousness at the time of the ratification of 
a given text, they eliminate a major constraint and grounding 
factor that regulates law. 
No Justice has claimed that history is so unknowable that 
it is constitutionally irrelevant. Consequently, any argument 
against the Court's use of public opinion, based upon judicial 
ignorance or institutional incompetence, proves too much. As- 
suming the Court can begin to assess public opinion in 1789, it 
has a similar ability to discern the current public mood. The 
Court admittedly has limited competence to assess any form of 
public opinion, as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia 
noted in Casey, but the Court has even less capacity to deter- 
mine public beliefs two hundred years ago, particularly the 
beliefs of the average citizen. Current public opinion may be an 
inappropriate variable in constitutional adjudication, but the 
argument against it must extend beyond judicial competence, 
because that argument also undermines any judicial use of 
history and tradition, favorite arguments of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. 
Perhaps the Court should only try to ascertain the 
Framers' views, not public opinion at the time of text's ratifica- 
tion. But that interpretation undermines the fundamental 
premise that the Constitution reflects the sovereign will of the 
people, not the Framers. By consulting only the Framers, the 
Court would be constitutionalizing the elite views of the politi- 
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cal leadership. The Court is supposed to be an intermediary for 
the people, not for the drafters. After all, judicial review is 
partially premised upon the argument that the Court is enforc- 
ing the views of the supermajority against, the People, the 
temporary majority. More practically, the body politic would be 
very wary of ever committing to a constitutional text if they 
knew their opinions were going to be completely ignored once 
the text was put into place. 
The Court needs to consult general public opinion to deter- 
mine the Framers' views. After all, the Framers self-conscious1y 
took public opinion into consideration. Thaddeus Stevens, for 
example, complained about the Joint Resolution that became 
the Fourteenth Amendment: "This proposition is not all that 
the committee desired. I t  falls far short of my wishes, but it 
fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the 
present state of public opinion."185 Making such determina- 
tions will not be easy. The Supreme Court can learn much 
about widespread public opinion by consulting such works as 
Professor Fischer's Albion's Seed, which not only captures the 
everyday life of America before the revolution but also demon- 
strates that  American culture and politics were influenced by 
four radically different conceptions of liberty. '136 
Fortunately, the Dred Scott Court did not have the last 
word on slavery.18' Abraham Lincoln, who had earlier glori- 
fied the rule of law, became a Humean political analyst, assert- 
ing that  "[olur government rests in public opinion. Whoever can 
change public opinion, can change the government, practically, 
just s o  While President, Lincoln justified his ag- 
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866), cited in Oregon v. Mitch- 
ell, 400 U.S. 112, 175 (1970) (upholding federal law setting minimum age for feder- 
al elections but striking down minimum age for state elections). 
186. FISCHER, supra note 183, at  782. 
187. The subsequent furor over admitting Kansas as a slave state may have 
been a more divisive event than Dred Scott. See, e.g., K E ~ H  M. ~ ~ T A M ~ P ,  AMERI- 
CA IN 1857 (1990). 
188. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Chicago, Ill. (Dec. 10, 1856), in 2 RIE W m -  
INGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 284 (Arthur B. Lapsey, Constitutional ed. 1923). The 
Lincoln-Douglas debates, which focused on slavery and Dred Scott, reflected the 
building tensions between law and public opinion concerning slavery. For Douglas, 
law was supreme, perhaps even to the point of stifling subsequent criticism: "As a 
lawyer, I feel at liberty to appear before the Court and controvert any principle of 
law while the question is pending before the tribunal; but when the decision is 
made, my private opinion, your opinion, all other opinions must yield to the majes- 
ty of that authoritative adjudication." Stephen A. Douglas, Douglas at Chicago 
(July 9, 1858), in TIMES, July 11, 1958, reprinted in PAUL M. ANGLE, CREATED 
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gressive tactics against the Southern rebellion, such as jailing 
hostile Maryland legislators and other dissidents, because the 
public would retain the last word about the validity of these ac- 
tions through the electoral and impeachment processes. At 
critical points, constitutional trust is more important than 
constitutional law.''' Ralph Waldo Emerson described with 
admiration how Lincoln patiently waited for the right moment 
to free all slaves behind rebel lines: 
The extreme moderation with which the President advanced 
to his design-his long-avowed expectant policy, as if he chose 
to be strictly the executive of the best public sentiment of the 
country, waiting only till it should be unmistakably pro- 
nounced-so fair a mind that none ever listened so patiently 
to such extreme varieties of opinion."190 
EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 20 (1958). 
Lincoln replied that he did not advocate resistance to the actual Dred Scott 
decision; he opposed extending the decision beyond the actual parties. "[Douglas] 
would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of 
government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of 
property, create no disorder, excite no mobs." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Spring- 
field (July 17, 1858), in ILL. ST. J., July 20-21, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, a t  
78. Lincoln observed that "a vast portion of the American people . . . look upon 
[slavery] as a vast moral evil." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Chicago (July 10, 
1858), in DAILY DEMOCRAT, July 13, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, at 35. 
Douglas attacked Lincoln's nonviolent attempt to use public opinion to amend 
judicial constitutional doctrine: 'Why, he is going to appeal to the people to elect a 
Resident who will appoint judges who will reverse the Dred Scott decision . . . . 
It is a proposition to make that court the corrupt, unscrupulous tool of a political 
party." Stephen A. Douglas, Douglas at Springfield (July 17, 1858), in ILL. LFT. 
REG., July 19, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, at 57. 
Frederick Douglass believed that the existing constitutional text was not an 
obstacle to manumission: 
I have much confidence in the instincts of the slaveholders. They see that 
the Constitution will afford slavery no protection when it shall cease to 
be adminiatered by the slaveholders. They see, moreover, that if there is 
once a will in the people of America to abolish slavery, there is no word, 
no syllable in the Constitution to forbid that result. 
Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slave? or 
Anti-Slavery?, in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 478 (P. Foner ed., 
1950). 
189. "[Tlhe constitution is different, in its application in cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion, involving the Public Safety, from what it is in times of profound peace 
and public security . . . ." Letter &om Abraham Lincoln to Ohio Democrats (June 
29, 1863), in POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 261 (Richard N. Current 
ed., 1967). According to Garry Wills, Lincoln never tried to grasp more power than 
was legally available under the Constitution to suppress the Rebellion. GARRY 
WILIS, LINCOLN AT GETNSBURG 139-40 (1992). 
190. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Emancipation Proclamation (1862), in SE- 
LECTED WRITINGS 886, quoted in WILLS, supra note 189, at 104. 
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Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation echoed Jefferson's Decla- 
ration of Independence in its plea to all of mankind, to history: 
"And upon this a d ,  sincerely believed to be an  act of justice, 
warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke 
the considerate judgment of mankind . . . ."lgl Lincoln's even- 
tual triumphs, including the Thirteenth Amendment's elimina- 
tion of slavery, were high-water marks of Republican participa- 
tory politics. Public opinion, combined with public will, had 
transformed the Constitution into a more centralized form of 
government with the power to combat all forms of racism.lg2 
The tree of liberty had been rewatered with patriotic blood. 
Underneath public opinion lay public will-black and white 
Northern foot-soldiers' dogged deterrninati~n. '~~ 
F. Public Opinion and the Post-Civil War Court: 
The Domestication of Public Opinion 
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court domesticated pub- 
lic opinion. It "scientifically" developed an elaborate, formal set 
of doctrines that allegedly transcended not only the views of 
the people but also the personal views of the Justices.'* For 
example, the Court held that antitrust laws could not apply to 
a massive sugar monopoly because the "manufacturing" of 
sugar was not "interstate commer~e."'~~ Perhaps such artific- 
es, premised upon a strong conception of individual economic 
liberty that repudiated slavery, were necessary healing devic- 
es.lg6 It may have been time for the Court to appear to depo- 
191. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (1863). See gen- 
erally MARK E.  NEELY JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY (1991) (evaluating Lincoln's civil 
liberties record during the Civil War). Not everyone was pleased with Lincoln's 
assertion of vast power, whether allegedly under the Constitution or not. Former 
Justice Curtis criticized pro-Lincoln newspaper assertions "that 'nobody cares' 
whether a great public a d  of the President of the United States is in conformity 
with or is subversive of the supreme law of the land." 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN 
ROBBINS CURTIS L.L.D. 332 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879). 
192. Conservatives like Justice Scalia would argue that the new Constitutional 
settlement precludes the use of virtually all racial categories. 
193. See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATI'LE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CML 
WAR ERA (1988). 
194. See David D. Field, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science (Address 
at the opening of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Sept. 21, 1859), in 
1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 
517-33 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884). 
195. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding antitrust 
laws not applicable to manufacturing of sugar). 
196. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967). 
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liticize the Constitution in particular and the legal system in 
general, both having been battered by the slavery debate.lg7 
Hundreds of thousands had been killed to  resolve these con- 
stitutional disputes, while politicians continued to  wave the 
"Bloody Shirt" even after the War to provoke sectional con- 
flict.lg8 
One function of the Supreme Court is the preservation of 
social order. To achieve this end, the Court must determine the 
public mood, develop a mode of rhetoric that the public finds 
acceptable, and make decisions that the public at least toler- 
ates. The postbellum Court's pseudo-scientific jurisprudence 
apparently fooled, or at least satisfied, enough people so the 
country could turn from the contentious issue of constitutional 
interpretation to the far less divisive task of making money. In 
other words, Langdellian formalistic jurisprudence had some 
salutary effects for twenty to thirty years after the Civil War. 
Supreme Court decisions like in re Debs,199 which per- 
mitted the federal courts to  fight unions with labor injunctions, 
and Lochner u. New York,2°0 which opposed legislative regula- 
tion of the market by striking down a state law limiting bakers' 
working hours, revealed the limits, both conceptually and prac- 
tically, of the Court's formalistic ideology. 
By self-consciously ignoring public opinion, the Court 
missed a fundamental change in political consciousness. The 
debate over the Lochner jurisprudence dwelled on the appro- 
priate role of public opinion. Dissenters like Justice Brandeis, 
who opposed economic substantive due process, expressly ar- 
gued that the Court improperly excluded public opinion. Con- 
versely, when the Lochner-style Justices ended up on the losing 
side during the 1930s, they criticized the new majorities for 
capitulating to  public opinion. 
More recently, Justice Scalia seeks an objective Constitu- 
tion governed by fixed legal principles. He has tried to weed 
public opinion out of constitutional adjudication, with the ex- 
ception of public opinion expressed through positive law, in 
order to  form a constitutionally protected "tradition." Although 
such formalistic interpretations might have satisfied 
197. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). 
198. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 117 
(1967). 
199. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
200. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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post-Civil War generations who were enamored with scientific 
metaphors, such interpretations are unlikely to persuade a 
modern, relativistic America. Perhaps the post-World War I1 
Court should not have resolved as many issues as it did, keep- 
ing them instead in the democratic domain. Supreme Court 
nominations might be less theatrical if the Court were less 
important, but such an institutional shift can only occur with 
societal consensus. Since such a consensus seems unlikely to 
develop, one can only hope that recent domestic conflicts like 
abortion and racial relations prove to be less polarizing than 
~lavery.~'' 
I. Informed public opinion: Determining "cruel and unusual 
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment 
In Casey?O2 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
rejected a venerable constitutional tradition when they severed 
constitutional law from public opinion. For over a hundred 
years, state and federal courts have explicitly used public opin- 
ion to expand the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment." 
In 1866, the Supreme Court stated, "What punishments shall 
be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of 
public opinion from one age to another."203 In 1892, the South 
Dakota Supreme Court applied severity and proportionality 
standards, proscribing "very extreme cases, where the punish- 
ment proposed is so severe and out of proportion to the offense 
as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of rea- 
sonable people.'a04 The South Dakota Supreme Court con- 
sidered two forms of public opinion: the general "public senti- 
ment" and the "judgment of reasonable people,"205 similar to 
Hudson's consultation of "public opinion" and "legal men." 
In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down 
201. Tocqueville observed that Americans tend to turn all political questions 
into legal questions. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supm note **, at  290. 
202. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
203. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351 (1886) (holding that crime 
punishable by imprisonment is "infamous crime* under Fifth Amendment); see also 
Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) ("In Great Britain, as in other coun- 
tries, public sentiment revolted against this severity, and . . . the additional pun- 
ishment of solitary confinement was repealed."). 
204. State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892), quoted in Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2696 (1991) (upholding mandatory life sentence for 
conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine). 
205. Beckr, 51 N.W. a t  1022. Compare this with the approach taken in Unit- 
ed States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). 
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bizarre punishments such as being forced to wear chains while 
in prison for twelve years and being put under permanent 
surveillance for making a false entry. The Weems Court echoed 
Hudson's dual conception of public opinion: ''me [cruel and un- 
usual punishment] clause of the Constitution in the opinion of 
the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is 
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."206 The 
Weems decision defined the appropriate form of public opinion 
as a benign interaction between humane, learned commenta- 
tors and the general public, a synthesis of the elite and the 
masses, of Federalism and Republicanism. 
Weems quoted Judge Cooley as one of its learned commen- 
tators. Cooley had written that states could not "establish the 
whipping post and the pillory in those States where they were 
never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in those 
States whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had 
banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual punish- 
ment~."~" As the Weems Court noted, Cooley's analysis was 
not very clear.208 In the second part of the quote, Cooley only 
considered public opinion at the time of constitutional ratifica- 
tion. He argued the state constitution had to be revised after 
public opinion changed to  justify a particular constitutional 
limitation. Yet, Cooley also applied a more universal ap- 
proach-certain punishments could never be introduced if they 
had not been previously used. In other words, a few states 
could continue to  use the pillory if it had been their practice or 
could reintroduce the pillory if public opinion had approved of 
the practice at the time of Constitutional ratification, but the 
rest of the states could never use the pillory. Although pro- 
foundly different in details, Cooley's conception of public opin- 
ion foreshadowed, at least in terms of complexity, Justice 
Souter's theory of public opinion. 
The Eighth Amendment did not play a major role again in 
constitutional adjudication until aRer the Second World War. 
When the Court fmally returned to the Clause, not only did it 
embrace the concept of public opinion, but it also flirted with 
notoriously fickle and unreliable public opinion polls.209 For 
206. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). 
207. Id. (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEX, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS 694 (8th ed. 1927)). 
208. Id. at 375. 
209. In 1968 the Court noted, "It appears that, in 1966, approximately 42% of 
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some Justices, the Eighth Amendment became very dynamic, 
requiring "a flexible analysis that recognized that as public 
opinion changed, the validity of the penalty would have to be 
re-e~arnined."~~~ 
Even some of the conservatives who would have upheld the 
death penalty for murder in Furman v. Georgia acknowledged 
the constitutional significance of polls. Justice Powell wrote: 
"Public opinion polls, while of little probative relevance, corrob- 
orate substantially the conclusion derived from examining leg- 
islative activity and jury sentencing-opinion on capital pun- 
ishment is 'fairly divided."*" Justice Powell had little diffi- 
culty ascertaining the public mood, at least with regards to the 
more visible murder cases: "It could hardly be suggested that 
in any of these highly publicized murder cases . . . the public 
has exhibited any signs of 'revulsion' at the thought of execut- 
ing the convicted murderers. The public outcry, as we all know, 
has been quite to the contrary.77212 In other words, the conser- 
vatives developed their own data base-jury sentencing, stat- 
utes, and "public outcry"-to determine what constitutes cmel 
and unusual  punishment^.^'^ From both perspectives, then, 
public opinion was an appropriate factor. 
the American public favored capital punishment for convicted murderers, while 47% 
opposed it and 11% were undecided." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 
11.16 (1968) (citing 2 POLLS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW ON PUBLIC OPINION, No. 3, at 
84 (1967)). Justice Stewart acknowledged a Gallup poll in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 181 11.25 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
For a general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of public opinion 
polls, see Susan J. Becker, Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence: Sugges- 
tions for Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Stanclad Governing Weight and 
Admissibility, 70 OR. L. REV. 463 (1991). 
210. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 n.37 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur- 
ring). The Woodson plurality cited a House Report "noting that the modification of 
the federal capital statutes to make the death penalty discretionary was in harmo- 
ny with 'a growing public sentiment.' " Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
293 n.27 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2 (1896) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 545, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1894))) (finding man- 
datory death penalty unconstitutional). 
211. 408 U.S. at 441 11.36 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
212. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). 
213. The legislative branches also have a duty to interpret the Constitution. 
For example, Congress will initially determine which crimes are "infamous": "The 
cases arising under the first Clause of the F'ifth Amendment recognize that what 
may be considered an 'infamous crime' within the meaning of that Clause may be 
affected by changes of public opinion from one age to another." Ullmann v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 422, 451 n.5 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (requiring testimony 
before grand jury). 
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In the past twenty years, some Justices questioned the 
constitutionalization of public opinion polls. In his concurrence 
in Furman u. Georgia, Justice Thurgood Marshall found polls of 
limited value: ' m e  a public opinion poll obviously is of some 
assistance in indicating public acceptance or rejection of a spe- 
cific penalty, its utility cannot be very great.'"14 Despite what 
he said above, Justice Powell's dissent in Furman also chas- 
tised the majority for relying too heavily on public opinion: 
"[Hlowever one may assess the amorphous ebb and flow of 
public opinion generally on this volatile issue, this type of in- 
quiry lies a t  the periphery-not the core--of the judicial pro- 
cess in constitutional cases. The assessment of popular opinion 
is essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function."215 In sub- 
sequent years, public opinion polls played an  increasingly un- 
important role.216 
More importantly, recent liberal and conservative Justices 
have found any conception of public opinion to be constitution- 
ally insignificant. Justice Marshall argued in Furman: "Regard- 
less of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of 
these punishments in a particular case or a t  any one moment 
in history, the Constitution prohibits it."217 Not surprisingly, 
214. 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
215. Id. at 443 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
216. The judicial battle against the use of public opinion, and public opinion 
polls in particular, began quickly. Chief Justice Burger was disturbed by the 
majority's search for public opinion in various statutes, polls, and jury decisions to 
determine if a state could execute a rapist: "If the Court is to rely on some 'public 
opinion' process, does this not suggest the beginning of a 'trend'?" Coker v. Geor- 
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 613 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (striking down death penal- 
ty for rape). In Penry v. Lynuugh, Justice O 'Co~or  was unimpressed by "several 
public opinion surveys that indicate strong public opposition to execution of the 
retarded." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 334 (1989) (upholding execution of 
mentally retarded murderer). 
A law review article which challenged the validity and accuracy of public opin- 
ion polls, Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Prcblic Opinion and the Death Penalty, 
26 STAN. L. REV. 1245 (1974), was cited in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 298 11.34 (1976) (plurality opinion), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 
352 n.5 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (holding that mandatory death penalty vio- 
lates Eighth Amendment). 
217. F'urman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). In 
Furman, Justice Marshall also argued that informed public opinion would agree 
with him that the death penalty was unconstitutional, particularly after the public 
learned that the death penalty did not deter. Id. at 361-63 (Marshall, J., concur- 
ring). Although it is easy to characterize Justice Marshall's informed opinion as 
opinion that agrees with him, it is important to distinguish between public opinion 
that has thought about an issue in contrast to immediate public reactions. See 
Gregory A. Mark & Christopher L. Eisgruber, Introduction: Law and Political Cul- 
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Justice Scalia dismissed "public opinion polls, the views of 
interest groups, and the positions . . . [ofl professional associa- 
tions" as too uncertain a foundation for constitutional law.'18 
2. The mixed role of public opinion in determining procedural 
fairness for criminal trials 
The Supreme Court has expressed some of its strongest 
views about public opinion in criminal cases, which often in- 
volve high stakes and provoke powerful public reactions. Public 
fury is often completely understandable, e.g.: "[Llittle Marsha 
Brill was dragged from her bicycle on one of the public thor- 
oughfares . . . and there stabbed to death. The impact of. . . 
two similar crimes upon the public mind was terrific . . . . Not 
only were they outraged but they were terrified."21g 
The Court has periodically characterized the public as a 
dangerous mob swayed by "public passion." Justices did not 
always hide their contempt for fellow citizens. In 1851, in  the 
context of a scandal over an adulterous woman who went 
abroad to have her baby and then accused her husband of a 
crime, the Court observed: "The early times, and the unintelli- 
gent condition of much of the population of New Orleans at 
that  day, must account for this absurd public opinion, and the 
proceedings founded on it."220 The Supreme Court reversed 
the Scottsboro boys' conviction, requiring counsel in all capital 
cases, because of "hostile and excited public sentiment" and an 
ture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 426 (1988) (discussing reflective public opinion). 
218. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (up- 
holding death penalty for seventeen-year-old juvenile). Although contemporary con- 
servative Justices claimed to distance themselves from public opinion, not everyone 
was convinced, even on the Court. Justice Stevens complained that "the 'hydraulic 
pressure' of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described-and that properly 
influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures-has played a role not only 
in the Court's decision to hear this case . . . but even in its resolution of the con- 
stitutional issue involved." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (permitting prosecutor to discuss effects of murder on fami- 
ly members) (footnotes omitted). Stevens also accused Justice Scalia of applying the 
views of the " 'victims' rights' movement." Id. 
219. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 912 (1950) (Frankfurt- 
er, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari to review state court order fmding radio 
broadcasters in contempt). 
220. Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 527 (1851) (discussing controversy 
surrounding adulterous wife who had baby abroad and then misled innocent hus- 
band); see also Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 287 (1882) (approving striking attor- 
ney from roll for encouraging mob to lynch suspect); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 
22, 23 (1889) (basing decision not to review change of venue upon court's assess- 
ment of state of public opinion). 
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atmosphere of public passion.221 For instance, the defense 
counsel was threatened and the trial court feared mob vio- 
l e n ~ e . ~ ~  Later, the Court took judicial notice of the Red Scare 
in determining what amount is excessive bail under the Eighth 
Amendment: "But the protest charges, and the defect in the 
proceedings below appears to be, that, provoked by the flight of 
certain Communists after conviction, the Government demands 
and public opinion supports a use of the bail power to keep 
Communist defendants in jail before c~nv ic t ion . "~~  
Over the years, the Court has created a set of rules to 
resolve such cases:224 "[A] trial judge must often be the bul- 
wark of the legal system when presented with unpopular caus- 
es and adverse public opinion."* Juries were instructed to 
ignore public opinion: 'When you do this you have responded to 
the high responsibilities which rest upon you as jurors. It mat- 
ters not whether your verdict accords with public sentiment or 
not ."226 
221. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51, 58 (1932) (requiring paid counsel for 
all indigents in death penalty cases). 
222. DAN T. CARTER, SCOlTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 223-25 
(1979). 
223. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 10 (1951) (opinion of Jackson, J.) (requiring 
proper methods for setting bail for defendants indicted under Smith Act). 
224. Trial judges must determine if local public opinion was so enraged that a 
defendant could not receive a fair trial: "[Tlhe refusal to grant a change of venue 
on the mere affidavit of the defendants' agent to the state of public opinion in the 
county clearly involves matter of fact and discretion, and is not a ruling upon a 
mere question of law." Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1889); see also Unit- 
ed States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386, 431 (1909) (Peckham, J., dissenting) ("The men 
who testified that there was no apprehension of mob violence were men who were 
specially cognizant of the state of public opinion at  that time."). 
225. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 645 n.22 (1980) (quoting Jacobs v. State, 
361 So. 2d 640, 650-57 (Ma. 1978) (Jones, J., dissenting)) (not permitting death 
penalty when jury was precluded from considering lesser included offense). Justice 
Jackson wrote: "The judge was put in a position in which he either must appear 
to yield his judgment to public clamor or to  defy public sentiment." Craig v. 
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 395 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (upholding contempt for 
unfairly publishing events in case pending before a state judge); see also Frank v. 
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 336 (1915) (holding that lower courts adequately considered 
defendant's due process claim that trial was unfairly influenced by mob). 
226. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 489 n.18 (1978) (quoting trial court 
instructions). The Supreme Court has periodically wrestled with the relationship 
between juries and public opinion. The Court upheld the following jury instruction: 
"[Iln this part of the trial the law does not forbid you from being influenced by 
pity for the defendants and you may be governed by mere sentiment and sympathy 
for the defendants in arriving at a proper penalty in this case; however, the law 
does forbid you from being governed by mere conjecture, prejudice, public opinion 
or public feeling." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 189 (1971) (holding that 
jury cannot impose death penalty without having been given standards); accord 
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In addition to keeping the adjudications immune from 
undue influence by public opinion, the Supreme Court consid- 
ered how public opinion directly affects the choice of appropri- 
ate criminal and civil procedures. Justices have used public 
opinion to justify administrative searches? the enlargement 
of "admiralty forms and jurisdiction,"228 the scope of the right 
to jury under the Seventh A ~ n e n d m e n t ~ ~ ~  he right to a pub- 
lic hearing before extradition,zsO the limited scope of the 
state's defense of sovereign immunity:31 the liability of cities 
for damages caused by riot,Zs2 and the absence of televisions 
in the c o u r t r ~ o m . ~ ~  In Georgia u. McCollum, the Court held 
that  a defendant could not use peremptory strikes to eliminate 
all members of a particular race, noting "two trials in Miami, 
Fla., in which all African-American jurors were peremptorily 
struck by white defendants accused of racial beating, and the 
public outrage and riots that followed the defendants' acquit- 
t a1."23Q 
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987) (upholding similar jury instruction). 
Judicial notice of public ignorance helped determine proper jury instructions: 
"The importance of a no-inference instruction is underscored by a recent national 
public opinion survey conducted for the National Center for State Courts, revealing 
that 37% of those interviewed believed that it is the responsibility of the accused 
to prove his innocence." Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 13.21 (1981) (holding 
that defendant had right to jury instruction explaining significance of defendant's 
refusing to testify); see also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 n.12 (1971) 
(quoting Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 94 N.E. 369, 376-77 (Mass. 
1911)) (holding that statute preventing change of venue, despite prejudice, on sole 
ground that the charge is a misdemeanor, violates 14th Amendment); Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965) (excessive publicity prejudicial to defendant). The 
Supreme Court has also acknowledged that juries bring a form of public opinion 
into the courtroom, ensuring that the defendant is found in violation of community 
mores as well as the law. Thus defense counsel could conduct a broad voir dire. 
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 US. 912, 914 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurt- 
er, J.) (denying certiorari). 
227. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959) (upholding health inspection 
of house without search warrant). 
228. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 493 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dis- 
senting) (admiralty case involving collision between two steamboats). 
229. Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 481, 486 (1858) (holding that plaintiff 
in ejectment must always prove personal legal title). 
230. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112 (1852) (holding that magistrate 
must participate in extradition proceeding). 
231. Davis v. Pringle, 268 US. 315, 318-19 (1925) (establishing priorities under 
bankruptcy law), quoted in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 
359 (1955) (reversing dismissal of counterclaim by bank against Republic of China). 
232. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911) (state can make 
county liable for mob damage). 
233. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965). 
234. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (criminal defendant cannot use peremptory 
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Even in criminal trials, public opinion has a benign side: 
"The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contem- 
poraneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective 
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power . . . . Without 
publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of 
publicity, all other checks are of small account.77235 Although 
trials must be conducted in pretrial litigation can 
take place behind closed doors. "Publicity concerning the pro- 
ceedings a t  a pretrial hearing, however, could influence public 
opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of 
inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual tri- 
a1.'"37 An examination of the Court's references to public 
opinion in criminal cases reveals that the Court has had sev- 
eral different publics in mind. The public can be dangerous, 
ignorant, a source of guidance, or a benign check on judicial 
abuse. 
3. Public opinion as ward of the Court: The First Amendment 
Progressive public opinion served as a consultant in most 
Eighth Amendment cases, while public passion was viewed as a 
threat in many criminal cases. In the First Amendment con- 
text, public opinion played a W e r e n t  role, as a ward of the 
Court. The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the First 
Amendment to protect "public opinion" from inappropriate 
governmental regulation. As early as 1855, dissenting Justice 
Daniel equated the suppression of public opinion with tyranny, 
"a power absolute and irresponsible enough to repress oppo- 
sition, or to silence the expression of public ~ e n t i m e n t . " ~ ~  In 
1889, the Court explained the importance of public debate: 
challenges to exclude on the basis of race) (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Su- 
preme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of 
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 195-96 (1989)). The entire Rodney King 
affair offers a compelling example of how public opinion interacts with the judicial 
system. 
235. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948) (reversing contempt based upon 
secret proceedings), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
592 (1980) (Brennen, J., concurring in judgment) (protecting newspapers' right to 
be present during criminal trial proceedings); see Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct. 
2720 (1991) (protecting defense attorney statements at press conference concerning 
pending adjudication). 
236. Oliver, 333 U.S. at  270. 
237. Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979). 
238. The Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 59 U.S. 570, 576 (1855) (Daniel, J., dis- 
senting) (federal court has jurisdiction over maritime accident). 
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"Public opinion thus enlightened [by debate], brought to bear 
upon legislation, will do more than all other causes to prevent 
abuses."23g To facilitate such informed debate, the Court had 
to protect the media from inappropriate governmental interfer- 
e n ~ e . ~ ~ '  Justice Brandeis considered public opinion to  be "the 
life of the nation."241 
239. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (upholding federal 
law preventing Chinese worker from returning to United States). In several dis- 
sents, Justice Black elaborated on the Court's duty to defend unpopular political 
opinions. He took judicial notice of the excesses of the Red Scare. Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding convictions of 
Communist leaders under Smith Act). Justice Black analogized the Subversive 
Activities Review Board's registration requirements to William Pitt's attempt to 
protect the "public mind" from perverted factions by requiring all writers to sign 
their works. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 153 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding Board's finding that 
American Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization"). 
240. The Court has been ambivalent about the media. On the one hand, gov- 
ernmental suppression of the media indicates tyranny: "The tragic history of recent 
years demonstrates far too well how despotic governments may interfere with the 
press and other means of communication in their efforts to corrupt public opinion 
and to destroy individual freedom." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 
51-52 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (upholding governmental antitrust action 
against news media). Consequently, the Court must protect the media: "A free 
press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the 
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v. American 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
620 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (upholding ban on political solicitations of co- 
workers under state merit system); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 
(1940) (striking down state law outlawing loitering and picketing near a business). 
On the other hand, the Court has also expressed fears over the media's capaci- 
ty to manipulate popular opinion. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 202 
(1957). It has acknowledged how a few private individuals have accumulated vast 
power. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1974) (nev- 
ertheless invalidating statute forcing newspaper to print replies to editorials). That 
power is largely unaccountable because the media is not forced to disclose informa- 
tion, while the government "may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what they 
might prefer to conceal." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (opinion of 
Burger, C.J.) (denying media right of access to jail). Such concerns helped legiti- 
mate the affirmative action plan in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
565-71 n.16 (1990) (quoting Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 
1252 (1949)) (upholding federal afiirmative action plan to achieve broadcast diversi- 
ty). The Court's media anxieties explained why it was initially unwilling to let 
television into the courtroom. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965). 
Perhaps the most pathetic example of the Court's use of public opinion oc- 
curred in 1915, when it concluded that movies should not receive First Amendment 
protection because films were only entertainment and could not affect public opin- 
ion. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915). Wheth- 
er one considers that case a "watershed" case or not, it was overruled almost forty 
years later. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). 
241. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 340 n.1 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissent- 
ing) (quoting John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. B. 
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To justify its doctrine favoring free speech, the Court has 
frequently cited leading lawyers such as John Adamsu2 or 
Lord Erskine, who defended Thomas Paine in a libel action 
over Common Sense.243 The Court has cited Thomas Jeffer- 
son, who had a broad conception of free speech (except when he 
was P r e ~ i d e n t ) : ~ ~  "[Tlhe opinions of men are not the object of 
civil government, nor under its j~risdict ion."~~ The Court has 
also quoted Justice Story: 
So long as known and open responsibility is valuable as  a 
check or an incentive among the representatives of a free peo- 
ple, so long a journal of their proceedings and their votes, 
published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy pub- 
lic favor and be demanded by public 0pini0n.l~~ 
The Court twice used the following quotation from Judge Coo- 
ley: 
[The First Amendment includes the need] to protect parties in 
the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure 
their right to a free discussion of public events and public 
measures, and to enable every citizen a t  any time to bring the 
government and any person in authority to the bar of public 
opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exer- 
ASS% 308 (n.d.)) (upholding conviction under state law for teaching or advocating 
resistance to war effort). Justice Jackson believed that protecting public opinion 
was the goal of the First Amendment: "The very purpose of the First Amendment 
is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind." 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (voiding state 
law requiring labor organizers to register before soliciting members). 
242. "[James] Otis' protest [that Writs of Assistance should require a showing 
of probable cause] was eloquent; but he lost the case. His speech, however, rallied 
public opinion. Then and there,' wrote John Adams, 'the child Independence was 
born.' " Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 248 (1856)) (permitting search based upon 
reliable informant). 
243. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 185 n.4 (1979) (Breman, J., dissenting in 
part); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-48 (1936) (quoting 1 
SPEECHES OF LORD ERSKINE 524-25 (James C. High ed., 1876)); see also LLOYD P. 
STRYKER, FOR THE DEFENSE 210-16 (1947) (relating the trial of Thomas Paine). 
244. See generally LEONARD W. LEW, JEFFERSON AND CNIL LIBERTIES: RIE 
DARKER SIDE (1963) (examining Jefferson's beliefs and actions throughout his years 
in public office). 
245. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE 
JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA app. 976 (John P. Fowler ed., 1967), quoted in Schnei- 
der v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (proscribing presidential security screening 
program of merchant mariners). 
246. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (quoting 1 STORY, C O N S ~ I O N  
Q 841) (upholding delegation of import duty powers to President). 
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cise of the authority which the people have conferred upon 
them.247 
There should be little surprise that the Court has frequent- 
ly cited famous thinkers, politicians, and treatise writers in 
constitutional adjudication. The Federalist Papers is the most 
prominent Every modern Justice has considered 
such authorities. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who asserted 
in Casey that the Court should not listen to any form of public 
opinion, cited John Locke as an authority in a constitutional 
opinion.249 Justice Scalia cited with approval an article by 
Professor Epstein in Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.250 Such citations provide additional authority allow- 
ing the Justices to consult "informed public opinion," to interact 
with the legal scholars who struggle with difficult jurispruden- 
tial problems. The real debate is not over consulting public 
opinion, it is over whose public opinions should be considered. 
The Court's duty to protect politically unpopular opin- 
ions251 puts the Court in a difficult balancing act. Both major- 
247. 2 THOMAS L. COOLEY, C O N ~ I O N A L  LIMITATIONS 885 (Walter 
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927), quoted in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962) 
(reversing judicial contempt). 
248. Wilson, supra note 80. 
249. Justice Rehnquist favorably referred to John Locke in Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-73 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (striking down OSHA regulation concerning 
exposure to benzene). 
250. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (citing Richard Epstein, Takings: Descent 
and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1). 
251. At some point, however, political dissent becomes constitutionally unpro- 
tected violence: "It seems to me most important that the courts should distinguish 
between the two with particular care in these days, when officials under the pres- 
sure of events and public opinion are tempted to blur the distinction." Norton v. 
Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 399 US. 906, 909 (1970) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (allowing no remedy for students suspended for 
distributing leaflets criticizing university administration). The distinction is not 
easy to find. 
Judge Learned Hand claimed to protect "public opinion" but excluded the coun- 
selling of legal disobedience: 
One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands. 
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and 
those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by 
any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is 
the final source of government in a democratic state. 
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
In Thornhill v. Alabama, Justice Murphy made access to the "market of public 
opinion" the constitutional lodestone that separates permissible from unprotected 
political speech: "Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only 
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ities and minorities have the right to  express themselves: 'Be- 
cause a subject is legally arguable, however, does not mean 
that public sentiment will be patient of its advocacy at all 
times and in all manners."252 To protect minorities from ma- 
jority abuses of their free speech rights, the Court must deter- 
mine the climate of opinion a t  the time253 of a particular con- 
stitutional controversy: "People were threatened in N.A.A.C.P. 
and Bates. But while an angry public opinion, and the evils 
which it may spawn, are relevant considerations in adjudging, 
in light of the totality of relevant considerations, . . . the exis- 
tence of an ugly public temper does not, as such and without 
more, incapacitate government ."254 
When it makes such factual determinations, the Court 
where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no 
opportunity to test the merits of the ideas by competition for acceptance in the 
market of public opinion." 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940). In other words, certain cate- 
gories of speech are unprotected because they short-circuit public discourse, pre- 
venting public opinion from having the last word. First Amendment doctrine 
therefore incorporates public opinion both as an end and as a doctrinal litmus test. 
252. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 33 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(statute prohibiting any breach of peace could not be applied with the First 
Amendment to person making controversial speech). 
253. The Court has defended particularly virulent speech during elections. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down various limits 
on campaign spending). As early as 1852, a dissenting Justice tried to 
constitutionalize the public's earlier rejection of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798. 
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 514 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting) 
(voiding state tax upon alien passengers). Consequently, political campaigns can be 
very ugly affairs, constrained only by public opinion. 
Justice Scalia let his disgust overwhelm his judgment when he stated: 
I doubt that those who framed and adopted the First Amendment would 
agree that avoiding the New Corruption, that is, calibrating political 
speech to the degree of public opinion that supports it, is even a desirable 
objective, much less one that is important enough to qualify as a compel- 
ling state interest. Those Founders designed, of course, a system in which 
popular ideas would ultimately prevail. 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (majority upheld state law prohibiting corporations from using gener- 
al treasury funds in election); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261 
n.16 (1952) (quoting David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group 
Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 728 (1942)) (upholding statute outlawing group defa- 
mation). I t  is easy to become appalled by politicians, political campaigns, the me- 
dia, the electorate, the average citizen, even democracy itself. The American experi- 
ment may fail, but it would more likely collapse should a petulant Court withdraw 
constitutional protection from basic democratic processes, tawdry though they some- 
times are. The Court must accept the glitter and manipulation as existing costs 
and characteristics of American democratization. 
254. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 102 (1961) (emphasis added). 
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should not be very deferential to the elected branches255 nor 
to the juries who decide "constitutional facts" that can under- 
mine free speech rights. The Court was correct in closely scmti- 
nizing a jury decision that civil rights leader Medgar Evers 
caused recompensable damage for leading an economic boycott 
during the Civil Rights movement? The subtle -relationship 
between law and public opinion permeates this area of consti- 
tutional law. The Court's determinations of which "facts" a jury 
must decide and what "standards" a jury must apply, such as 
"clear and present danger" for seditious speech, "malice" for 
libel against a public figure, or "prevailing community stan- 
dards" for o b ~ c e n i t ~ ~ ~ '  invariably reflect the Court's underly- 
ing view of how and how much local public opinion should con- 
strain various categories of speech.25s 
255. W]e are cautioned that state legislatures must be leR free to 
'experiment' and to make 'legislative' judgments. We are told that 
mistakes may be made during the legislative process of curbing public 
opinion. In such event the Court fortunately does not leave those 
mistakenly curbed, or any of us for that matter, unadvised. 
Beauharmis, 343 U.S. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting). 
256. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US. 886, 932-34 (1982). 
257. Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, 
J.) (post office could not ban magazines which were not obscene). Dissenting in an 
obscenity case, Justice Douglas complained that the unelected judiciary should not 
set strict obscenity standards because that would bend "the popular mind to new 
norms of conformity." United States v. 12 2004% Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 
U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Congress may ban obscene material 
under Commerce Clause). 
258. No history of public opinion in constitutional interpretation would be 
complete without noting the Court's tendency to provide less protection to political 
dissent during wartime, when the majority popular opinion is of'ten the most cohe- 
sive and self-righteous. Only one of the World War I speech cases overtly discussed 
public opinion, but they all reflected it. According to the dissent in Schaefer, the 
First Amendment does not proted "wilIfully untrue statements or reports of mili- 
tary operations which might mislead public opinion as to the competency of the 
army or navy or its leaders." Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 492-93 
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (evidence sufficient to convict several defendants 
under Espionage Act). The Schaefer Court actually created a "malice" standard of 
"willfblly untrue statements" that is not all that different from the acclaimed mal- 
ice standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964) (striking down 
jury verdict for libel against public figures for lack of malice). Consequently, the 
real problem with many cases is neither the principles nor the doctrines, it is the 
application of those principles and doctrines. 
On the other hand, the general goal of encouraging debate so public opinion 
can be better infomed has led to Justices' arguing for a generous reading of the 
Speech and Debate Clause. See Gravel v. United States, 408 US. 606 (1972) (hold- 
ing that Speech and Debate Clause immunity extends to Senator's aide). The Court 
has to battle governmental secrecy: "By using devices of secrecy, the government 
attains the power to 'manage' the news and through it to manipulate public 
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4. Public opinion triumphant: Economic and social legislation 
a. The Lochner era. After the Civil War, the Court creat- 
ed a more formalistic, pseudo-scientific jurisprudence, which 
was gradually undermined by internal contradictions, Legal 
Realism, and the Depre~sion.~" The Lochner era attempted 
to create objective, principled doctrinal limits that would per- 
mit the Justices to distinguish between unconstitutional inter- 
ferences and legitimate exercises of the police power, as well as 
between law and policy. The quest was futile because doctrine 
will always have an element of incoherence due to irreconcil- 
able political goals and beliefs. The legal system, particularly in  
its leading cases, invariably reflects society's most pressing ten- 
sions. After all, the "felt necessities of the time" influence plain- 
tiffs even more than courts. The nine Justices are torn between 
competing interests and ideologies which have a claim to some 
power and constitutional protection. 
opinion." Id. at 640-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Secrecy in a Free Society, 
213 NATION 254, 256 (1971)); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (up- 
holding congressional delegation of power); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 
581, 603 (1889). Free speech within Congress was particularly important: T h e  
actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the 
power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons." Wilson v. New, 243 
U.S. 332, 366 (1917) (Day, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516, 531 (1884)) (Congress has power to set eight-hour-day work limits but not 
wages for interstate carriers). 
Justices have noted the link between informed public opinion and free speech 
while deciding to be wary of censorship, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 
U.S. 43, 68-69 (1961) (Warren, CJ., dissenting) (permitting city to require film be 
presented to it prior to granting of permit); to require full dissemination of infor- 
mation about labor disputes, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (strik- 
ing down statute prohibiting picketing near businesses); to disclose allegedly im- 
proper business practices, Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 305 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); to guar- 
antee free speech rights of civil servants, Wieman v. Updegrd, 344 U.S. 183, 191 
(1952) (proscribing loyalty oath for civil servants); and to insure the separation of 
church and state, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2674-75 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (public school could not have nonsectarian prayer at graduation ceremo- 
ny). In a similar vein, an attorney told the Court in 1866: "Wlhenever the people 
are told, as they have been in this case, that the indefeasible right to worship God 
according to the dictates of conscience is about to be invaded, the public mind a t  
once arouses itself to repel the invasion." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
277, 304 (1866) (argument of State counsel) (prohibiting State from requiring cler- 
ics and priests to take oath that they never assisted Confederacy). 
259. Professor Horwitz has described how American law evolved from a 
Blackstonian, quasi-feudalism to an explicitly developmental system and next to a 
"formalist" approach. H o R ~ ,  TRANSFORMATION 1780-1860, supra note 162, at 166. 
Horwitz's second book describes how formalism collapsed under legal realism's 
assault. H o R ~ ,  TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44. 
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In his famous dissent in Lochner, Justice Holmes reminded 
the nation of the Court's limits. The Lochner majority did not 
only err because they constitutionalized their own economic 
ideology. They also ignored the public's views: "I think that the 
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when 
it  is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opin- 
ion . . . ."260 Such relativism undercuts both the Casey joint 
opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent. On a doctrinal level, Jus- 
tice Holmes advised against an expansive judicial reading of 
substantive due process. But more generally, he was wary of 
any rigid theory, such as Justice Scalia's originalism, which can 
isolate the Court from the polity. The rest of that same sen- 
tence in his Lochner dissent demonstrates that Holmes' skepti- 
cism still mandated limited judicial review: "[Whenever] it can 
be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit 
that the statute proposed would infiringe fundamental princi- 
ples as they have been understood by the traditions of our peo- 
ple and our law."261 Even this scope of judicial review is con- 
textual; the Court must protect America. traditions and Ameri- 
can law, not jurisprudential abstractions. 
Another problem with Lochner-style substantive due pro- 
cess was the Court's inconsistency. The Supreme Court has 
continually fluctuated between perceiving the public and public 
opinion as perverse, wise, and sovereign, even during the 
pro-capital eras of vested rights and Lochner formalism. Some- 
times the postCivi1 War Court denigrated the general 
populace's wisdom, noting, for example, "the well-known mania 
of the people to run in debt for public improvements?" 
Thus, private corporations had to be protected from public 
venality to avoid "the monstrous injustice of thus placing the 
large investments of complainant, made under the stimulus of 
the inducement held out by the act of 1858, a t  the absolute 
260. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For 
further discussion of this passage fiom Lochner, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Su- 
preme Court, 1992 Term--Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal 
Fundamentali@ Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 79-82 (1993). 
Holmes' common law tradition remains a more formidable obstacle, with a 
lengthy historical pedigree, to Justice Scalia's "originalism" than the "non- 
interpretivism'' that Justice Scalia has castigated. Scalia has explicitly rejected the 
common law perspective. Antonin Scalia, Essay: The Ruk of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
261. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
262. Ritchie v. Franklin County, 89 U.S. 67, 75 (1874) (state can collect special 
tax to pay interest on bonds). 
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mercy of an irresponsible public sentiment, or of public cupidi- 
Indeed, the people would not have ratified the Consti- 
tution if there was "the possibility of a government usurping 
the ordinary business of individuals, driving them out of the 
market."2M The Constitution limited state power in the mar- 
ketplace: "It is not to  be supposed that the company would 
have entered upon this large undertaking in view of the possi- 
bility that, in one of the sudden changes of public opinion t o  
which all municipalities are more or less subject, the city might 
resolve t o  enter the field itself."265 
Nevertheless, that same formalistic Court often deferred t o  
the public. In 1876, the Court applied the malleable law-policy 
distinction to uphold the purchase of stock by local communi- 
ties to  construct a toll road: "Whether the policy was a wise one 
or not is not now the question. It was in accordance with the 
public sentiment of that period."266 Through the legislature, 
the public could determine the means of economic development: 
"[Tlhe legislature, reflecting the public sentiment, [can] decide 
that this general benefit is better promoted by [railroads'] con- 
struction through individuals or corporations than by the State 
itself."267 Because corporations were state creatures, the gov- 
ernment could limit their powers and regulate their abuses. 
Legislatures could define and proscribe monopolies based upon 
public ~entiment:~" [Tlhe general sentiment of the public de- 
clares that such monopolies must be limited to the necessities 
of the case, and rebels against the attempt of one road to con- 
trol all traffic between terminal points.'a69 Public opinion, op- 
263. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 367 (1884) (Field, 
J., dissenting) (quoting a United States district court case from California) (states 
can require utilities to supply goods at fmed prices). 
264. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 457 (1905) (state agents 
liable for federal liquor tax). 
265. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1898) 
(holding city can not er& water works in violation of contractual noncompetition 
clause). 
266. County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682, 693 (1876) (holding county 
can issue bonds). 
267. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 US. 641, 658 (1890) (quoting 
1 COOLEY, supra note 247, at 537) (holding that Congress has power to grant rail- 
road right of -way through Indian Territory). 
268. "It is certainly the conception of a large body of public opinion that the 
control of prices through combinations tends to restraint of trade and to monopoly, 
and is evil." National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905) (holding 
state antitrust laws do not violate due process). 
269. Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 676-77 (1896) (state can amend 
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erating through the legislature, could be the basis for amend- 
ing corporate charters: "[Hlence it has been held that charters 
for purposes inconsistent with a due regard for the public 
health or  public morals may be abrogated in the interests of a 
more enlightened public opinion."70 The states could also use 
their police power to regulate some markets, or in the case of 
lotteries and intoxicating liquors~" even ban the sale of pre- 
viously legal goods.272 Most importantly, the Court ignored 
Taney's interpretive technique in Dred Scott, upholding paper 
money even though the "public mind" at the time of constitu- 
corporate charter if right to amend in original incorporation). "The acts of the 
Minnesota legislature of 1874 and 1881 undoubtedly reflected the general sentiment 
of the public, that their best security is in competition." Id. at 677. 
270. Id. at 666. The states first had to put a savings clause in the charter to 
allow future legislative amendments. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 708 (1819) (Story, J., concurring). 
271. For some years after the Civil War, leading dissenters to the Lochner 
jurisprudence made explicit references to public opinion. The first Justice Harlan 
asserted in Pollock that public opinion, not the Court, should determine income tax 
rates: 
But the remedy for such abuses is to be found at the ballot-box, and in a 
wholesome public opinion which the representatives of the people will not 
long, if at  all, disregard, and not in the disregard by the judiciary of 
powers that have been committed to another branch of the government. 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 680 (1895) (Harlan, J., dis- 
senting) (finding federal income tax to be unconstitutional direct tax). 
Justice Holmes held public opinion in little regard: "I loathe the thick-fingered 
clowns we call the people." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes Wov. 16, 1862), in 
TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY 71 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1946), 
quoted in HORW, TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supm note 44, at 123. Neverthe- 
less, he concluded the public could abuse many constitutional powers without legal 
recourse: 
The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when compen- 
sation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it 
has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it . . . . Wine has been 
thought good for man from the time of the Apostles until recent years. 
But when public opinion changed it did not need the Eighteenth Amend- 
ment, notwithstanding the Fourteenth, to enable a State to say that the 
business should end. 
Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing 
state can enforce criminal prohibition against reselling tickets at higher prices). A 
lawyer appearing before the Supreme Court anticipated Holmes in 1847: "But there 
was no occasion to multiply proofs of public opinion, for intemperance was every- 
where deprecated and lamented, and had almost everywhere fallen under the con- 
demnation of legal restraint, by enactments for that purpose, or by taxation." 
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 520-21 (1847) (argument of State 
counsel). 
272. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392 (1898) (refusing to grant habeas car- 
pus petition to individual charged with violating maximum hour limitations for 
miners). 
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tional ratification opposed such inflationary, pro-debtor 
means.273 
Lawyers quickly seized upon such internal contradictions. 
Overtly influenced by Brandeis' famous brief, the Supreme 
Court in Muller v. Oregon created a loophole to reconcile the 
tension between perpetually changing public opinion and a 
fixed, written Constitution: 
The -legislation and opinions ' referred to in the margin may 
not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little 
or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us 
for determination, yet they, are significant of a widespread 
belief that woman's physical structure . . . justify special 
legislati[ve] restrict[ions] . . . . Constitutional questions, it is 
true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public 
opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution 
that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative 
action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular 
government which otherwise would be lacking.274 
The Muller Court attempted to  reconcile the fixed text with 
fluid public opinion by asserting that public opinion does not 
"settle" constitutional cases. Public opinion, however, could 
influence constitutional determinations. The Muller Court tech- 
nically decided the case by labelling the shift in public opinion 
a question of "fact": 
At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and 
debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional 
limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to  that fact, 
a widespread and long continued belief concerning i t  is wor- 
thy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all mat- 
ters of general kn~wledge?'~ 
Justices frequently employed the fact-law distinction to shift 
away from existing doctrinal formalism, recharacterizing ques- 
tions of law as questions of fact. Not surprisingly, Justice 
Brandeis, author of the famed Muller brief, was a leader in the 
273. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 6!54 (1870) (Field, J., dissent- 
ing) (quoting Mr. Ellsworth in 3 MADISON PAPERS 1345 (Henry D. Gilpin ed., 
1842)) (upholding congressional power to print paper money); see also Hepburn v. 
Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 633 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting) (invalidating 
statute permitting paper money to satisfy debts). 
274. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (emphasis added) (upholding 
ten-hour day for women workers). 
' 275. Id. at 420-21. 
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use of this technique. Justice Brandeis wrote that both Con- 
gress and the public legitimately could consider the "evidential 
fact" of changes in the cost of living?" In an earlier dissent, 
Justice McKema noted that public opinion had changed about 
unions: 'We know things are in chang-have changed-and a 
mark of it is that the drift of public opinion, and of legislation 
following opinion, is to alter the relation between employer and 
employee."277 In short, the constitutionality of a statute de- 
pended on five Justices' determination that a certain variable 
had become a social, legislative "fact.'a78 Eventually, public 
opinion, by itself, became a constitutionally relevant "fact" for 
Brandeis: 
Nearly all legislation involves a weighing of public needs as 
against private desires; and likewise a weighing of relative 
social values. Since government is not an exact science, pre- 
vailing public opinion concerning the evils and the remedy is 
among the important facts deserving consideration; particu- 
larly, when the public conviction is both deep-seated and 
widespread and has been reached aRer deliberati~n.~" 
These interpretations resemble Justice Souter's argument 
in Casey that the Court should consider overruling watershed 
cases when there is widespread belief that the facts have 
changed. Once the Court permits public opinion to redetermine 
such legislative/constitutional "facts" as women's vulnerability 
in Muller or black schoolchildren's injuries in Brown, public 
opinion will have the capacity to transform most constitutional 
doctrines. The constitutional text remains the same, but its 
meaning becomes 
276. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 496 (1929) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ICC can issue recaption order requiring railroads to place 
excess income in a reserve fund and not to keep interest there). 
277. Arizona Employers' Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 438 (1919) (McKenna, J., 
dissenting) (upholding state employers' liability law for inherently hazardous em- 
ployments). 
278. See H o R ~ ,  TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at  189, 198. 
279. Truax v. Conigan, 257 U.S. 312, 357 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted) (state cannot immunize union leaders fiom civil liabilities). 
280. Although he lost the case, the Solicitor General advocating enforcement of 
child labor laws combined public opinion with existing caselaw upholding state 
police powers: "It c a ~ o t  be denied that a change in public opinion regarding child 
labor has occurred like that in relation to lottery tickets." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251, 253 (1918) (argument of Solicitor General) (Congress cannot regulate 
child labor). 
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b. The death of economic substantive due pro- 
cess. Although a judicial revolution occurred in 1937, the first 
shift took place three years earlier. Taking judicial notice of the 
Depression, the Court upheld a state law limiting creditors' 
remedies against defaulting mortgage holders in Home Build- 
ing & Loan Ass'n v. B l a i ~ d e l l . ~ ~ ~  The majority disregarded the 
history of the impairment of Contract Clause, which indicated 
the Framers had created the Clause to  preclude exactly the 
kind of legislation involved in B l a i ~ d e l l . ~ ~ ~  Dissenting Justice 
Sutherland not only condemned the majority's dismissal of 
history but also claimed the Court reinterpreted the Constitu- 
tion because of a change in public opinion: 
Public sentiment and action effect such changes, and the 
courts recognize them; but a court or legislature which should 
allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving to 
a written constitution a construction not warranted by the 
intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with 
reckless disregard of official oath and public d ~ t y . 2 ~  
Justice Sutherland's fears were more than amply realized. 
In 1936, Justice Cardozo quoted in a dissent Professor Warren, 
who observed that numerous constitutional objections concern- 
ing the Bankruptcy Clause, "so hotly and frequently asserted 
from period to  period, were overcome either by public opinion 
or by the Court."28" In 1937, the Court began systematically 
to overrule economic substantive due process cases. Chief Jus- 
281. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
282. See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 
39-51 (1969). See generally Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love 
Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119. 
283. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 452 (1934) 
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 COOLEY, supra note 247, at 124) (state can 
establish mortgage relief during Depression). Justice Sutherland quoted Judge Coo- 
ley extensively: 
A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would 
be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circum- 
stances or be modified by public opinion. It is with special reference to 
the varying moods of public opinion, and with a view to putting the fun- 
damentals of government beyond their control, that these instruments are 
framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible change in 
their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law. 
Id. 
284. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 10 (19351, 
quoted in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 
513, 536 n.6 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (state water district can issue bonds, 
levy and collect taxes, sue and be sued). 
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tice Burger later expressed the prevailing view: "The means 
chosen to effectuate legitimate governmental interests are not 
for this Court to  select. 'These are matters for the legislative 
judgment controlled by public opinion.' The last word on 
this struggle belongs to retired Justice Roberts, the "switching" 
Justice who "saved Nine": "Looking back, it is difficult to  see 
how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform 
standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a 
unified 
IV. WHAT ROLE OUGHT PUBLIC OPINION PLAY 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION? 
This section will argue that several conceptions of public 
opinion ought t o  be part of constitutional adjudication. It will 
start with a relatively non-controversial example: the Court's 
continuing duty to  eradicate state-sponsored racism, a particu- 
larly odious form of public opinion. This section will then exam- 
ine several "structural" issues to demonstrate how public opin- 
ion, reflected through the legislative process, has and ought to  
have the last word on many important constitutional questions. 
The article will then return to the Casey controversy, evalu- 
285. Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561 (1981) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)) (invalidating city's general ban of billboards carrying noncommercial 
advertising). 
286. OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951). Seven 
years earlier, Justice Roberts had been more committed to stare decisis: 
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era 
whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, 
which has been looked to  as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a 
steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary 
ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh 
doubt and conhsion in the public mind as to the stability of our insti- 
tutions. 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 670 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (states cannot 
abridge right to vote in federal elections on the basis of race). 
The modern Court has conceded that public opinion, directly and indirectly via 
legislation, is a major factor in regulating the economy. Tigner v. Texas, 310 US. 
141, 149 (1940) (legislature can refuse to extend antitrust laws to farmers and 
stockmen). The Court has also deferred to congressional regulation of the 
business-labor relationship. American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 
335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (state can pass "right to 
work" law); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 349-50 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (court has authority under federal law to issue national 
labor injunction); see also ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE 
OF LAW xiii, xv, xvii, 25 (2d ed. 1976). 
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ating the three relevant opinions in light of what has been 
presented. That discussion leads in turn to an inquiry about 
the relationship between "principles" and "public opinion." 
A. Weeding Out Venal Public Opinion: 
Equal Protection and Race 
Nowhere has the Supreme Court's uneasy relationship 
with reality been more evident than in its race cases. The bat- 
tle against racism, after all, is an effort to eradicate a vile, 
unenlightened form of public opinion.287 Putting the issue 
more generally, the Court cannot determine which traits de- 
serve additional constitutional protection as "suspect classifica- 
tions" without consulting history, particularly the history of 
public "irrational prej~dice."~" For example, Justices Murphy 
and Rutledge looked at California's "public mind" to argue that 
the California Alien Land Law was racist and unconstitution- 
al.289 
Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion demonstrates the 
Court's selective use of public opinion. Taney inaccurately de- 
scribed the state of public opinion at  the time of the 
Constitution's ratification and expressly ignored existing opin- 
ion at the time of his decision.290 On the other hand, Taney 
properly observed that colonial racial laws, such as the pro- 
scription against racial intermarriage, were stigmatic proof of 
the blacks' lack of equal citizenship rights.291 
287. I do not mean to imply that the First Amendment leaves racist speech 
completely unprotected. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (in- 
validating statute crirninalizing burning of cross under a viewpoint discriminatory 
approach). 
288. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 450 (1985) 
(invalidating city's refusal to permit a group home for mentally retarded). 
289. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-62 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(holding state c a ~ o t  pass discriminatory alien land law). 
290. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-09 (1856). 
291. Id at 409. The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott. The Su- 
preme Court later reflected: "It is sufficient to say that the country did not acqui- 
esce in the opinion, and that the civil war, which shortly thereafter followed, pro- 
duced such changes in judicial, as well as public sentiment, as to seriously impair 
the authority of this case." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 274 (1901) (Congress 
and President can permit Puerto Rico to set different customs and duties than rest 
of country). 
Yet there were limits to that momentarily enlightened public sentiment. The 
drafters initially did not include an explicit right to vote in the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment because they feared public opinion. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 180 
n.42 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2532 (1866)). 
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The Supreme Court firmly put its racial blinders on when 
it upheld the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v. 
Fergu~on.~'~ Ignoring Taney's argument in Dred Scott, the 
majority did not find segregation to  be stigmatic. They consid- 
ered any injuries to be mere fantasies of the black minority. In 
his dissent, Justice Harlan openly discussed the pernicious 
influence of Southern racism on the laws and customs in ques- 
tion: 
[Earlier state judicial decisions] were made a t  a time when 
public opinion, in many localities, was dominated by the insti- 
tution of slavery; when it would not have been safe to do 
justice to the black man; and when, so far as  the rights of 
blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically, the 
supreme law of the land?" 
In a variety of ways, Chief Justice Warren demonstrated 
his political astuteness when desegregating public schools in 
Brown v. Board of  ducati ion^^^ overruling Plessy in the pro- 
cess. He knew Brown had t o  satisfy world opinion: "The federal 
government prepared an amicus brief that explained in great 
detail the harmful effects of American segregation on the for- 
eign policy of the executive branch."2g5 He lobbied Justice 
Reed for months to join the opinion to create a unanimous 
vote.296 Chief Justice Warren then wrote a short, 
nonjudgmental opinion, designed to be accessible t o  the average 
citizen.297 He criticized neither the South nor the Plessy 
Court, gently distinguishing Plessy by citing leading social 
scientists who had recently "discovered" that segregation in- 
jures black children. The Rrown II remedy also reflected defer- 
ence2" to the Southern white public, both in terms of timing 
292. 163 US. 537 (1896). Chief Justice Shaw created the doctrine. LEVY, supra 
note 171, at 109-17. 
293. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
294. 349 US. 294 (1955) (Brown II). 
295. FISHER, supra note **, at 18. The Government's brief noted: "Racial dis- 
crimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises 
doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the dem- 
ocratic faith." 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AM) ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME C o r n  OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Cas- 
per eds., 1975). 
296. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 698 (1975). 
297. "The genius of the Warren opinion . . . was that it was so simple and 
unobtrusive." Id. a t  697 (quoting Barret Prettyman). 
298. "[Ilt should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional 
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them." 
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("all deliberate speed") and implementation (by lower federal 
In short, a variety of public opinions, regional, na- 
tional, and international, permeated those all-important deci- 
sions. 
After the South became intransigent, the Warren Court 
turned more judgmental?' The Court found local school de- 
segregation plans to be inadequate because they were compro- 
mised by hostile public opinion.301 The Court knowingly 
forced its decrees upon an unwilling white majority: "[Tlhe 
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to 
yield simply because of disagreement with them."302 Justice 
Breman described the South's dismal racial history: 
The real evil in the southern States you will find in the baf- 
fled pro-slavery tendency prevailing there; in a diseased pub- 
lic sentiment which partly vents itself in violent acts, partly 
winks at them, and partly permits itself to be overawed by 
them. That public sentiment is not only terrorizing timid 
people, but it is corrupting the jury-box, it is overawing the 
witness-stand, and it is thus obstructing the b c t i o n s  of jus- 
t i ~ e . ~ ' ~  
More recently, the Court has returned to a more formal 
conception of equality, levelling the playing field without evalu- 
ating the condition of the players. The actual state of public 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (requiring desegregation of 
schools with all deliberate speed) (Brown II). 
299. KLUGER, supra note 296, at 698. 
300. In 1968, the Court relied upon legislative history to outlaw racially dis- 
criminatory housing: "[Tlhe Senatois concern . . . was that Negroes might be 'op- 
pressed and in fact deprived of their freedom' not only by hostile laws but also by 
'prevailing public sentiment.' " Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 432 
n.54 (1968) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 3%h Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1866)) (holding that 
African-Americans have right to sue private home sellers for racial discrimination). 
301. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (rejecting freedom of 
choice plan as insufficient to accomplish elimination of dual school system). The 
district court in Dowell v. Board of Education criticized desegregation plans: "[The 
Board] rationalize[d] its intransigence on the constitutionally unsound basis that 
public opinion [was] opposed to any further desegregation." 338 F. Supp. 1256, 
1270 (W.D. Okla.), af'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 
(1972). 
302. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968) (holding that "free 
transfer plann is insufficient to eliminate dual school system) (quoting Brown II, 
349 U.S. at 300). 
303. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 218-19 (1970) (Breman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 
687 (1872) (remarks of Senator Schurz)) (emphasis added) (holding that white 
plaintiff failed to prove conspiracy under civil rights law). 
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opinion, particularly the overall extent and effects of racism, 
has become constitutionally insigmficant. Justice O'Connor 
struck down Richmond's affirmative action plan in City of Rich- 
mond v. JA. Croson Co. partially on the technical ground that 
there were insdlicient findings of racism in the local construc- 
tion industry.s04 On one level, that legalistic argument bor- 
ders on the absurd. There is and has been widespread, dam- 
aging racism in Richmond, Virginia that has impaired black 
entrepreneurs for centuries. Richmond, aRer all, was the capi- 
tal of the Confederacy. There may be reasons not to  have affir- 
mative action, but insufficient evidence of racism and racism's 
insidious effects is not one of them. 
In his Casey dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist used Brown 
to  demonstrate how his jurisprudence was grounded on ab- 
straction, not racial realities: "The rule of Brown is not tied to 
popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment 
that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segre- 
gation, no matter whether the public might come to believe 
that it is beneficial."305 Somewhat ironically, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was confirming an earlier liberal complaint that the 
Brown opinion was too contextual because it is largely pre- 
mised upon unstable social science findings of injury. There are 
times to be formalisticso6 and to ignore public opinion, but 
there are other times to  take such realities into consideration. 
Many liberals will use formal doctrine to  immunize Brown's 
core holding proscribing legal segregation fkom changes in 
social views or social science, yet they also want the Court to 
be aware of the actual state of racial relations in affirmative 
action cases.307 The judicial choice is over when to use the 
public opinion argument, expressly or not, not whether to use it 
at all. 
B. Public Opinion as Constitutional Decisionmaker 
and the Constitutional Structure 
In a recent article, this author wrote that the American 
304. 488 U.S. 469, 485, 499 (1989). 
305. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2865 (1992) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring in the judgement in part, dissenting in part). 
306. See James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formulism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431 
(1985). 
307. Of course, Justice Souter's hedged opinion may satisfy public opinion more 
than Justice Scalia's more rigid approach or the liberals' more absolutist 
protections. 
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constitutional system cannot be adequately understood without 
importing the English concept of "constitutional conven- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~ ~  Constitutional conventions are allocations and regu- 
lations of constitutional power that the judiciary cannot effec- 
tively determine andlor enforce. Conventions are formed by 
circumstance and are ratified by practice and public opinion. 
Examples include impeachment standards and proceedings, the 
obligation of the electors in the electoral college to vote for the 
presidential nominee who received the most votes in the 
electors' state, and most internal workings of Congress.. 
Although it has never conceptualized such issues as "con- 
stitutional conventions," the Supreme Court has cordoned off 
certain constitutional disputes from meaningful judicial review. 
The factor of public opinion helps justify protection of the core 
stmctural doctrines of federalism30g and separation of powers: 
"Probably of more importance is the public reaction engendered 
by any attempt of one branch to dominate or harass another. 
Even traditional political attempts to establish dominance have 
met with little success owing to contrary public sentiment."1° 
308. See James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially 
Unenforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to 
Regulate Political Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1992). 
309. When the Warren Court was constitutionalizing numerous criminal proce- 
dures, Justice Frankfurter partially justified such actions for their educative value, 
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 202 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (uphold- 
ing admission of allegedly coerced confession); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is 
the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992). 
Indeed, the Court explained how public opinion created different state and fed- 
eral rights: 
There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained 
by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under 
State or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more 
effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police 
directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporad- 
ically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively ex- 
erted throughout the country. 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1949) (exclusionary rule does not apply to 
unreasonable search and seizure in state court); see &o Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
US. 618, 630-31 (1965) (refusing to give retroactive application of exclusionary rule 
to the states). Less activist Justices were less charitable, believing federal court 
interventions led to the "growing denigration of the state courts and their functions 
in the public mind." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 264 (1973) (Powell, 
J., concurring) (quoting Judge Paul C. Reardon, Address at  the ABA section of 
Judicial Administration annual dinner (Aug. 14, 1972)) (state need not prove that 
defendant knew he had right not to consent to search). 
310. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 523 (1972) (bribery not protected 
by Speech and Debate Clause). 
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For example, the Supreme Court recently refused to review 
Federal District Judge Walter Nixon's procedural challenges to 
his impeachment because Nixon raised a "political ques- 
t i~n."~" Congress alone will initially determine when, why, 
and how someone should be impeached. The public remains the 
only meaningful constraint. Because the Court cannot effective- 
ly regulate either the process or substance of impeachments, 
the rest of us need to develop precise constitutional conventions 
to control the politicians' congressional discretion. For instance, 
we should continue to support the convention, established by 
the failure to impeach Justice Chase, of not impeaching Jus- 
tices for their political views. Nevertheless, impeachment, a 
legislative weapon that can only be effectively regulated by 
public  opinion^* remains the final safeguard against judicial 
1. Congressional committee investigations: A case study of law 
and convention 
Over a period of years, Congress has developed a set of 
conventions to prevent constitutional abuses: "It is not, there- 
fore, reasoning upon things as they are, to  suppose that any 
deliberative assembly, constituted under it, would ever assert 
any other rights and powers than those which had been estab- 
lished by long practice, and conceded by public opinion.'"14 
Examples include limiting the Supreme Court to nine Justices 
and refusing to use congressional power over federal jurisdic- 
tion to  strip the federal courts of the power to  adjudicate con- 
stitutional claims. Congress is another interpreter and protec- 
tor of the Con~ti tut ion.~~~ 
311. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). 
312. Wilson, supra note 308, at 699-701. 
313. In two different opinions, seven Justices held that Judge Nixon's claim 
was a nonjusticiable political question. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 732. For an argument 
favoring judicial review in the Nixon case, see Rose Auslander, Note, Impeaching 
the Senate's Use of Trirtl Committees, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 68 (1992). 
314. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 US. (6 Wheat.) 204, 232 (1821) (Sergeant at Arms 
of House has defense to assault and battery and false imprisonment for arresting a 
Member held in contempt). 
315. Justice Daniel reminded the Court that it had to coexist with public opin- 
ion expressed through the legislative branches: 
[Tlo whatever extent, therefore, the opinions of this tribunal may be rec- 
ognized, (and by no one will they within their proper bounds be main- 
tained with truer loyalty than by myself,) yet when challenged to obedi- 
ence to those opinions, I am bound to remember that the constitution is 
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The investigatory powers of congressional committees pres- 
ent problems that can best be resolved by a mixture of law and 
convention. The Supreme Court has properly created legal 
rights that even congressional committees must respect. For 
above all and over all, and that public opinion conveyed through its legit- 
imate channel, the legislation of the country, will cause itself to be heard 
and respected. 
The Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 570, 576 (1855) (Daniel, J., dis- 
senting) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to try case involving boat collision). 
Such an allocation of power is not as disturbing as it might seem. Another 
nineteenth-century court observed that public opinion joins the judiciary in protect- 
ing constitutional rights: 
[N]o serious invasion of constitutional guarantees by the legislature 
could withstand for a long time the searching influence of public opinion, 
which was sure t o  come sooner or later to the side of law, order and 
justice, however it might have been swayed for a time by passion or 
prejudice, or whatever aberrations might have marked its course. 
Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 534 (1892) (holding states can regulate fees 
charged by grain elevators). 
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall concluded the Court should 
defer to legislative determinations of the need for a particular means to fulfill a 
particular constitutional end. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412-24 (1819). The Lochner 
era demonstrated that such judicial deference was not always forthcoming. Because 
the public-legislative assessments of necessity vary over the years, legislators can 
change many constitutional arrangements: 
The question before us is not one of policy but of power, and while public 
opinion had gradually brought all the States as matter of fact to the 
pursuit of a uniform system of popular election by general ticket, that 
fact does not tend to weaken the force of contemporaneous and long con- 
tinued previous practice when and as different views of expediency pre- 
vailed. 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1892) (holding states can determine how 
members of electoral college are selected but c a ~ o t  set different election date). 
Congress is the best forum to "modify the law to reflect such changes in popular 
attitudes." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (poll tax unconstitutional). 
Committing many constitutional disputes to the Legislature does not undermine 
the Constitution. "To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of 
public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a 
contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free peo- 
ple." Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (states can require 
school students to take Pledge of Allegiance). In 1821, the Court explained how 
public opinion helps develop constitutional practices: 
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and 
charged with the care of all that is dear to them; composed of the most 
distinguished citizens, selected and drawn together from every quarter of 
a great nation; whose deliberations are required by public opinion to be 
conducted under the eye of the public, and whose decisions must be 
clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited confidence in their wisdom 
and purity can inspire . . . . 
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821). 
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example, it held that the Self-Incrimination Clause prevents 
Congress from forcing individuals to  testify without immuni- 
tye316 
Congress, however, is fkee to interrogate whomever it 
wants, both to  develop policy and to attempt to  modify behav- 
ior. The primary check on congressional investigations is public 
~pinion.~" It is permissible to  attempt to mobilize the public 
to eliminate the House Un-American Activities Committee, but 
such attempts do not immunize HUAC critics from WAC 
 investigation^?'^ The Court cannot stop all constitutional 
wrongs; it cannot protect those who are being investigated from 
the injury caused to  their public reputations by being investi- 
gatede31g Consequently, the country needs to develop addi- 
tional constitutional conventions to balance Congress' "need to 
know" against important individual rights and interests. For 
example, the Senate recently createdSm an important, desir- 
able convention. Senators from both parties who were investi- 
gating the leak of Anita Hill's affidavit decided not to  force 
testimony from the reporters who first wrote about the leak of 
316. One witness noted in Sweezy v. New Hampshire that the right against 
self-incrimination becomes somewhat illusory when the public is enraged: "My own 
reason for rejecting it is that, with public opinion in its present state, the exercise 
of the privilege is almost certain to be widely misinterpreted." 354 U.S. 234, 241 
n.6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (state c a ~ o t  conduct investigations under the vague 
phrase of "subversive persons"); see also Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 546 
(1917) (House has no express power to punish contempt aside from its own 
members). 
317. "When the powers of legislative inquiry are abused, the remedy does not 
lie in noncooperation or defiance; it is to be sought through the normal c h a ~ e l s  of 
informed public opinion." Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 564 
n.6 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR FACULTIES, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 
(1953)) (state cannot dismiss employee for refusing to testify). 
318. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961) (upholding House 
contempt for rehsing to testify on First Amendment grounds). In a prior dissent, 
Justice Douglas argued that such legislative investigations were unconstitutional 
because they constituted "infamy." U l l m a ~  v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 448-54 
(1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (person can be forced to testify before Committee 
after being granted immunity). 
319. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 500-01 (1960) (Douglas, J., dis- 
senting) (upholding Civil Rights Commission's power to investigate without permit- 
ting cross examination); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 421-23 (1958) 
( B r e ~ a n ,  J., dissenting) (upholding discharge of employee for refusing to answer 
questions about Communist f i a t ions ) ;  Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 US. 123, 128-29 (1951) (holding Attorney General can not designate 
certain groups as Communist without having a hearing). 
320. Constitutional conventions can be created or modiiied by a single episode. 
K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSIT~PTIONS 180 (1951). 
10371 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 1113 
Professor Hill's allegation that she was sexually harassed by 
future Justice Thomas.321 
2. Public opinion, war, and peace 
In Marbury v. Madison:22 Chief Justice Marshall limited 
the vast scope of judicial review to legal questions. For in- 
stance, the Court has little authority over such political prob- 
lems as foreign policy  decision^.^^ In 1823, Chief Justice 
Marshall explained how only public opinion could regulate 
territorial conquest.3u Justice Reed later argued that "meth- 
ods for maintenance of Army discipline should be subject to 
public opinion as expressed through Congress."3* Another 
Justice concluded that only military tribunals and public opin- 
ion could stop "wanton cruelty" during wartime.32B Immediate 
public opinion and carefully crafted conventions remain the pri- 
mary regulators of these all-important powers. 
Of all the modern Supreme Court Justices, Justice Jackson 
has been the most attuned to  the complex, contextual relation- 
ships linking constitutional law with constitutional politics. 
When the Court upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans 
during World War 11 in Korernat~u:~' Jackson dissented. He 
concluded that the federal district court did not have the power 
to punish a Japanese-American defendant violating a camp 
curfew because the federal judiciary has no jurisdiction over 
such an issue. The only effective constitutional constraints 
were nonjudicial: 
I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that 
seems to me wholly delusive . . . . The chief restraint upon 
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the 
future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the polit- 
ical judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judg- 
321. TIMOTHY M. PHELPs & HELEN  WINTER^, CAPITOL GAMES 431-33 (1992). 
322. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
323. Id. at 165-66. 
324. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823) (holding Unit- 
ed States courts cannot recognize title of land granted from Indian tribes to indi- 
viduals). 
325. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 43 (1955) (Reed, J., 
dissenting) (ex-serviceman could not be subjected to trial by court-martial). 
326. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 166 (1879) (army officer not liable for 
injuries resulting from military actions or orders in Southern states under martial 
law). 
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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ments of history.328 
Eight years later, Jackson apparently limited his judicial 
deference t o  armed conflicts immediately threatening the 
nation's existence. He decided that President Truman acted 
unconstitutionally by seizing the country's s tee1 mills during 
the Korean War.329 This time, the rule of law, expressed 
through congfessional legislation, congressional inaction, and 
judicial decisions, prevailed over executive prerogative powers. 
What had been unreviewable in World War I1 had become 
unconstitutional. Jackson saw the President's unique relation- 
ship with the body politic not as just a constraint but also as a 
threat: 
No other personality in public life can begin to compete with 
him in access to the public mind through modern methods of 
communications. By his prestige as head of state and his 
influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those 
who are supposed to check and balance his power which ofken 
cancels their effecti~eness.~~' 
Jackson's opinions demonstrate that many constitutional 
issues should not be reduced to  convention; we need a proper 
mix of law and   on vent ion.^^' For example, the Court proper- 
ly protected the New York Times in the watershed Pentagon 
Papers case, because a free press is needed to inform public 
328. Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson's arguments supporting the 
Nuremberg trials were very different. He argued that international law was needed 
to punish the major Nazi leaders who had engaged in evil ads  of war. TELFORD 
T A ~ R ,  THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 53 (1992). The British had 
initially wanted to execute the leaders without trial. Id. at 29. 
329. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579, 634 (1952) (Jack- 
son, J., concurring) (preventing President from seizing and running steel mills 
during wartime). 
330. Id. at 653-54. 
331. Prosecutorial and administrative discretion temper the rule of law with 
political considerations. Except in the rarest situations, the Court does not review 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in criminal cases. Consequently, 
the control of administrative discretion takes place largely outside the courtroom. 
Yick Wo is the exception that proves the rule. That case held that the San Fran- 
cisco Board of Supervisors violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving laundry 
licenses to virtually all white applicants but no Chinese applicants. Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886) (striking down racist administration of laundry 
licenses). However, the Court noted: "[Iln many cases of mere administration the 
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of 
the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the 
suffrage." Id. at 370. 
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opinion about foreign affairs and military conflicts.332 The 
public, after all, cannot create and enforce conventions to pre- 
vent abuses abroad if the public does not know what is happen- 
ing abroad. 
3. Public opinion and  the judiciary 
Justice Souter's argument that the Supreme Court needs 
the support of the body politic is not original. A lawyer told the 
Court in 1849 in The Passenger Cases: "It is desirable [that the 
unelected judges] should secure the affections of the peo- 
ple."33s Judges write opinions, containing their reasoning, to 
persuade public opinion: 
[Als long as the judges of the United States are obliged to 
express their opinions publicly, to give their reasons for them 
when called upon in the usual mode, and to stand responsible 
for them, not only to public opinion, but to a court of impeach- 
ment, I can apprehend very little danger of the laws being 
wrested to purposes of injustice."' 
Over the decades, the judiciary and public opinion combine to 
determine which judicial outcomes, which judicial reasons, and 
which judicial modes of argument are constitutionally legiti- 
mate. 
Like impeachment, the judicial power to punish contempt 
is a governmental power, arising under the law, that cannot 
effectively be regulated by law alone: "The power to punish for 
332. In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in 
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon exec- 
utive policy and power in the areas of national defense and interna- 
tional affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and 
critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of dem- 
ocratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press 
that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of 
the First Amendment. For without an informed and fkee press there 
cannot be an enlightened people. 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., con- 
curring) (permitting newspapers to print stolen, classified Pentagon Papers during 
Vietnam War). 
333. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 379 (1849) (argument of defense 
counsel) (invalidating state laws imposing taxes on foreign ship passengers). 
334. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 107 (1895) (quoting Unit- 
ed States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1336 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815). The 
open judicial process serves as a cathartic vehicle to absorb community anger after 
a violent crime has taken place. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
571-72 (1980) (plurality opinion) (criminal trial cannot be closed to media). 
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contempt is always open to abuse. The persons injured are 
judges in their own case. The only safeguard, outside of public 
opinion, lies in the character of the persons intrusted with this 
power.77335 The power will sometimes be abused by the entire 
judiciary, as in In re Debs.336 In the first volume of the Unit- 
ed States Reports the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a 
contempt of court because the defendant's speech "prejudic[ed] 
the public (a part of whom must hereafter be summoned as 
jurors) with respect to the merits of a cause depending in this 
court, and of corrupting the administration of justice.77337 
Just  as there are costs and risks in creating discretionary 
powers, there are also benefits. The Court has praised judges 
who resist local pressures: "A judge who is part of such a dra- 
matic episode can hardly help but know that his decision is apt 
to be unpopular. But the law of contempt is not made for the 
protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public 
opinion."3s8 Certainly Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., who bat- 
tled Southern segregation for decades, is a judicial h e r ~ . ~ ~ ~  
The public should closely scmtinize judicial behavior and feel 
free, protected by the First A m e n d ~ n e n t , ~ ~ ~  to criticize the ju- 
335. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 723-24 (1964) (appendix) (quoting 
ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL AW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 174 (1930)) (emphasis 
added). 
336. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
337. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 326 (1788) (opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Pe~sylvania) (interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution to 
uphold libel action against newspaper article criticizing judge); see also Toledo 
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 415 (1918) (newspaper can be held 
in contempt for writing article calling judge's integrity into question). But see Craig 
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (reversing contempt for publishing newspaper arti- 
cles critical of state trial judge). 
338. Craig, 331 US. at 376. 
339. See generally TINSLEY E .  YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (1981) (examining Judge Johnson's career up to his ap- 
pointment to the Fifth Circuit); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Ac- 
tivism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979). 
340. "The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding 
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public 
opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not 
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions." Bridges v. California, 
314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (footnote omitted) (state judges can only punish contempt 
if there is "clear and present danger"). But see P e ~ e k a m p  v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 
(1946) (holding that trial court could not find critical newspaper articles to be in 
contempt of court). "Courts c a ~ o t  function in a free country when the atmosphere 
is charged with the effusions of a press designed to poison the mind of the public 
against the presiding judges rather than to clarify the issues and propagate the 
truth about them . . . ." Id. at 344 n.6 (quoting P e ~ e k a m p  v. State, 22 So. 2d 
875, 885 (Fla. 1945)). 
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diciary. Judges, on the other hand, should not be intimidated 
by the public. Two conflicting fears reside at the heart of this 
problem. But there is no contradiction in distrusting both the 
judiciary and the public; there is only common sense. Every 
group has the capacity to abuse its power. Ultimately, the pub- 
lic retains the last word. Not only can the public complain 
about judges, but it also can pressure Congress to  impeach.341 
C. The Judicial Tradition Opposing the Use of Public 
Opinion in Constitutional Adjudication 
This survey has revealed that Justices tend to refer ex- 
pressly to public opinion in the most contentious cases: Dred 
Scott, the debate over the Lochner jurisprudence, Blaisdale, the 
Pentagon Papers case, and Casey. Overt judicial discussion of 
public opinion is a symptom of major judicial conflict. 
As seen in the initial section of Casey, public opinion anal- 
ysis has influenced modern substantive due process cases.342 
Justice Harlan incorporated public opinion into his determina- 
tion of "ordered liberty" in the first contraception case, Poe v. 
U l l r n ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Public opinion of one era created the 
anti-contraception statute: ';The so-called Comstock Law may 
be regarded as characteristic of the attitude of a large segment 
of public opinion on this matter through the end of last centu- 
~ y . ' ' ~ ~  That public opinion became dated: ';Indeed the 
criticism of these measures assumes that they represented 
There were limits to this principle; courts could bar pickets near the 
courthouse because the state had the power to protect the judicial process from 
being misjudged in the minds of the public. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 
(1965) (reversing conviction for picketing "near" a courthouse). 
341. In 1866, an attorney in Ex parte Milligan explained: "For any wilful or 
corrupt violation of their duty, they are liable to  be impeached; and they cannot 
escape the control of an enlightened public opinion, for they must sit with open 
doors, listen to full discussion, and give satisfadory reasons for the judgments they 
pronounce." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 64 (1866) (defense counsel argument) (military 
courts do not have jurisdiction over civilians when civil courts are still available). 
342. In her concurrence in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor cited an AMA poll: "56% 
of those surveyed had told family members their wishes concerning the use of 
life-sustaining treatment if they entered an irreversible coma." Cruzan v. Director 
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 n.1 (1990) (O'Co~or, J., concurring) (citing 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, SURVEYS OF PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC OPINION ON 
HEALTH CARE ISSUES 29-30 (1988)) (holding that state can require clear and con- 
vincing evidence that person in coma wanted termination of life-support systems). 
343. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
344. Id. at 546 n.12 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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general public opinion, though of a bygone day."345 As noted 
in the Introduction, Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade partially 
relied on leading "professional" public opinion, discussing the 
views of the American Medical Association, the American Bar 
Association, and the American Public Health Asso~iation.~~ 
Justice Souter's Casey opinion attempted to reconcile the 
ancient tension between the Federalists and the Republicans 
by incorporating both perspectives, much as Justice Johnson 
had done in Hudson.347 According to Justice Souter, the 
Court must be committed to  "principle" in order to have con- 
tinued public respect and support. The Court must ignore mo- 
mentary swings in public sentiment, particularly those generat- 
ed by furious partisans. However, when a large percentage of 
the public comes to believe that a watershed constitutional 
decision was wrongly decided, as was the eventual fate of 
Plessy and Lochner, the Court can and should change the basic 
constitutional doctrine to  incorporate that transformation in 
public opinion. In such cases, the Court should also consider 
the views of leading legal thinkers, such as Professor Charles 
Black. In other words, constitutional "principles" are not immu- 
table but are contingent creatures. 
In one of the most honest judicial opinions ever written, 
Justice Souter has sought to  combine the stability of principle 
and stare decisis with the inevitable constitutional revolutions 
that sweep this country. Some constitutional thinkers, includ- 
ing some of his colleagues, will not like this fluid vision of the 
Constitution, but I think it accurately describes how the Con- 
stitution has operated over the past two c e n t u r i e ~ . ~  All law 
is permanently in flux. The only question is the rate of change. 
By the same token, the rejection of public opinion by Jus- 
tice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Casey does not make 
them constitutional revoluti~naries.~~~ They can turn to a 
345. Id. at 547 n.12. 
346. 410 U.S. 113, 141-47 (1973). Justice Blackmuds opinion is overly defer- 
ential to the medical profession; Roe sometimes reads more like a right to practice 
medicine case than a privacy case. 
347. 11 US. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
348. In addition, Justice Souter's approach is consistent with the views of 
many constitutional thinkers, on and off the Court. 
349. Justice Thomas cited a book arguing that the judiciary's insularity makes 
it attractive to leftist lawyers. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 905 n.4 (1993) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 25 (1973)) (defendant barred in collater- 
al review from raising new constitutional rule challenging death sentence). 
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smaller group of cases to formulate a different judicial tradi- 
tion. Unless one wants to transform the Constitution into a 
purely majoritarian document, the Court must protect some 
"core" rights from prevailing public opinion. Justice Jackson's 
Barnette opinion eloquently stated the Court's obligation: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and 
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, 
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they de- 
pend on the outcome of no elections.350 
In 1827, Justice Johnson, author of the Hudson opinion, 
equated "public opinion" with the politics side of the 
law/politics distinction: "[Acquiescing to unfounded doctrines 
and dicta] affords facilities for giving an undue bias to  public 
opinion, and, I will add, of interpolating doctrines which belong 
not t o  the law."351 Recall that Justice Story also separated 
"principle" from "popular appeal" in Dartmouth College. We 
have already seen how Chief Justice Taney's opinion'in Dred 
Scott explicitly repudiated current public opinion: "Any other 
rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of 
this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion 
or passion of the day."352 
In the 1880s, members of the formalistic Supreme Court 
isolated themselves from public opinion: "The truth is, that 
public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging back- 
ward and forward to extreme lengths."353 They praised Eng- 
350. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 638 (1943) 
(state cannot require schoolchildren to take Pledge of Allegiance). Justice Jackson 
added: 
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our 
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these begin- 
nings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of 
the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of 
the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal 
opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by 
public opinion, not public opinion by authority. 
Id. at 641. 
351. Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 614 (1827) (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
352. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856). 
353. Ex pa& Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting) 
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lish judges for their capacity to  transcend their fellow citi- 
z e n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Such judicial arrogance helped set the stage for the 
Lochner era, in which the Court ignored, at great cost to the 
country, radical changes in the economy, technology, and public 
opinion.355 In addition to quoting favorably the above state- 
ment from Dred Scott, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell Justice Sutherland argued: "The Constitution is a 
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That 
which it meant when adopted it means 
Justice Souter's Casey opinion could also be criticized on 
the ground that no Supreme Court had ever applied his partic- 
ular conception of public opinion. Furthermore, many Justices 
have separated the judicial domain, excluding public opinion, 
from the political domain, where public opinion reigns su- 
preme. In other words, Justice Scalia might argue that Justice 
Souter has not properly adhered to the Supreme Court's "tradi- 
tion." Justice Souter's argument, however, resembles the Hud- 
son decision: he consults both the public and leading legal 
scholars like Professor Charles Black t o  determine whether or 
not a watershed case should be overruled. Justice Scalia's tra- 
dition of pure judicial autonomy from public opinion, based 
upon Osborn, Dred Scott, and Sutherland's Blaisdell dissent, 
proves, at  best, that at least two competing "traditions" can be 
teased out of the cases. 
The historical record is rich, not easily susceptible to a 
single interpretation. It is notoriously difficult to "prove" any- 
(upholding law prohibiting federal officials from giving or receiving anything from 
any other officer for political reasons). Justice McClean's dissent in Dred Scott con- 
demned the pro-slavery change in state law caused by "some new light" or "excited 
public opinion." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at  563 (McClean, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855)) (published version of 
law prevails over unpublished version). In Pease v. Peck, the Court rejected a then 
recent precedent because it reflected excited public opinion: 
When the decisions of the state court are not consistent, we do not feel 
bound to follow the last, if i t  is contrary to our own convictions,-and 
[sic] much more is this the case, where, a h r  a long course of mnsistent 
decisions, some new light suddenly springs up, or an excited public opin- 
ion has elicited new doctrines, subversive of former safe precedent. 
59 U.S. a t  599. 
354. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 140 (1895) (Gray, J., dis- 
senting). 
355. For a contrary view, see Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence 
and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
356. 290 U.S. 398, 450 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting South Caro- 
lina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)). 
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thing in constitutional law, particularly what is or is not a 
"tradition." Those observations contain an additional problem 
for Justice Scalia. The characterization of a constitutionally 
valid tradition involves another subjective choice between com- 
peting definitions. Justice Scalia, however, has tried to use the 
tradition argument to formulate "objective" law. In  other words, 
Justice Scalia endorses arguments that he believes will 
eliminate indeterminacy and subjective choice. The historical 
record presented in this Article demonstrates the hti l i ty of 
such a quest, whether in determining a "tradition" or defining 
"public opinion."357 
Interpretive irony colors Justice Scalia's approach. At the 
end of Casey, he graphically describes the sullen portrait of 
Chief Justice Taney, painted after Dred Scott, in Harvard Law 
School's library. Justice Scalia noted that Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion failed to reunite the country and predicted that  Justice 
Souter's opinion will probably meet a similar fate. Yet, Justice 
Scalia's constitutional methodology reproduces Chief Justice 
Taney's rigid commitment to text and ratification history. In 
addition, Chief Justice Taney's ruthless twisting of the Terri- 
tories Clause, finding that Congress had no power to regulate 
slavery in any new territories under that Clause,s5' neither 
persuaded much of the country nor removed the Court from 
political controversy. Over a hundred years ago, Chief Justice 
Taney's decision demonstrated that an  explicit, exclusive ap- 
peal to text and history, combined with express repudiation of 
existing public opinion, is not invariably the best mode of con- 
stitutional interpretation. The Court's ultimate decisions tend 
to drag it into political controversy far more than its choice of 
interpretive techniques. 
A Scalian might retort that Justice Scalia never banished 
public opinion from the constitutional universe. One of the 
goals of objectifying the law is to separate law from politics, 
principle from policy. That distinction cannot be made without 
being aware of what is on the other side, namely, public opin- 
ion. Public opinion is something that takes place outside the 
courtroom. Sometimes it is to be feared and other times to be 
protected. 
357. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI.  L. REV. 
349 (1992); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C .  Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Defi- 
nition of Rights, 57 U .  CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). 
358. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432-51. 
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Justice Scalia, of course, does not completely keep public 
opinion out of the adjudicatory process. An "originalist," he con- 
sults text and history to determine what the populace thought 
when they ratified a particular part of the Constitution. Fur- 
thermore, Justice Scalia accepts more contemporary public 
opinion expressed through legislation, which transforms other- 
wise suspect opinion into constitutional tradition: "The public 
sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions 
may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objec- 
tive indicator of contemporary values upon which we can re- 
1y."559 
Justice Scalia has not only dismissed the long-standing 
judicial tradition of expressly incorporating public opinion into 
constitutional analysis in a variety of ways, but he also has 
created a model that is internally inconsistent. How can Justice 
Scalia ignore public opinion when he counts statutes and prac- 
tices to determine what is or is not a constitutionally protected 
"tradition"? Despite the myriad imperfections of our democratic 
system, statutes are reflections of dominant public opinion. Is 
not the "legislative mind" similar to the "public mind"? In 
Furman Justice Powell noted the powerfid link between legisla- 
tion and public opinion: "In a democracy the first indicator of 
the public's attitude must always be found in the legislative 
judgments of the people's chosen  representative^."^" 
Justice Scalia aspires to create an objective constitutional 
jurisprudence that precludes the Court from imposing any 
subjective values on the electorate. That goal is impossible 
because the subjective/objective distinction cannot resolve con- 
stitutional questions, which require inherently norma- 
tivelsubjective choices between competing conceptions of the 
Nevertheless, we need to determine the appropriate 
scope of judicial review. Few of us want the Court to become 
tooidios$cratic, too unaware of the rest of the country. Justice 
Scalia's "tradition" argument limits judicial discretion by link- 
ing it more closely with the views of the general public as ex- 
pressed through statutes. Tradition, thus, becomes a legitimate, 
but not an "objective," technique. But that interpretation forces 
the Court to weigh public opinion, not exclude it or give it de- 
terminate force. The questions are whose public opinion 
359. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). 
360. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 436-37 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
361. See H O R W ~ ,  TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at 139. 
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counts-the legislators', the commentators', andlor the average 
citizens'-and how much that opinion should count in a partic- 
ular case, not whether public opinion is relevant at all. 
Unlike many other methods of ascertaining public opinion, 
Justice Scalia's technique does not have many methodological 
problems. After all, he only consults constitutional text, histori- 
cal writings, and written statutes. But, he still has the problem 
of subjectively interpreting the objective statutory survey of the 
statutes in question. One can never be certain what the Court 
will do when it has completed its arithmetic. For example, the 
Court ignored the absence of statutory authority in Powell u. 
Alabama:62 requiring all the states to  provide free lawyers to  
indigent defendants facing the death penalty. In Coker u. Geor- 
gia,36s the Court struck down the death penalty for rape as 
disproportionate, partially because only a few states authorized 
the penalty. In 1981, the Court deferred to  a mixture of legisla- 
tive procedures regulating the termination of parental rights, 
although the majority of states were moving in the direction of 
providing counsel: "[Slignificantly, 33 States and the District of 
Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in 
termination cases. The Court's opinion today in no way implies 
that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opin- 
ion and now widely followed by the States are other than en- 
lightened and wise."3B4 Perhaps Justice Scalia is saying that 
the Court will only provide constitutional protection when all 
the legislatures have consistently protected a right. But under 
such a model, he has created an elaborate, unnecessary, con- 
fusing fiction. What plaintiff need bring a constitutional action 
if all the states already acknowledge that plaintiffs rights on 
other grounds? 
Justice Scalia has not consistently excluded public opinion 
from his formulation of constitutional doctrine. Dissenting in 
FWIPBS u. Dallas:" he wmte that the Supreme Court's ob- 
scenity standards, which protect erotic material, have "met 
with general public acceptance,"366 but the application of 
those standards has "most certainly not [been] approved."367 
362. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
363. 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
364. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (not re- 
quiring court-appointed counsel in termination of parental rights cases). 
365. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
366. Id. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
367. Id. 
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He pointed to continuing efforts to  combat "sexually oriented 
businesses" to prevent "the erosion of public morality" through 
techniques such as zoning ordinances.3ps Justice Scalia tried 
to  resolve this public reaction by allowing communities to pro- 
scribe businesses that distribute vast amounts of sexually ori- 
ented material as engaged in "the sordid business of pander- 
ing," even though those communities could not ban any single 
Whether his creative doctrine should have become 
constitutional law or not, Justice Scalia's methodology sits 
uneasily with his complaints in Casey about Justice Souter's 
use of public opinion. It is very dimcult, not to mention unde- 
sirable, to  exclude a valuable form of constitutional interpreta- 
tion from all decisions. 
Some of Justice Scalia's goals become less objectionable 
after removing the distracting adjective "objective." The Court 
needs to have a dual conception of constitutional power, sepa- 
rating the political from the legal, public opinion from legal 
rights. This Article has attempted to show that the two cate- 
gories have never been, and should not, be mutually exclusive. 
Some overlap is inevitable, even desirable. 
Eventually public opinion will have its way,370 expressly 
amending the Constitution or forcing the Court to respond to  
the "felt necessities of the ti~ne[s]."~'~ The most obvious exam- 
ple was the repudiation of economic substantive due process 
during the Depression. In 1992, a large segment of the public 
validated the right of privacy as applied to abortion when it 
overwhelmingly voted for the two pro-choice candidates, 
Clinton and P e r ~ t . ~ ~ ~  That election helps explain how judicial 
368. Id. at 251-52. 
369. Id. at 260. In formulating this standard, Justice Scalia quoted a prior 
statement by Justice Stevens on the limits of principle: 'We learned long ago that 
broad statements of principle, no matter how correct in context they are made, are 
sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute limit of the stated 
principle is reached." American Mini Theaters v. Young, 427 U.S. 50, 65 (1976), 
quoted in FWIPBS, 493 US. at 263. 
370. Robert Goldwin observed that "public opinion and popular taste rule, ulti- 
mately, on everything." Robert A. Goldwin, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Mo- 
rality in the Constitution, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
15 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 2d ed. 1979). 
371. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) 
(188 1). 
372. Some political scientists have concluded that the abortion controversy 
played a major role in the 1992 presidential election. David S. Broder, Lasting Ef- 
fects of Perot, Religious Right Debated; Each Likely to Remain a Force, Scholars 
Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at A6. In a famous passage, Ely applied modem 
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review in general, and the doctrine of substantive due process 
in particular, can legitimately exist in our form of democratic 
government. To paraphrase Tocqueville, the people have con- 
tinued to permit the Court to engage in substantive due pro- 
cess review.373 Former Judge Bork learned the price of defy- 
ing public opinion when he argued that the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment did not outlaw sex discrimination because that issue was 
not on the Framers' minds. The seating on the Supreme Court 
of Justice Ginsburg, a leading early advocate of gender equali- 
ty, confirms the public's power to participate in the perpetual 
reinterpretation of the Constitution. 
D. A Matter of Principles 
One way to narrow most of the cases discussed above is to 
assert that the Court has usually considered public opinion as 
something outside the courtroom. The Court has seen public 
opinion as a threat in many criminal cases, something to be 
protected. in First Amendment cases, or an independent ad- 
judicator of some structural issues. The acutely controversial 
problem is whether or not the Court should sometimes let pub- 
lic opinion "inside" its doctrine, allowing public opinion to  influ- 
ence directly the types of constitutional rights and powers that 
the Court has traditionally determined. In other words, should 
public opinion help shape the contours of fundamental rights 
andlor compelling state interests? The Court has consulted 
public opinion to expand the definition of "cruel and unusual 
punishments"; can the Court also use public opinion to limit 
the scope of constitutional rights and principles? To begin to 
answer those questions, we need to consider the relationship 
between politics and principles. 
Many legal scholars have criticized Herbert Wechsler's fa- 
mous article on "neutral  principle^,"^^ both as a general idea 
political philosophy to constitutional adjudication: 'We like Rawls, you like Nozick. 
We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated." ELY, supra note 9, at 58. Ely will not be much 
more pleased with a crude reduction of this Article's argument: "Anti-abortionist 
President Bush won only 37% of the popular vote in 1992 against two pro-choice 
candidates. We win, 5-4. Roe affirmed. Statute upheld under undue burden test." 
For discussions of the Court's relationship to electoral politics, see David 
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS. L. 
REV. 790; Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 795 (1975). 
373. TOCQUEVIUE, supra note '**, at 100. 
374. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
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and as applied to criticize Brown v. Board of E d u ~ a t i o n ? ~ ~  
There were both substantive and methodological problems. 
How and why should the Court limit itself to "neutral" princi- 
ples, and how the Court could determine which principles are 
"neutral"? In short, who knows what the adjective "neutral" 
means?376 
The word "principle" presents a related set of prob- 
l e m ~ . ~ ~ ~  Are "principles" anything more than "values," dressed 
up in academically and legally acceptable language, that courts 
ought to take seriously, applying them consistently until they 
collide with other principles?378 Such a query has its own tra- 
dition. In  1882, Jevons wrote in the context of legislation: "It is 
futile to attempt to uphold in regard to social legislation any 
theory of eternal fixed principles or abstract  right^."^" Yet, a 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 I m .  L.J. 1 (1971). 
375. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
376. See H o R ~ ,  TRANSFORMATION 1870-1960, supra note 44, at  170; Jan G. 
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between 
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Cass R. Sunstein, Neu- 
trality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and 
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
377. Such doubts have a tradition: "Radical neo-realism seems to deny that 
there are rules or principles or conceptions or doctrines at all." Roscoe Pound, The 
Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 707 (1931). Although some 
thought he overreacted, Pound's complaint had substance: 
Some Progressive critics (who came to include the 'Legal Realists' of the 
1920's and 30's) delighted not only in showing the class bias of Liberal le- 
galism~, but in exploding its aspirations to technical coherence: The fa- 
mous 'principles' were exposed as empty formulae that could lead by 
logical manipulation, to totally contradictory results. 
PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 362 (3d ed. 1992). fiofessor Brest never- 
theless has proposed a different set of principles as essential parts of the judicial 
function: 4W)here the very authority of the judiciary is based on its ability to 
expound and apply general principles, it cannot a d  on such an ad hoc basis [as a 
school board]." Paul Brest, Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 47 (1976); see also Ronald 
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992) (arguing that the distinction between enumerated and 
unenumerated rights is "bogus"). Morton Horwitz noted that the search for "un- 
derlying universal principles" is a relatively new one, "virtually unknown" to the 
common law for over the previous 500 years. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION 1870- 
1960, supra note 44, at 201. 
378. "The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, 
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it al- 
ways retains old ones from history at the other . . . ." HOLMES, supm note 371, at  
32. 
379. W. STANELY JEVONS, THE STATE w RELATION TO LABOUR 16 (3d ed. 
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powerful tradition exists that perceives the Court as principled. 
Alexander Bickel characterized the Court as  an institution 
dedicated to principle.380 Justice Powell wrote: "Congress is 
not a n  adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific dis- 
putes between competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is 
to be representative rather than impartial, to make policy rath- 
er than to apply settled principles of law."381 
The word "principle" loses some of its import because it 
often is used simply as another word for "doctrine." Even 
Langdell did not make a clear distinction: "Law, considered as 
a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines."382 The 
Supreme Court has often equated "principle" with modifiable 
doctrine.383 
How can public opinion coexist with legal principles inside 
constitutional doctrine? The short answer may be that some 
fundamental rights are more fundamental than others. The 
Court has always created an hierarchy of rights, determining 
which interests are "f~ndamental."~" There is, and ought to 
be, a small set of "core" fundamental rights that the Court 
should isolate from public opinion, particularly majori- 
1894), quoted in DICEY, supra note 43, at  446. Dicey extended Jevon's analysis 
beyond social legislation to judicial decision-making. More recently, Mark Tushnet 
has criticized neutral principles because they are open to  substantial manipulation. 
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 46-47 (1988); see also Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
380. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
Even Bickel concedes that the word "principle" is ambiguous, partially aspirational. 
Id. a t  199-200; see also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 469 (1981). 
381. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(upholding minority set-asides for federal construction contracts). Chief Justice 
Warren wrote: "[P]articularly in the Supreme Court, the basic ingredient of decision 
is principle, and it should not be compromised and parceled out." EARL WARREN, 
THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 6 (1977); see also Hany T. Edwards, The Judicial 
Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837 
(arguing that "result-oriented" decision-making is unprincipled). 
382. C.C. LANGDEU, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS v i  
(187 1). 
383. For a judicial example, see the Supreme Court's claim in Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co. v. United States that i t  complied with E.C. Knight's "principle" that 
the manufacturing of sugar was not interstate commerce, even though the 
Addyston Court held that manufacturing steel pipes was interstate commerce. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 246-48 (1899) (distin- 
guishing United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)). 
384. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
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tynegislative opinion. The Court, for instance, should be partic- 
ularly anti-majoritarian when formulating First Amendment 
rights.385 The Court needs to protect both minority viewpoints 
and the processes that lead to informed public opinion from 
suppression by passionate public opinion, be it in the form of 
an  elected official, an  agency, a statutory act, or an  angry mob. 
We will, of course, disagree over which rights are "core" rights. 
There are, however, a few such "core" rights that most of us be- 
lieve are non-negotiable: the right to free speech, the right to a 
basically equal vote in state elections, and the right not to be 
expressly, maliciously discriminated against on the basis of 
race, gender, ethnicity, or religion. In those situations, the 
Court should prefer formal rules, elevating those "principles" 
over politics. Most other issues are murkier, more contextual, 
more amenable to compromise. In other words, we can use the 
word "principle" so long as we don't take it too seriously. 
Constitutional law, like all law, frequently involves the 
allocation of inevitable suffering. The Court creates formalistic 
doctrine that accepts ongoing injury, whether that injury be 
Jerry Falwell's anguish a t  seeing his mother's reputation 
dragged through the mud,sg6 or black contractors having to 
contend against societal racial discrimination after City of 
Richmond u. JA.  Croson CO.~" When determining which par- 
ty should bear the burden, the Court must sift among several 
modes of argument that do not always favor one side over an- 
other: text, history, precedent, tradition, policy, morality, and 
structure. Public opinion simply is another variable. Sometimes 
the Court should consider public opinion to be irrelevant or 
even threatening; but, at other times, the Court ought to tailor 
its decisions to the country's prevailing mood. 
The task will not be easy. There are institutional and 
methodological difficulties in  determining any form of public 
opinion. Justices do not face the electorate or have frequent 
385. Skepticism can coexist with a hierarchy of principles: "To have doubted 
one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man." Oliver W. Holmes, Ideals 
and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915). The trick is not to confuse operating prin- 
ciples that one pretends are absolute with the notion of immutable absolutes. See, 
e.g., GORE VIDAL, Novelists and Critics of the 19#s, in UNITED STATES: ESSAYS 
1952-1992, at 12-13 (1993) (discussing the lack of absolutes in literary criticism). In 
other words relativism and existentialism need not lead to nihilism. 
386. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (First Amendment pro- 
tects offensive parody of public figure). 
387. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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contacts with lobbyists. Polls are unreliable and fickle, while 
intuitive assessments of public opinion often are little more 
than projections of the Justice's personal beliefs. One of the 
Court's more awkward moments arose when it seemed to re- 
solve a sex discrimination case on the assumed passage of the 
Equal Rights Amendment.388 Assuming the Court will consid- 
er public opinion in a particular case, the Court next has the 
difficult task of choosing between the many forms of public 
opinion.389 Even if the Court can determine when and what 
public opinion is relevant, it then must decide how much 
weight that particular kind of public opinion should receive. 
For instance, Justice Souter's approach forces him to determine 
when a watershed decision has been accepted, merely disputed, 
or so rejected by such a substantial majority that it should be 
overruled. 
Because all of us have different rankings of constitutional 
norms, the best way for me to demonstrate the influence of 
public opinion on constitutional analysis is to discuss several 
cases in which the courts made "unprincipled" compromises 
that I initially disagreed with. The tests of time and public 
opinion however, have given those decisions more ~alidity.~" 
Affirmative action recently has been one of the country's 
more divisive issues. Both factions have powerN arguments. 
Opponents favor the "color blind" Constitution over proponents' 
388. "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are in- 
herently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not 
without significance to the question presently under consideration." Frontier0 v. 
Richardson, 411 US. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (army must provide 
same benefits to men and women). 
389. This Article demonstrates that many definitions of public opinion have 
permeated constitutional theory and doctrine. Theorists and judges have used Zeit- 
geist, reputation, honor, approbation, elite public opinion, public opinion of the 
masses, reasoned public opinion, passionate public opinion, mob, views of partisans, 
perspective of the body politic, enlightened, lawyers, reflective and informed reac- 
tions, judgment of history, world opinion, views of the Framers, views of the popu- 
lace at  the time of any constitutional ratification, prevailing views, statutory law, 
tradition, a threat to liberty, and a guarantor of liberty. 
390. I have long believed that the Supreme Court should interpret the Consti- 
tution to do more for the poor. See James Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
391 (1990). However, no powerhl faction is clamoring for such a jurisprudence. 
Public domestic discourse presently swirls around race and sex more than class. 
Perhaps the Court is wise in leaving to the elected branches the resolution of the 
systematic abuse and neglect of poor young children during the late twentieth 
century. But such wisdom is paltry, providing no honor either to the Court or to 
the people i t  serves. 
1130 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
pleas for equal opportunity and just compensation for past 
injustices.391 Many people criticized Justice Powell's control- 
ling, solo opinion in Bakke392 for prohibiting racial quotas 
while holding that universities could consider race as a factor 
to achieve "diversity." In  his concurrence, Justice Breman 
chided Justice Powell for allowing universities to reach the 
same end of more minorities in the classroom under the rubric 
of "diversity" instead of "social discrimination," but only 
through less candid means of factors instead of quotas. In  the 
1990s, Justice Scalia has sought to eliminate all affirmative 
action except "where . . . [it] is necessary [for the states] to 
eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial 
classifi~ation."~~~ As a matter of principle, both Justice 
Brennan and Justice Scalia offer more coherent doctrine. Ei- 
ther the Court should find virtually all affirmative action plans 
to be unconstitutional, or it should generally defer to the 
maj oritarian process. 
What is the practical difference between a quota and mak- 
i ng  race a factor? Just ice  Powell seems to have 
constitutionalized hypocrisy in Bakke. Yet, Justice Powell's 
opinion has withstood the test of time, within the Court and in 
the court of public opinion. Both political sides currently use 
Justice Powell's rhetoric. Affirmative action critics attack "quo- 
tas," while advocates praise "diversity." Justice Powell's awk- 
ward compromise better reflects the country's ambivalence 
about the issue than Justices Breman's and Scalia's purer 
conceptions of constitutional rights. Affirmative action was 
bound to strain the country's political and social fabric. Justice 
Powell's compromise has allowed a diluted form of affirmative 
action to exist for almost twenty years, providing many educa- 
tional opportunities for minorities without alienating the rest 
of America from the Court. Critical Legal scholars like Roberto 
Unger might see Justice Powell's decision as proof of antimo- 
nies that reduce liberalism to incoherence and contradic- 
t i ~ n . ~ "  I see his opinion as a prime example of liberalism's 
capacity to compromise. 
391. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1991). 
392. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
393. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
394. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AM) POLITICS (1975). 
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In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court refused to  extend busing 
from the inner cities into the suburbs.395 Milliken undercut 
Brown v. Board of Education's commitments to equal opportu- 
nity, equal education, and reduction of psychological injury to 
black children.3g6 The constitutional text does not distinguish, 
as the Court did, between states and local governments formed 
by the states. As a matter of policy, inner-city busing increased 
middle-class flight.397 Doctrinally, the Court easily could have 
extended desegregation into the suburbs. The Court previously 
had found that violations within a school district tainted the 
entire district,SgS but it refused in Milliken to  find that simi- 
lar violations could cross municipal boundaries within the same 
urban community. 
The conservatives' claim in Milliken that the State was not 
responsible for city boundaries is inaccurate because municipal- 
ities are creatures of the state. The conservatives themselves 
quickly jettisoned that argument when it no longer suited 
them. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 ,  Justice 
Powell, who was part of the Milliken majority, wrote, "The 
Constitution does not dictate to the States a particular division 
of authority. . . between state and local governing bodies."399 
In other words, the state has ultimate responsibility for all 
education decisions. It would seem that proof of intentional 
discrimination in one part of the state's system, Detroit, should 
spill over to  the rest of the state's system, the suburbs, just as 
proof of segregation in part of a school district polluted the 
entire district in Keyes. More realistically, it is commonly be- 
lieved that many people fled to  the suburbs to  isolate them- 
selves from blacks and the poor. The legal fictions of "intent" 
and local boundaries prevailed over the inner-city 
schoolchildren's need for a quality, equal education, cleansed of 
state-facilitated racism. The Court completed its defense of the 
suburbs by protecting them from racial housing integration in 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop - 
ment C ~ r p . ~ "  and from equal school subsidies in San Antonio 
395. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
396. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); see Sonia R. 
Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285 (1992). 
397. See generally J. ANTHONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985). 
398. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
399. 458 U.S. 457, 492-93 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The liberals, of 
course, also flip-flopped. The state-local distinction was irrelevant in Milliken but 
became crucial in Washington. 
400. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that respondents failed to show racially dis- 
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Independent School District u. Rodrigue~.~~'  Overall, the con- 
servatives reflected the powerful suburban wish to be isolated 
from the anguish of the inner city. 
In terms of precedent, immediate policy, morality, princi- 
ple, and even text;O2 I believe the Court grossly erred in cas- 
es like Milliken. On the other hand, the best justification for 
Milliken is the mood of the predominantly white suburbs, 
which expressed their views a t  the time of Milliken by electing 
Richard Nixon to the Presidency. If the Court had tried to 
integrate the suburbs by itself, a powerful part of the citizenry 
would have become enraged. At the very least, many suburban- 
ites would have pulled their children out of the suburban pub- 
lic schools, undercutting the goals and benefits of racial and 
economic integration. Legislatures would engage in  a variety of 
subterfuges, entangling the federal courts in ugly, perpetual 
conflicts.403 We want constitutional law to reflect and sappeal 
to our better sides, but the Court is also committed to maintain 
social stability and harmony. It must balance moral aspirations 
against societal constraints. It must practice realpolitik, trying 
to determine how particular groups will react to its decisions. 
Political reality, a major policy variable, may justify an other- 
wise unjustifiable decision.404 
Although I express these depressing arguments reluctant- 
ly, there is a slight glimmer of hope within them. Perhaps one 
day the country will be more willing to share its pains and 
benefits, giving the Court the leeway to mandate a more egali- 
tarian, racially just, educational system that provides equal 
opportunity to all. The Court could start with more equal fund- 
ing, not more disruptive, counterproductive busing. Recent 
state court efforts to require equal funding for all public schools 
may provide some answers. However, based upon the 1993 
criminatory intent in challenged rezoning decision). 
401. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Milliken might have been less damaging if the Court 
had decided Rodriguez the other way. The dual system Rodriguez tolerated has 
been fiercely criticized. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 214-19 (1991). 
402. As has been written many other places, the text of "equal protection" is 
open to many meanings. For example, Ronald Dworkin distinguished between the 
Framers' particular conception of a text and the text's broader "concept." RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1977). 
403. For a recent example of adverse public reaction, see Sam H. Verhovek, 
Texans Reject Sharing School Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at  A12. 
404. This Article provides a way to distinguish and limit opinions like 
Milliken, a way to overcome them as precedent, while also giving them more 
short-term legitimacy. 
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Texas vote not to equalize school funding, there is little reason 
for short-term optimism.405 
Public opinion analysis reminds us of the intimate relation- 
ship between rights and remedies. The Court may be unwilling, 
or unable, to fully protect a "right" because any meaningful 
remedy would be ineffective, even counterproductive. The right, 
abstractly expressed, might not seem too controversial until the 
Court considers the range of viable remedies. Few will argue in  
the abstract against "equal educational opportunity." But, 
equalizing public school payments could lead to more rich and 
middle-class flight out of the entire public school system, there- 
by increasing electoral opposition to increased funding of any 
public schools. Like it or not, the Court has sacrificed Brown's 
broadest aspirations of equal, non-injurious education for 
African-Americans to the suburban public opinion. Only the 
"core" right of not being forced by the state to attend racially 
segregated public schools remains untouched. 
While it is easy to criticize such opinions, liberals should 
be aware of the political costs of constitutionalizing their entire 
political agenda. Conservatives can develop a broader political 
coalition, combining social/religious conservatives, who are 
particularly irked by decisions like Roe u. wade406 and those 
banning prayers in schools~'' with libertarians and free mar- 
keteers, who know their social rights will not be affected so 
long as the Court does not become too conservative or deferen- 
tial. Although there seems little doubt that the American econ- 
omy was the determinative factorF8 William Jefferson 
Clinton might not have become President if the Court had not 
decided against homosexuals409 in Bowers u. Hardwick:'' 
405. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (striking down school financing legislation as 
imposing unconstitutional ad valorem tax); see also Allen W. Hubsch, Education 
and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 
J.L. & E ~ u c .  93 (1989). But see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (strik- 
ing down finance provision of state education act for insufficient provision for poor- 
er school districts). 
406. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
407. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
408. But see Charles R. Morris, "It's Not the Economy, Stupid," ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, July 1993, at  49 (arguing that it is unrealistic to expect the President 
to have much influence over the economy). 
409. See generally Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 1992 (Magazine), at  18 (discussing the rising power of the gay electorate). 
410. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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threatened abortion rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Seruicesfl and gagged doctors in Rust u. S u l l i ~ a n ? ~  Many 
wealthy homosexuals and corporate feminists prefer the eco- 
nomic policies of the Republicans and the social politics of the 
Democrats. In the crucial electoral state of California, homosex- 
uals make up an important part of the voting ele~torate .~ '~ A 
liberal, activist Supreme Court, with a firm majority, allows 
such swing voters to have it both ways. In other words, the 
Brennan-Marshall constitutional jurisprudence certainly made 
political sense to many, including this author. But if those two 
Justices had succeeded, they might have created a formidable 
conservative coalition that would dominate the country today. 
One of the ironies of the modern American system is that one 
of the political conservatives' best friends is an activist, liberal 
The primary question this Article has sought to answer is 
the role of public opinion in constitutional adjudications, theo- 
ries, and controversies. This Article concludes that Justice 
Souter's Casey opinion is somewhat more consistent with Amer- 
ican constitutional tradition than the views of Justice Scalia 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, whose interpretive techniques 
echo Chief Justice Taney and Justice Sutherland in completely 
refusing to consider contemporary public opinion. I t  should not 
be very surprising that the Court has paid so much attention to 
public opinion over the years; our democratic system is pre- 
mised upon popular sovereignty and public participation. 
This Article has not offered any easy method, any 
three-prong test, to determine which definitions of public opin- 
ion should be admitted into constitutional adjudication and 
how much weight those definitions should be given. The Article 
only argues that public opinion does and should enter the 
multi-factored, balancing equation that is also known as consti- 
tutional law. I am certainly not recommending that the Court 
jettison all precedent and "principle," consulting only Gallup 
411. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
412. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
413. See Schmalz, supra note 409. 
414. It is possible that there is some deep structure within the Constitution 
that tends to drive political issues back to the center, towards a political equilibri- 
um. 
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polls. The Court must decide which "core" rights are largely 
immunized from public will. Public opinion, however defined, 
can lead to deadly outcomes.415 
The Supreme Court is caught in a dilemma when engaging 
in crowd control.416 If the Court refuses to consider public 
opinion, it can quickly generate opinions like Dred Scott, 
Lochner and even Roe v. wade?' Even the two Brown deci- 
sions, which refused to let racist regional sentiment determine 
fundamental constitutional rights, compromised with those 
sentiments by implementing desegregation at "all deliberate 
speed."418 Many of us do not want anyone to push their prin- 
ciples to logical extremes, ignoring external realities. More gen- 
erally, it is doubtful that there are any absolute rights or abso- 
lute powers.41g Yet, if the Court frequently includes elaborate 
assessments of the public mood in its opinions, the law becomes 
ever more indeterminate, a potentially thin shield against ma- 
jority tyranny. 
Part of the answer to this Polonius-like waffling lies in  
rhetoric. The Court writes opinions in part to convince the rest 
of us of the correctness of its decision.420 There are many rea- 
415. Gore Vidal recalled "in 1935 when the Nazis solemnly determined that 
anything is punishable if it was deserving of punishment according 'to the hnda- 
mental conceptions of penal law and sound popular feeling.' " Gore Vidal, Sex and 
the Law, in UNITED STATES: ESSAYS 1952-1992, at  530 (1993). Vidal also recounts 
"In response to public opinion, the Emperor Justinian made homosexuality a crimi- 
nal offense of the grounds that buggery, as everyone knew, was the chief cause of 
earthquakes." Id. at 531. This leads him to conclude: "At any given moment, public 
opinion is a chaos of superstition, mis-information, and prejudice. Even if one could 
accurately interpret it, would that be a reason for basing the law upon a consen- 
sus?" Id. at  536. 
416. For those of us who work in offices and work with words, preferring 
briefs to bombs, "public opinion" is frequently a polite metaphor for the mob: never 
completely knowable, always unpredictable, and potentially dangerous. "Public opin- 
ion" is the Other, the crowd that we lawyers try to control. 
417. One of the risks of the plastic doctrine of substantive due process, wheth- 
er practiced by the Lochner Court or the Roe Court, is that the Court can be 
tempted by early successes to miscalculate. For example, public acceptance of 
Griswold's protection of contraception among married couples led the Court to 
believe the Country was also indifferent about abortion. The subsequent fury over 
Roe may help explain why the Court was later unwilling to protect homosexuals in 
Bowers. 
418. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown IT). 
419. T o r  one thing, no principles of law, or of anything else, can be guaran- 
teed good past the next revolution." GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 68 
(1974). 
420. "On every case which lawfully invokes the action of these powers, this 
Court, I trust, will not hesitate to exert it, that it will, by so doing, 'plant' itself in 
public opinion and confidence, on an 'impregnable position.' " Holmes v. Jennison, 
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sons why a Justice will reach a particular decision, but some 
are not rhetorically acceptable. Justice Blackmun may have 
reached his decision in Roe partially because he had been gen- 
eral counsel for the Mayo Clinic. Justice Scalia's hostility to 
Roe may reflect his Catholicism. Justice Kennedy allegedly 
changed his mind in Casey because of letters from a pro-choice 
nun.421 The Justices need not always put such "reasons" into 
opinions.422 The Court has a duty to tell the truth about the 
reasons it chooses, but it need not tell the whole truth.423 The 
Court must present arguments that the public will accept, 
reasons that almost certainly will change over the decades. 
Justice Souter's remarkable degree of candor should be seen as 
an exception to the rules of constitutional dscourse. 
Ironically, the American people seem to prefer a Court that 
does not expressly ground its opinions on public opinion, a t  
least most of the time. The public wants its Constitution and 
Court to be both predictable and largely immune from momen- 
tary public passions. However, the public expects its Constitu- 
tion to respond to hndamental shifts in cultural consciousness. 
Consequently, the Court needs to be aware of the public mood 
but should not try to calibrate its opinions too finely. The Court 
takes a longer-term view of the political process, sometimes 
forcing the majority to develop a supermajority through the 
amendment process to overrule judicial decision or at least to 
develop a political coalition that can eventually transform the 
Court through presidential appointments. The additional time 
and energy needed to accomplish such goals may generate 
enough reflection to prevent the creation of odious constitution- 
al text or doctrine.422 
Whether American lawyers like it or not, we live in a cul- 
ture that is saturated by many forms of public opinion.425 The 
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 632-33 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (appendix 11). 
421. David G. Savage, The Court's Rescue of Roe vs. Wade, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 1992, a t  Al, A22. 
422. It is both hard and undesirable to weed all doctrinal formalism out of 
constitutional - adjudication. See Wilson, supra note 306. 
423. But see David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV.  L. 
REV. 731 (1987). 
424. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895) (in- 
validating federal tax on real and personal property as unconstitutional unappor- 
tioned direct tax). 
425. The role of public opinion helps answer Professor Bobbit's argument that 
constitutional judging can be reduced to judicial "conscience," PHnIP BOBBIT, CON- 
~I'I'~JTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991), and Professor Tushnet's emphasis on charac- 
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public will eventually repudiate or constrain unpopular judicial 
developments. Examples range from Lochner's substantive due 
process, to Justices Brennan's and Marshall's attempts to 
constitutionalize liberal social policy, to  anger by doctors, femi- 
nists, and libertarians over the Rehnquist Court's unwilling- 
ness to  protect abortion rights by permitting the federal gov- 
ernment to "gag" abortion speech in federally funded clinics in 
Rust v. Sullivan.426 
Denial is not the answer. Better to  admit that constitution- 
al adjudication is a difficult process that involves both compro- 
mise and guesswork. The Court needs to  decide which issues, if 
any, should be influenced by public opinion. It then needs to 
define which "public opinion" it is considering, to determine 
what that public believes, to establish the weight to be given 
such opinion, and to conclude whether it should expressly dis- 
cuss public opinion at all. Adding these questions to  all the 
other factors the Court must consider demonstrates the com- 
plex process that lies behind the phrase "constitutional inter- 
pretation." 
All of which brings us full circle to  Justice Souter's Casey 
opinion. Using a balancing approach, the "undue burden" test, 
he closely analyzed Pennsylvania's statutory constraints on 
abortion rights, upholding an informed consent provision427 
but striking down a spousal notification ~ection.~'' Such com- 
promises will not satisfy those who believe that a woman's 
autonomy or bodily integrity generates an absolute right to 
abortion.429 Abortion opponents will be even more distraught 
ter, Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. 
L. REV. 747 (1992). Admittedly, character and conscience are very important: "The 
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high com- 
petence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique 
upon its work." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). But 
public opinion constrains the choice of judicial arguments and judicial outcomes. 
Judges who stray face reversals if they sit on lower courts, derision on and off the 
bench, declining influence over hture cases caused by lack of respect and coopera- 
tion, and even impeachment in extreme situations. 
426. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). One of President Clinton's first decisions was to 
eliminate the regulation establishing the gag rule. Robin Toner, Clinton Orders 
Reversal of Abortion Restrictions Left by Reagan and Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
1993, 5 1, at 1. 
427. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824-26. The joint opinion also upheld a record-keep- 
ing requirement. Id. at 2832-33. 
428. Id. at 2826-31. 
429. Casey states: "Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not sug- 
gested that there is a constitutional right to abortion on demand." Id. at 2826. 
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because the states must permit most abortions. Legal purists 
can condemn the decision for being "unprincipled," arguing that 
either the woman has the right or the state has the power. But 
just as Justice Powell forged a doctrine that satisfied, a t  least 
for a while, much of the country in Bakke, so Justice Souter 
may have created a solution that will defuse the abortion con- 
troversy. If so, his opinion will have been, a t  least for some of 
us7 a triumph. 
